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The Australian national flag is the primary symbol of the nation. The flag produces and 
reproduces national identity through its presence in all spheres of the public domain. 
This thesis is an examination into the national flag’s representational force. It focuses 
on how the flag makes meaning in accordance with dominant discourses of nation and 
nationhood through an analysis of its uses and applications across a range of 
institutional sites. The thesis also takes into consideration the meaning-making 
potential of the national flag for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. This work 
deploys a wide-range of historical and contemporary sources that include art and 
literary responses to the flag. The thesis also draws on a range of theoretical works on 
nation alongside the use of vexillology as a focused study of flags. A critique of the 
messages and meanings that the Australian national flag transmits raises important 
questions pertaining to the way the nation is constructed and maintained. While the 
thesis does not proffer a definitive solution to the many complexities surrounding 
Australian national identity, it offers the opportunity for further study as debates about 
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CHAPTER ONE: Raise the National Standard 
This land was never given up                                                                                                 
This land was never bought or sold                                                                                         
The planting of the union jack                                                                                              
Never changed our law at all.1 
       (Yothu Yindi with Peter Garret & Paul Kelly 1992).  
 
Introduction 
The above lyrics are from Treaty, a song composed in 1990 by Yothu Yindi in 
collaboration with musicians Peter Garrett and Paul Kelly (Corn 2009). These words reject the 
colonial authority of the British flag and demonstrate that Aboriginal people remain the 
sovereign owners of land that was never ceded or sold. The words of Treaty affirm that despite 
British colonisation, Aboriginal law has survived. Treaty was written in response to a broken 
promise by the Australian Government. The words of Treaty provide a fitting epigraph for this 
thesis; they categorically refute the signification of the Union Jack and Britain’s claim of 
sovereignty over Australia. In 1988, as the white nation celebrated two hundred years of British 
colonisation, Indigenous people publicly called for a treaty. In June 1988, then Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke attended the Barunga Festival in the Northern Territory where he was presented 
with a petition. The “Barunga Statement” as it became known, called for a treaty, land rights, 
self-determination, an end to discrimination, and the protection of Indigenous human rights. At 
the Barunga Festival Hawke promised, “[T]here shall be a treaty negotiated between the 
Aboriginal people and the Government on behalf of all the people of Australia” (qtd. in 
Brennan et al. 2005: 16). Hawke’s commitment to a treaty 30 years ago did not eventuate. The 
                                                 
1 Lead singer of Yothu Yindi, Dr Mandawuy Yunupingu notes “[T]he intention of this song was to raise public 
awareness about this [the promise of a Treaty by 1990] so that the government would be encouraged hold to his 
promise. The song became a number-one hit, the first ever to be sung in a Yolngu language, and caught the public's 
imagination. Though it borrows from rock 'n' roll, the whole structure of “Treaty” is driven by the beat of the 
djatpangarri that I've incorporated in it. It was an old recording of this historic djatpangarri that triggered the song's 
composition. The man who originally created it was my gurru (maternal great-grandmother's husband) and he 
passed away a long time ago in 1978. He was a real master of the djatpangarri style” (qtd. in Special Broadcasting 
Service [SBS] 2013).  
2 
 
Barunga Statement was later gifted to Parliament House in Canberra and is on permanent 
display as part of the parliamentary art collection. A public emblem of a broken promise.  
This thesis is an inquiry into the socio-cultural effects and symbolism associated with 
the Australian national flag. The work will examine this primary symbol of national identity 
from a range of standpoints, and in particular, it will engage with Indigenous perspectives.2 In 
order to explore the bodies of knowledge which have emerged surrounding flag and nation, I 
draw from a diverse range of texts and contexts, from books, journal articles, theses, scholarly 
works and media reports that relate to the Australian nation and its flag, as well as the flag’s 
uses and applications in public and private domains. Indigenous sources are used whenever 
possible; not only as a means to challenge Western epistemology, but also as a way to garner 
knowledge, to provide a ‘balanced’ body of work and thus develop a greater understanding of 
the responses elicited by the Australian national flag. 
The thesis embarks on this analysis with a view to critically evaluating the Australian 
flag, its origins, functional contexts, and its meaning-making potential, with an emphasis on 
the ways in which the nation’s most prominent symbol works to discursively produce and 
reproduce national identity. My questions are: how does the Australian national flag signify 
the nation given the placement of its colonial insignia, the Union Jack, in the flag’s upper left 
corner, and what are the effects of this signification on both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people? In other words, what kind of nationalism is being created and maintained by the 
Australian flag and how is this nationalism received and understood by Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people in light of over two hundred years of colonisation marked by a continued 
lack of treaty/ies or constitutional inclusion?  
                                                 
2 For this thesis I use the terms Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people or Indigenous people unless 
specifically writing about Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people.    
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My research comes at a timely opportunity to contribute to discussions in the public 
domain which surround national identity and its associated symbols. Currently there are four 
former British colonies which retain the Union Jack on their national flag: Tuvalu, Fiji, New 
Zealand, and Australia. Both Fiji and New Zealand have recently reviewed the designs of their 
flags which, like Australia, feature the Union Jack in the top left hand corner. In 2014 former 
New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, announced that New Zealanders would have the 
opportunity to change their national flag by a referendum. Key declared that the current 
national flag, “remains dominated by the Union Jack in a way that we ourselves are no longer 
dominated by the United Kingdom” and he urged New Zealanders to “take one more step in 
the evolution of modern New Zealand by acknowledging our independence through a new 
flag” (qtd. in Chapman 2014).  
To begin the process of changing the flag a panel of twelve leaders from a variety of 
backgrounds was selected to represent a cross section of the New Zealand public. New 
Zealanders were then asked to identify core values they considered to be important. The top 
five values noted were freedom, history, equality, respect, and family. The public was then 
invited to submit and share alternative flag designs. Some 10,292 were received. From these 
the three most popular symbols were identified as the Southern Cross, Fern and Koru.3 The 
favourite five colours nominated were white, blue, red, black and green respectively. With 
these values, symbols and colours in mind the Flag Consideration Panel selected 40 flags to 
create an official long list.4  
The panel then spent ten weeks in consultation with the New Zealand public and in 
September 2015 a shortlist of five flags was announced. A subsequent binding postal 
                                                 
3 The silver tree fern is found throughout New Zealand and is a widely recognised national symbol. The koru is 
an unfurling frond of the New Zealand silver fern. In Maori culture this is a significant symbol in that it represents 
new life, strength and perpetual growth. 
4 This information was presented by Malcolm Mulholland, member of the New Zealand Flag Consideration Panel 
at the 26th International Congress of Vexillology (ICV 26), 31 August 2015.  
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referendum resulted in the Silver Fern flag being selected by the public as the official preferred 
alternative flag. In March 2016 New Zealanders voted in a second referendum to decide 
whether to keep their current national flag or endorse the preferred alternative. New Zealanders 
voted against changing their flag. 56.6 per cent of the 2.2 million voters chose to keep the 
current national flag. New Zealand’s process of selecting a flag by referenda stood in contrast 
to Fiji, where the decision rested with the government.  
In 2013, as part of its national renewal process, Fiji issued a new currency. The image 
of British Queen Elizabeth II had featured on Fiji’s currency since 1969 and was replaced with 
Fijian flora and fauna. Fiji’s interim Prime Minister, Frank Bainimarama, also announced that 
Fiji would change its flag. These measures were taken, “to reinforce a new Fijian identity and 
a new confidence in being Fijian on the global stage” (qtd. in Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation [ABC] News: 2013a). Bainimarama stated that the Union Jack on Fiji’s flag refers 
to a respected past but it has no place in the country’s evolution as a modern nation, “Fiji’s new 
flag should reflect its position in the world today, as a modern and truly independent nation-
state” (qtd. in ABC News: 2015). At the 2016 Rio Olympic Games, Fiji won its first Olympic 
gold medal. Prime Minister Bainimarama was moved “to witness the way Fijians have rallied 
around the national flag as our Rugby Sevens team brought home Olympic gold for Fiji …” 
(qtd. in Ewart 2016). As a result the Fijian Government voted against changing the flag.  
In Australia in 2010, a Morgan Gallup Poll found that 69% of 652 respondents aged 
over 14 answered ‘yes’ to the following question: “[S]hould the Union Jack remain in the 
Australian flag?”. This figure was up 16% from a previous 1998 poll and according to the 
findings was at its highest since 1982 (Morgan 2010). These results indicate an ongoing 
attachment for the Union Jack which in turn suggests that the Union Jack has a significant 
bearing on Australia’s current perceptions of national identity. Executive Chairman “of 
Australia’s most highly regarded research company”, Gary Morgan “is often called upon to 
5 
 
provide political and social comment” (Morgan 2017). His analysis of the 2010 poll however, 
reveals a distinct bias, 
[D]espite recent unwarranted calls for a new Australian Flag, the Morgan Poll shows 
that the clear preference of Australians is to stick with the current design that was first 
flown on September 3, 1901 in Melbourne over the Australian Parliament and has so 
well represented our nation for over 100 years since (Morgan 2010).  
 
In his evaluation Morgan, “whose clients include many of Australia’s leading companies, 
institutions and government departments” (Morgan 2017), is forthright in his assertion that the 
national flag in its current formation serves “our” nation well.  
Ralph Kelly from the Flag Society of Australia (FSA / Flags Australia) states that 
proposals to change the national flag are rejected for two main reasons:    
1) The status quo should endure because the case for change is not accepted.  
2) The national flag is symbolic of the nation and it should be honoured without 
alteration (Flags Australia 2013).  
Kelly explains that many proponents of the national flag make no distinction between flag and 
nation. The flag is a symbol of loyalty to Australia. Therefore, if the flag and nation are 
‘imagined’ as one, it is not difficult to understand resistance to change. Currently much of the 
rhetoric which surrounds the flag is framed by comfortable terms of reference which speak of 
tradition, national sentiment, and values. Geoffrey Blainey, an influential historian noted for 
his conservative stance, claims that the national flag,  
is the main symbol of national loyalty and national unity. It links the living and the 
dead. It is the only flag, in the history of the world, to command the loyalties of the 




Blainey’s claims are not unfamiliar or unusual in the context of discussions about Australian 
nationalism. He espouses a view of nation that is both institutionally endorsed and embraced 
by many citizens. What is absent from these discussions are Indigenous perspectives. Therefore 
the task for this thesis is to investigate the discourses surrounding the national flag and to 
initiate possibilities for another way of ‘seeing’ or ‘re-viewing’ the national flag.  
The Australian National Flag 
 
 
Figure 1: The Australian National Flag (Flags Australia 2013).  
 
The Union Jack is situated on the upper left-hand corner of the Australian national flag. 
Its position is significant. In vexillology, the upper left-hand corner is known as the canton and 
is the official point of honour for a flag. The upper left canton sits closest to the flagpole and 
thus, as the last part of the flag to ‘wear out’, occupies a position of privilege. The Union Jack 
is the term commonly used to refer to the Union flag of the United Kingdom. The term “Union 
Jack” dates from 1801 when the saltire of St Patrick of Ireland was added to the cross of St. 
Andrew of Scotland and the cross of England’s St. George.5 A saltire is diagonal cross whose 
arms extend to the edges of a flag or shield. Aside from the Union Jack, the rest of the 
                                                 




Australian flag is known as the “field” and is charged with white stars. The Federation or 
Commonwealth Star sits directly beneath the Union Jack and points to the centre of the English 
red cross of St. George. On the fly, or right-hand side of the flag, there are five smaller stars to 
represent the constellation, Crux Australis, which is more commonly known as the Southern 
Cross, a constellation visible only in the skies of the southern hemisphere. The honoured 
section of the Australian flag belongs to the flag of Britain. In 1770, the British flag was used 
to take possession of the east coast of the continent.  
“Captain Cook” 
The British colonisation of Australia commenced on 29th April 1770 when Lieutenant 
James Cook6 sailed into Botany Bay, the country of the Gweagal and Bidjigal people of the 
Dharawal Eora nation. Frederick Wood notes that the Englishmen spent some time observing 
the local people, who were cooking fish, before a group rowed towards the shore. Resistance 
to the British was immediate, Wood explains, “[A]s they drew near, two natives seized their 
spears and prepared to resist the landing party … the natives threw their spears at the boats, 
and the Englishmen fired muskets” (1940: 27).  
Once the party landed, Cook planted a flag on Kurnell’s Milgurrung Beach and wrote 
in his journal, 
[D]uring my stay in this harbour I caused the English colours to be displayed on shore 
every day, and the ship’s name, and the date of the year to be inscribed upon one of the 
trees near the watering place (qtd. in Salt 2000: 19).  
 
Cook’s words speak to his understanding of posterity as an enduring reminder of British 
colonial conquest. Today these colonial colours, the British red, white and blue remain a 
prevalent manifestation of Australian identity. The place where Cook first set foot on land is 
                                                 
6 Cook becomes a Captain in 1772. 
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marked by an obelisk. In 1881 Prince Albert and Prince George visited the area and planted 
four pine trees. In 1970, the bicentenary of Cook’s landing, Queen Elizabeth visited the park 
which is now heritage-listed and known as “The Landing Place Reserve”. The significance of 
the royal imprimatur on the landing site of invading forces cannot be understated. The planting 
of trees signifies foundations, growing roots, in this instance, establishing foundations and a 
new beginning sanctioned and authorised by the highest order of British authority: the Crown. 
The final erasure of pre-colonial occupation is captured by the name: “The Landing Place 
Reserve”, a name connoting a place of “landing” that removes colonial violence from purview 
and produces imagery of a peaceful park where others simply “landed”, a memento of a 
moment of neutrality. Kurnell, the original site of Aboriginal dispossession is thus implanted 
with a flag, trees, and a name that erases all traces of pre and post invasion history.  
Maria Nugent (2009) provides a detailed account of the eight days and nights Cook and 
his party spent around Kurnell. On the fourth day, a sailor, Forby Sutherland, died and became 
the first white man to be buried in Australian soil. Cook named the south point of the bay in 
the sailor’s memory.7 Sutherland was mythologised by nineteenth century colonial poets. 
Henry Kendall claimed that Sutherland’s grave was sacred and his body in the ground 
represented the start of settler Christian society. In 1825 Barron Field further cemented colonial 
claims of possession and legitimacy by arguing that Sutherland’s Christian burial was of greater 
import than the planting of the flag, 
  “… and thence a little space  
Lies Sutherland, their shipmate; for the sound 
Of Christian burial better did proclaim 
Possession than the flag, in England’s name” (qtd. in Nugent 2009: 70).  
 
                                                 
7 Today Sutherland’s ‘Shire’ is home to nearly a quarter of a million people and covers some 369 Km2 (Sutherland 
Shire Council 2017).  
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As the first white man to be buried, the dead sailor became, to borrow Nugent’s economic 
metaphor, a “holding deposit – a claim to the country until the colonists arrived” (Nugent 2009: 
70). ‘Firsts’ matter in the construction of history. As a discursive form of reference ‘firsts’ mark 
the end of one era and the beginning of another. ‘Firsts’ also connect the colonists to the 
landscape and seemingly erase any traces of ‘others’ (Nugent 2009). Bruce Pascoe argues that 
prior to colonisation democracy was practiced in Australia, “more perfectly than anywhere on 
earth” (2007: 113). John Maynard substantiates this by drawing attention to some of Cook’s 
personal observations, 
[I]n a personal and highly revealing logbook account Cook reflected on the shocking 
inequality of living conditions in Britain, where raw sewage flowed through the streets, 
filth and disease was rampant and opportunities of bettering oneself were largely 
discouraged. In stark contrast Cook observed Aboriginal Australia as being a healthy 
paradise of equality (2014a: 16).  
 
Maynard claims that Cook’s reflections have been largely ignored by historians. Bain Attwood 
proffers a reason for this, “History was not only the colonisers’ discourse; it was also a 
colonising one” (1996a: viii). To put this more stridently, the mythologising of history provides 
“a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness” (Foucault 1997: 12). The dismissal 
of Cook’s comparison between Britain and Australia can thus be understood as an historical 
erasure, a deletion that has augmented a particular view of Indigenous people’s pre-colonial 
social structures. Throughout the eight day encounter the local people resisted and attempted 
to avoid the landing party. On the eighth day they chose to boycott the area thus ending Cook’s 
hope of a noteworthy meeting (Nugent 2009). 
Cook continued on his voyage of ‘discovery ‘sailing to an island seventeen kilometres 
off the tip of Cape York Peninsular in north Queensland. The traditional owners, the Gudang 
people and Kaurareg people, know the island as Bedanug. It was here that Cook felt certain no 
other European had previously landed. On Wednesday 22nd August 1770, Cook once more 
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planted the Union Jack and declared the whole of the east coast of Australia to be a British 
possession,  
[N]otwithstand[ing] I had in the Name of His Majesty taken possession of several 
places upon this coast, I now once more hoisted English Coulers [sic] and in the Name 
of His Majesty King George the Third took possession of the whole Eastern Coast . . . 
by the name New South Wales, together with all the Bays, Harbours Rivers and Islands 
situate upon the said coast, after which we fired three Volleys of small Arms which 
were Answerd [sic] by the like number from the Ship (qtd. in State Library of New 
South Wales [NSW] 2018).  
 
The hoisting of the British flag accompanied by the pomp and ceremony of a volley of firearms 
was indicative of the intentions of those whose force was yet to be realised. The practice of 
using a flag to take possession of land can be traced back several centuries. For example, during 
the Crusades flags were officially recognised as a way of transferring privilege or title to land. 
Throughout the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, as European colonists explored and seized 
lands in other parts of the world, the international legal principle of Discovery mandated that 
by planting their flag in the ground the ‘discovering’ European nation attained property rights 
and sovereign authority over the newly ‘discovered’ lands and peoples (Miller et al 2010). 
Having planted the flag on Bedanug, Cook imposed a further linguistic declaration of British 
ownership and named the island “Possession Island”, a name it bears to this day. A white stone 
monument sits on the headland above the beach commemorating the place where Cook and the 
British flag claimed possession on behalf of King George III.  
The ongoing failure to recognise Indigenous sovereignty in Australia can be traced back 
to 1768 when two directives contained in the Secret Instructions, which detailed the specifics 
of the voyage and were handed to Cook by the British Admiralty, were disregarded. First, if 
Cook ‘discovered’ land that was inhabited, he was instructed to make an alliance with the 
people and garner their consent before taking possession. Second, Cook was ordered to take 
possession of the land only if it was uninhabited:  
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[Y]ou are also with the Consent of the Natives to take Possession of Convenient 
Situations in the Country in the Name of the King of Great Britain: Or: if you find the 
Country uninhabited take Possession for his Majesty by setting up Proper Marks and 
Inscriptions, as first discoverers and possessors (Museum of Australian Democracy 
[MoAD] 2011a). 
 
Cook knowingly instigated the illegal dispossession of Aboriginal land. Evidence supports the 
contention that he took matters into his own hands, “‘[A] man would not accomplish much in 
discovery who only stuck to orders’” (Cook qtd. in Moorehead 1987: 62). Land ownership 
conferred exclusive rights for its use, administration, and future direction as part of the British 
Empire. Whoever lived on Crown land automatically became British citizens with rights and 
obligations under British law. However, for Indigenous people these rules and regulations were 
insurmountable. For example, as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were not 
Christian they could not swear under oath, therefore any transgressions committed against them 
were legally inadmissible (Dingle 1988). Furthermore, as British citizens, Indigenous people 
could not wage war to defend their lands; if they killed or injured another British subject in 
protest of their dispossession, it was deemed a criminal offence. Tony Dingle asserts, “[T]he 
rules of war did not apply on the frontier but the criminal law did” (1988: 56). It was on the 
basis of the claims made during Cook’s voyage relating to “terra australis”8 and 
representations of “the aborigines” that “the British Government determined in 1785 that New 
Holland9 was a terra nullius, that is, no-man’s land” (Attwood 1996a: viii-ix). 
Under British law, land that was not cultivated or seen to be inhabited with fixed abodes 
was deemed to be ‘empty land’ (Miller et al 2010). Terra nullius was the legal justification for 
the occupation of Australia. Cook’s refusal to abide by official dictates manifest in his actions 
                                                 
8 Terra Australis Incognita, Latin for unknown southern land, was an imaginary continent which featured on 
European maps from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.   
9 Following the mid-16th century expeditions of the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman, the southern continent was 
referred to as New Holland. 
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and proclamations, the foundational basis upon which the colonial project came to rely. 
Rosemary Hunter asserts, “[T]he dispossession of the indigenous owners of this country was 
achieved by force but justified by Captain Cook’s law, which was a legal doctrine developed 
specifically by European jurists to facilitate colonialism” (1996: 6). As a result of Cook’s brief 
Australian voyage of ‘discovery’, a British penal colony was established. On 26 January 1788, 
eighteen years after Cook left Australian waters, the First Fleet, led by Captain Arthur Phillip, 
arrived at Kurnell. Unable to locate a suitable supply of fresh water, the fleet continued north 
and landed at Sydney Cove. There, the British flag was unfurled once more and guns again 
fired to announce the invasion.10 In 1938, the white nation celebrated 150 years of 
(dis)possession, and on 26 January a re-enactment of the landing and flag raising ceremony 
was staged. 
                                                 
10 John Kirwan (1934) claims that in 1828 Australia had a white population of 58,000. Some 40,000 lived in 
Sydney and its surrounds, the remaining 18,000 were in Tasmania. British authorities were uneasy, could “the 
two English-speaking isolated communities of New South Wales and Tasmania [constitute as] an effective 
occupation of a great island continent” (Kirwan 1934: 7-8). With this in mind, and underpinned by the known 
wealth of untapped agricultural and mineral resources, London sent official instructions to Sydney. On Christmas 
Day, 1826, a party of soldiers and convicts occupied King George’s Sound (Albany), in Western Australia and 




Figure 2: “The pages of History were rolled back 150 years on the morning of Anniversary Day, January 26, 1938, when the 
landing ceremony of Captain Arthur Phillip, on the shores of Sydney Cove, was faithfully re-enacted” (Ziegler 1938: Chapter 
11:4). 
 
In white Australia “Captain Cook” is renowned as something of a heroic figure. His 
name is taught to Australian children from an early age and popular culture is replete with the 
mythology of Cook’s ‘discovery’. There are, however, challenges to the official doctrine of 
Cook’s historical legacy. Maynard offers a distinctly oppositional view to that proffered in 
official narratives, likening Cook to a “time-travelling bogeyman” who, 
transcends time and space to wreak havoc across the continent upon the Aboriginal 
inhabitants over the course of the past 243 years. In this manifestation he represents 
white Australia in all its guises including invasion, occupation, dispossession and the 
conducting of a symphony of violence (2014a: 16). 
 
Maynard draws attention to the way in which, for many Aboriginal people, “Captain Cook” is 
a metaphor, a euphemism for white Australia. Maynard notes that Cook has been embedded in 
Aboriginal narratives since first contact, and that the realities associated with his failure to 
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formally recognise that the Australian landscape was inhabited and sustained prior to his arrival 
are well understood. He argues that the perpetuation of Captain Cook narratives demonstrate 
the continuing persistence of Aboriginal worldviews. Hunter contends that Captain Cook 
narratives facilitate a way for Aboriginal people to assert truths which have been denied or 
obfuscated. She explores two Aboriginal truths: firstly, “Aboriginal Law is older, more 
venerable and generally superior to the immoral Captain Cook law relied on by the European 
invaders” and secondly, “the land belonged originally and still rightfully belongs to the 
Aborigines, and so its forcible acquisition by Europeans has no legitimacy” (Hunter 1996: 4). 
Hunter’s truths stand in sharp contrast to dominant settler-colonial narratives and make a 
significant contribution to an anti-colonial discourse that has, since invasion, challenged the 
‘truths’ associated with official Cook narratives. As Nugent argues, “[T]his is no closed chapter 
of history. It is a past that is continually kept alive by constant talk about it” (2009:105).  
Under the auspices of the Australian flag, which privileges the British flag, Captain 
Cook narratives and artistic responses11 continue to reflect the nature of relationships between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. They disclose the enduring violence of colonisation, its 
legacies of massacres,12 dispossession, enforced relocation, the removal of children and the on-
going litany of inequality that continues to affect many Aboriginal people. Nugent points out, 
“the name of Captain Cook became shorthand among Aboriginal people for ‘a large set of 
people, processes and regulations’ that had dispossessed them of their territory” (2009: 123). 
Many Aboriginal people distinguish between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Captain Cooks, to the 
                                                 
11 Jason Wing recalls being taught in high school that James Cook discovered Australia, “[T]his colonial lie is 
further reinforced by a huge bronze sculpture in Hyde Park, Sydney, which is situated on a massacre site” (Wing 
2017: 129). Wing’s reaction to this statue is one of physical repulsion and in response he produced a sculpture. 
Captain James Crook (2013) features a bronze bust of Cook. In order to portray Cook’s criminal status Wing 
covered Cook’s face with a balaclava. His work triggered a vitriolic online response, “… their disgust at my 
disrespectful and inaccurate version of Australia’s history and my alleged defamation of Captain Cook’s great 
name … prove that colonial propaganda and racism is alive and well …” (Wing 2017: 129).  
12 Most recently a digital map which begins to document the scale of massacres has been developed by Professor 
Lyndall Ryan, “[T]he map shows massacres were widespread with intense periods of warfare, and often included 
soldiers and police” (Power 2017: 6). The massacres, Ryan states, “were conducted in secrecy and few perpetrators 
were brought to justice” (qtd. in Power 2017: 6)  
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extent that new Captain Cooks have become a euphemised reference point for colonial 
violence,  
[W]hen the old Captain Cook died, other people started thinking they could make 
Captain Cook another way. New people. Maybe all his sons. Too many Captain Cooks. 
They started shooting people then. New Captain Cook people…Those are the people 
that made war…They are the ones who have been stealing all the women and killing 
people. They have made war. Warmakers, those New Captain Cooks … And then they 
made a new thing called “welfare”. All the Captain Cook mob came and called 
themselves “welfare mob”…They wanted to take all of Australia … All the new people 
wanted anything they could get … (Paddy Wainburranga qtd. in Mackinolty and 
Wainburranga, 1988: 359).  
 
This way of seeing the ‘settlers’ and their descendants provides a counter discourse which calls 
into question the traditional colonial settler-histories of triumph and progress. By default, 
Captain Cook narratives comprise frames of reference that express the realities and tensions of 
ongoing power relationships inscribed by colonial rule.  
In Australia colonial narratives continue to frame white understandings of history. For 
example, on 15 March 2013, then Federal Opposition Leader Tony Abbott made a pledge to 
become a Prime Minister for Aboriginal affairs, “[H]e said Australia could not feel ‘relaxed 
and comfortable’ unless Aboriginal people had comparable health, education and social 
opportunities to other Australians” (Keyzer and McGee 2014: 19). One year later Abbott 
addressed the Melbourne Institute and declared, 
I guess our country owes its existence to a form of foreign investment by the British 
government in the then unsettled or, um, scarcely settled, Great South Land (qtd. in 
Koori Mail 16 July 2014: 4).  
 
Former Member of Parliament, Nova Perris responded, “British settlement was not foreign 
investment. It was occupation” (qtd.in Koori Mail 16 July 2014: 4). National Congress of 
Australia’s First Peoples co-chair, Kirstie Parker said Abbott’s remarks “were wrong in fact, 
law, and history [and] clearly demonstrate how far some Australians have to go in 
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understanding this country’s true history” (qtd. in Koori Mail 16 July 2014: 4). Abbott’s 
comments are revealing, indicative of a “Captain Cook mindset”, which favours the terra 
nullius version of history. Statements such as this transmit a fundamental message of white 
superiority and are strategic to both the formation of knowledge and relations of power. Michel 
Foucault claims that “a statement is always an event that neither the language (langue) nor the 
meaning can quite exhaust” (1997: 28 emphasis in the original). Once uttered, the statement 
either enters the mind to linger, or materialises in print. A statement therefore exists with the 
capacity to be both repeated and reinvented and is inevitably linked with others which have 
gone before and are yet to follow. 
The manipulation of Australian history has long suited the dominant interests, but not 
without a cost. Gerry Georgatos argues that when groups are unrepresented it causes a tension 
which  
humiliates identity by making it a liability, cultural and historical and therefore we 
[minority groups] engage in what should be unnecessary, in the politics of identity, 
when equality should have brought us together in harmony (2013: 20).  
 
While notions of “harmony” are somewhat ambiguous what Georgatos alludes to is the amount 
of ‘wasted’ energy which is expended by minority groups who daily battle for the basic human 
rights of justice and equality. For the wider population, the project of national “harmony” is 
something of a fantasy inspired by flag-waving and the commandeering of a swathe of national 
symbols. I suggest that it is the flag, and its attendant paraphernalia that work to inspire 
hegemonic ideals of harmony. The flag’s colonial insignia functions to reassure, to lay to rest 
anxieties. Under the banner of the national flag, the nation has the appearance of ‘unity’, 
however, without its visible comfort, the nation is forced to look inward at itself. It is the fear 
of this knowledge that drives the continual reinvigoration of national symbols without which 
non-Indigenous Australians would have to concede to the ongoing consequences of illegitimate 
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occupation. Ghassan Hage argues that fear is fundamental to Australia’s “colonial paranoia” 
which he states is, “a combination of the fragility of White European colonial identity in general 
and the Australian situation in particular” (2003: 49).13  
Thesis Background: Flagging Inclusion  
Ben Wellings asserts the national flag is a metaphor of the nation and should 
“symbolize unity over division: whatever our political views, ethnicity, class, gender or 
regional location, the flag and nation are supposed to be above such potential sources of 
division” (2010: 15). As I seek to discover the Australian national flag’s ‘unifying’ capability 
through its dissemination, the representational force of the Union Jack holds particular interest. 
In 1770 Cook used the British flag to claim Australia as a possession for King George III. The 
British flag, the Union Jack, is the flag of my birthplace. It is the national symbol which 
socialised me as a child. Growing up in England, the Union Jack represented my national 
identity and symbolically connected me to the broader British population. I was socialised well.  
When I migrated to Australia in 1984, I recall gleaning comfort from that little bit of 
‘home’ which was sitting up there on the Australian flag – I felt included. Wellings echoes this 
sentiment commenting that his previous connection to the Union Jack meant settling in 
Australia was, “easier in a country where I only ever felt half-foreign” (2010: 22). My 
experience was similar. Somehow, the flag provided me with a sense of complacency and the 
promise of eventual assimilation into the cultural milieu. I wasn’t quite ‘outside’ or ‘inside’; I 
‘sort of’ fitted in. I knew the language, and many of the social customs and despite a few 
cultural differences, the political, religious and legal landscape were similar, comprehensible, 
and not difficult as a migrant to navigate. Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues that British 
migrants “feel included in the nation because prepossession has been claimed on their behalf, 
hence their implicit understanding that the nation is a white possession” (2015: 29). 
                                                 
13 See also Hage in Thornton (2017). 
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Furthermore she claims, British migrants’ amalgamation into “the narrative of Australian 
migration history works to separate them from the history of Indigenous dispossession” (2015: 
28). Moreton-Robinson’s premise is compelling. On my arrival and for some time after, I 
viewed the Australian flag through a blinkered white migrant lens of privilege, and I did indeed 
feel somewhat ‘removed’ from the brutal realities of Australian history.  
For many years it did not occur to me to question why the Union Jack featured on the 
Australian flag. Nor would I have considered what the flag might symbolise to Indigenous 
people. I did not wonder if it were acceptable, or indeed appropriate, that the Australian national 
flag had been colonised by the British flag just as the continent had been. When I returned to 
study and learned about the colonial history of Australia, I began to think about what the 
placement of the Union Jack might mean for those whose land and cultures had been colonised. 
These questions, accompanied by a need to know more, generated further questions. 
Eventually, I realised that a process of unlearning was taking place and that old and comfortable 
information was being replaced by less comfortable knowledge. Like most citizens of modern 
democracies, I had been institutionally socialised throughout my life into what Michael Billig 
refers to as “banal nationalism”, a term used to encompass “the ideological habits which enable 
the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (2013: 6).  
My interest in this thesis has thus been forged out of a combination of life experience 
and academic learning. It is an inquiry that has developed over time. In recent years I have 
reflected on the colonial symbolism of the national flag, its emblematic force, and its on-going 
effects. My discomfort with the flag’s colonial signification continues to challenge me and to 
impel my research. For many the flag is a symbolic endorsement of tradition, national values 
and a history encoded by a white, Christian ethos. Examples of this are located on the 
Australian National Flag Association’s (ANFA) homepage: “[I]t is our history book … you 
can’t change history” states Lindsay Fox, and Blainey asserts “[I]t is the flag of the people as 
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well as the nation” (qtd. in ANFA 2012a). The national flag as it stands today was not designed 
until 1901, and did not become the official national flag until Queen Elizabeth II gave her 
assent on 14 February 1954 (Kwan 2006). Prior to this, the national flag of Australia was the 
British Union Jack. And so, in reality the Australian national flag represents a selective and 
extremely small part of the continent’s history.  
Carol Foley argues that the Union Jack, with its three Christian crosses is more than a 
mere colonial reminder of a past relationship with Britain. She states “[W]e are recognised 
throughout the world primarily as a Christian people, with Christian ethics and morals, and 
these ethics are interwoven into our social institutions” (1996a: 93).The Union Jack, she claims, 
stands in testimony to “our” British origins: of governance, language, education, democracy, 
religious and spiritual inheritance. Conversely, for Indigenous people, what does the Union 
Jack stand in testimony to? Noel Pearson identifies the need for inclusion and argues that, 
“Australia’s Indigenous heritage should rightly sit alongside these fundamental British 
traditions and institutions” (2013: 23).  
Since invasion, Indigenous people in Australia have experienced systemic and ongoing 
hardship. Paternalistic policies and practices were designed to foster deprivation and exclusion 
and resulted in generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people being denied access 
to their land, kinship networks, cultural practices, languages, wages, and health services. 
Indigenous people were educated according to colonial mandates. In some areas it was 
obligatory and in other areas, forbidden. Until the mid-twentieth century Indigenous people 
were excluded from participating in political, social and legal systems. The systematic 
application of exclusion is enshrined constitutionally: of the 128 sections of the Australian 
Constitution14 there is no recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. George 
                                                 
14 The Australian Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900) is Australia’s founding 
document. It took over a decade to develop and was drafted without Aboriginal input or consultation. The 
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Williams notes, “Australia is the last democracy with a constitution permitting laws that 
discriminate on the basis of race” (2012: 10). Section 25 of the constitution allows the states to 
disallow entire races of people from voting. The ‘races power’ in section 51(xxvi) allows the 
Federal Parliament to initiate laws that discriminate for or against people based upon their race.  
Pearson argues that the Australian Constitution is a racist document and that the 
“allowance and promotion of racial discrimination is at odds with fundamental tenets of 
democracy” (2013: 23). Former Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, acknowledges that prior to 
Federation 1901, there was a decade of planning in which the colonies debated how the 
Constitution was to be crafted,  
[B]ut there is no record of any Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person taking part. 
Indigenous people did not ordain our Constitution nor contribute to its drafting. They 
had no opportunity to vote for it, and yet all were affected by what it said and what it 
failed to say. They were affected by provisions that even by the standards of the time 
seem questionable and strike us now as harsh and inhumane. But they were also affected 
by the “great Australian silence”15 which fell upon our founding document. Because 
among the 128 sections of the Constitution, there is no acknowledgement of Australia’s 
First Peoples (qtd. in National Indigenous Times 20 February 2013: 19). 
 
To include Indigenous people in the Australian Constitution or change its discriminatory bias 
requires a referendum, as Gillard explains,  
…recognition [of Indigenous people] is not a matter for politicians or experts. Instead, 
the Constitution belongs to the people. It was created by them. It serves them. And it is 
amendable by them alone (qtd. in National Indigenous Times 20 February 2013: 19). 
 
                                                 
constitution came into force on 1 January, 1901. As the modern Australian nation was born it was specific in its 
exclusion of Aboriginal people. Section 127 stated, “[I]n reckoning the number of the people of the 
Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted” 
(Sanders 2005: 220). Section 51 (xxvi) authorised the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to, “[T]he people 
of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any state, for who it is deemed necessary to make special laws” 
(Sanders 2005: 220). It was not until the 1967 Referendum that these exclusionary clauses were removed: section 
127 was deleted and section 51 (xxvi) was revised and the middle phrase deleted. 
15 In his delivery of the 1968 ABC Boyer Lectures, William Stanner coined the term “The Great Australian 
Silence”. This phrase describes what Stanner argues is the historic and deliberate neglect of Indigenous people in 
all facets of Australian life (see Chapter Two).    
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The fundamental principle of inclusion thus rests with the wider population and in the twenty 
first century the reasoning for this is extraordinary. Australia’s founding document “belongs” 
to the people who created it. This document was “created” by white society, it “serves” white 
society and as it stands today, it “belongs” to white society. This is the discourse of white 
prerogative. Such leverage satiates the dominant mindset with inherently false notions of power 
and legitimacy as it relegates Indigenous people once more to the behest of the white majority. 
Crucially, Pearson states it is “not for mainstream Australia to confer recognition upon 
Indigenous people, but for Indigenous people to decide whether that type of recognition was 
something they wanted” (qtd. in Maxwell 2015: 5). Narrungga Elder, Tauto Sansbury argues 
“[T]hey could have put something in the Constitution from day one but they didn’t” (qtd. in 
Koori Mail 23 September 2015: 3). Since invasion, the political and social climate has excluded 
Indigenous people, and this has had significant impacts on health and wellbeing outcomes. 
The 2014 Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) ‘Poverty in Australia Report’ 
finds that the determinants of disadvantage can interrelate and perpetuate social exclusion.16 
The multi-dimensional nature of disadvantage, such as material inequality, political and social 
exclusion, means that for many Indigenous people, poverty and adversity are intergenerational 
and according to Daphne Habibis & Maggie Walter are “directly related to the history of black-
white relations in Australia” (2010: 75). While the detrimental effects of both structural and 
social racism are well documented, it is only in more recent years that research has found that 
the experiences of racism negatively impact physical and mental health and wellbeing. In July 
2013, the Federal Government launched its new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health 
Plan. Pat Anderson,17 chairwoman of the Lowitja Institute, Australia’s National Institute for 
                                                 
16 The seven social exclusion indicators identified are: health, education, employment, material resources, social 
connection, community and personal safety (ACOSS 2014). 
17 Pat Anderson received the 2016 Human Rights Medal for her significant contribution and lifetime commitment 
to the health and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Koori Mail 11 January 2017: 9).   
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Research, considers it ground-breaking because 
for the first time racism is identified as a key driver of ill-health. Anderson calls for social and 
political change through education and debate and for all Australians to understand that racism 
in all its forms has health implications for Indigenous people. Anderson’s dialogue concerning 
“connection” is significant. Not only must Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people be able 
to connect with their families, communities and cultures, “[W]e must also feel connected to the 
rest of society. Racism cuts that connection” (Anderson 2014: 20). 
How do these findings which clearly identify the health implications of racism, however 
“casual”, and the importance of social connection, intersect with the national flag? Does the 
Australian national flag have the capacity to provoke feelings of disconnection or exclusion for 
Indigenous people? In relation to this and the fundamental importance of both inclusion and 
connection Lowitja O’Donoghue’s view of the flag is worth citing in detail, 
[O]ur national flag should be a symbol of our national ideals and of the people we want 
to be. We regard ourselves as independent, individual and inclusive – but our existing 
flag, our national symbol says none of this...  
We are a country that prides itself on diversity and tolerance, yet some of us cling to a 
flag that represents a monoculture and intolerance. We are a country that has debated 
important national issues such as justice, rights and identity, yet the current flag 
symbolises quite the opposite – complacency, dependency and subordination (qtd. in 
Ausflag 2013)  
 
O’Donoghue raises important questions about the flag’s (in)capacity to both truthfully 
represent the nation’s history and also, its ability to symbolically project the nation’s current 
and future aspirations. In marking “complacency, dependency and subordination” as notable 
facets of the flag’s representational force, O’Donoghue brings to the fore the fracture between 
symbol and reality, between the national flag as a material object and its symbolic power to 
represent the nation. She pinpoints the racial hierarchy upon which the nation is built, and 
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draws attention to the exclusion that is clearly made visible through the iconography of the 
national flag.  
Conclusion  
This inquiry is both an analysis and a cultural history of the Australian national flag. 
The thesis is also an exploration into Australian national identity that encompasses some of the 
questions that demand my attention. As a research project, this work seeks to disclose the 
‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of the Australian national flag through an examination of its history, 
its uses and applications in the public domain, and its political force as a socio-cultural regulator 
of this nation state. I question what it might mean for Indigenous people to come into daily 
contact with this prominent symbol. Furthermore, I ask how the force of the flag is maintained: 
what sustains it? What gives it life in the national imagination?  
This investigation will throughout be attentive to the manifold ways in which whiteness 
and nation interpellate through national symbols which forge identity, power and knowledge. 
This methodology will be discussed in Chapter Two. An exploration into how and why the 
modern nation was created will be discussed in Chapter Three. Following this, in Chapter Four 
I will examine how the modern Australian nation has been maintained. Chapter Five will 
provide information relating to the history of flags, the construction of both the Union Jack and 
Australian flag, and will consider various applications of the flag. Chapter Six will investigate 
the longstanding resistance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to colonial rule as 
a prelude to Chapter Seven which will look specifically at Indigenous responses and reactions 
to the Australian national flag. At this introductory point, I draw from the metaphorical 
“between the flags” of the Australian beach where the nation is instructed to swim in order to 
maintain ‘safety’ and ‘cohesion’. Through the study of vexillology I aim to provide another 
way of understanding Australian society. Who is included and who is not? By exploring the 
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binary of this question, I hypothesise that somewhere between the flags lies a national identity 




CHAPTER TWO: Methodology 
The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a coherent 
national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle 
of national subjects.                                                                                         
                                                                                                                     (Bhabha 1994: 209).  
Introduction 
Repeated exposure to national signs, when combined with a nationalist discourse, 
constitutes, as Homi Bhabha notes, the signs of a “coherent national culture”. The recurring 
utility of the national flag across all institutional sites makes a significant contribution to the 
illusion of coherence. In this chapter I outline the theoretical framework which will underscore 
my analysis of the Australian national flag. I begin with a review of the literature. For several 
decades, the literature available has identified that the ‘functions’ of national flags have been 
under-researched. From my research, it is also evident that there is a noticeable absence of 
Indigenous viewpoints in the literature which relate to the Australian national flag. An 
examination of how whiteness functions will help to reveal its relationship with the formation 
and maintenance of Australian national identity. The union of flag and nation is a site of 
conflicting opinions that constitutes tension for many people. I draw from the work of Martin 
Nakata to explore the parameters and opportunities which exist at what Nakata calls the 
“cultural interface”.18 I also examine Michael Billig’s theory of “banal nationalism”19 to 
ascertain the effectiveness of the flag as a seemingly neutral and unremarkable symbol of day 
to day life. In order to facilitate a way to understand how the Australian flag intersects and 
influences the socio-political landscape, this methodology is informed by work in the field of 
vexillology.  
                                                 
18 Disciplining the Savages: Savaging the Disciplines (Nakata 2008a). 
19 Banal Nationalism (Billig 2013). 
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Scot Guenter argues that the focused study of flags, vexillology, can facilitate “deeper 
understandings of the complex processes of social behavior and cultural systems” (2010: 1). In 
the Australian context, analysis of the national flag’s uses and applications, and an exploration 
into its relationship with nation building, discloses much about Australian society, both past 
and present. Australian national identity is underscored by the illegitimate nature of British 
settlement, the ongoing repercussions of which are compounded by a systemic failure to 
recognise Indigenous sovereignty. Patrick Sullivan claims “Australian national identity will 
remain hollow at the core until we develop a sense of belonging together” (2011: 122). Sullivan 
stresses the importance of including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at all levels 
of the nation, as does the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). The introduction of the AFN draft 
interim charter promotes and advocates for an ongoing dialogue and engagement, “between the 
First Nations and all levels of the Australian government and industry” (Koori Mail 16 
December 2015: 30). Patrick Dodson calls for national political leadership to “forge new 
systems of governance that include Indigenous people as honoured partners in Australian 
nation building” (2007: 28). Most recently the Referendum Council20 recommends, “a 
referendum be held to provide in the Australian Constitution for a representative body that 
gives Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander First Nations a Voice to the Commonwealth 
Parliament” (Referendum Council 2017a). The inclusion of an Indigenous advisory body into 
the Australian Parliament would, for the first time, provide Indigenous people the opportunity 
to discuss the laws and policies that concern them.21 
                                                 
20 The Referendum Council was established in December 2015 to advise the Prime Minister and Opposition 
Leader on Constitutional recognition. Widespread consultation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
from across the nation culminated with a convention at Uluru in the Northern Territory. Supported by the majority 
of delegates the ‘Uluru Statement from the Heart’ was drawn up (See Appendix A) and on 30 June 2017 the 
Referendum Council issued its recommendation for constitutional change.   
21 On 26 October 2017 information was leaked to the media that revealed the recommendation for a “Voice to 
Parliament” had been rejected by the Turnbull government. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Indigenous Affairs 
Minister Nigel Scullion and Attorney-General George Brandis released a joint statement in which they argue, “the 
idea of a representative assembly for Indigenous Australia – in addition to the House of Representatives and 
Senate –  would be inconsistent with the fundamental democratic principle of all citizens having equal civic rights” 
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Sullivan (2011) also claims that through language, practice and values non-Indigenous 
people must recognise and acknowledge their implication in the lives of Indigenous people. 
The following statement identifies the core values of the Australian National Flag Association, 
[I]t is vitally important, in this time of rapid change, that our National Flag with the 
history, heritage and traditions that it represents be NOT destroyed by unrepresentative 
and divisive lobby groups pushing radical political views.  
Welcome to ANFA a patriotic and voluntary organisation dedicated to promoting pride, 
respect and understanding in the Australian way of life by acknowledgment of the 
principles for which our Flag of “Stars and Crosses” proudly represents to our 
generations and those coming.22 
 
From this it is evident that the ANFA is strident in protecting what it deems to be the symbol 
of “the Australian way of life”, which is replete with British “history, heritage and traditions”. 
In this endorsement of the national flag, any recognition of Indigenous people is absent. The 
words used by the ANFA are not new; they have been part of Australian national discourse for 
over a century. In 1914, the Sydney Daily Telegraph explored reactions to the Union Jack from 
around the British Empire and branded any denouncer of the flag as an “infuriated extremist” 
(qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). A range of responses included, a “wild Irishman” who described 
the flag as “dirty” and a “strike-leader in South Africa” who consigned the flag to “hell”, while 
in India “once more” the flag “was held up to hatred as the symbol of oppression by the orators 
of unrest” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). From these examples it becomes apparent that for over 
one hundred years the British Union Jack has been a symbol of division.23 
                                                 
(Hunter 2017: 6). The date has a significant resonance. On 26 October 1985, Uluru, formerly known as “Ayers 
Rock” was ‘handed back’ by the Australian Government to its traditional owners. For cultural reasons, the Anangu 
traditional owners have decided to ban people from climbing Uluru. The last climbing day will be on 26 October 
2019 (Koori Mail 15 November 2017:1).  
22 This extract is taken from the ANFA membership form, made available at the National Flag Day Ceremony in 
Martin Place, Sydney, 3 September 2015. The membership form includes the following pledge: “I promise 
allegiance to Australia and our National Flag of “Stars and Crosses.” To serve my country and all its people 
faithfully and to uphold Australia’s laws, customs, values and traditions to the best of my ability”.   
23 Throughout the world the Union Jack continues to leave its mark. It is a living symbol, as the flags of New 
Zealand, Fiji, Tuluva and Australia testify. In order to give the flag a more contemporary relevance there have 
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The Daily Telegraph pays tribute to the Union Jack stating it holds “so many millions 
of mankind in affection or respect or fear” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). The notion that for 
some this flag is a symbol of “fear” is dispelled by the newspaper through rhetoric which defers 
to Britain’s strength, arguing that the flag offers protection and achievement, and is “vitally 
related to justice and civilisation, and to all else that makes for the happiness and betterment of 
mankind” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 206). The virtues of the British Empire are extolled and 
Australians are duly instructed on how to attach themselves to both flag and Empire, 
[T]he way to get a healthy and inspiring pride in our Empire-citizenship and in the flag 
as the Empire’s symbol is to get the Empire idea into our minds and to cultivate it (qtd. 
in Crowley 1973: 207).24 
 
The development of nationalism is thus fostered through a set of discursive practices that come 
into being as the material artefacts of nation. These include an array of symbols, artworks, 
literary works, film, television programmes and so on that constitute national culture in its 
many and various formations. Nationalism is widely disseminated and so it enters the psyche 
of the body politic as a creed that is shared among the citizenry. Nationalism depends upon a 
tangible sign for its efficacy so the importance of a nation’s flag cannot be overstated. Set a 
century apart, the above-mentioned examples from the ANFA and Daily Telegraph propel a 
discourse, a set of statements and practices, which seeks to uphold and embellish the virtues of 
British heritage. Discourses carry with them the ability to be reinvented and rejuvenated, thus 
the transmission of past assumptions and values are never entirely extinguished; they lie in 
readiness, patiently waiting to (re)present themselves.  
  
                                                 
been calls to include a fourth cross. A cross of thin black stripes, “to remind the citizens of the living legacy of 
colonialism” (Eriksen 2007: 6). 
24 This was the era of Australian nation creation. On 12 March 1913 the foundation stone of the nation’s capital 
was laid. The Attorney-General stated that “Canberra was the visible sign” of the nation and argued, “[T]he people 




What the Literature Revealed  
There is a dearth of literature on Indigenous views of the Australian national flag. It 
could be argued that this missing dialogue, unmasking Indigenous peoples’ views about the 
“scraps” of material which create the Australian flag, and its symbolism, are excluded from 
public discourse precisely because they challenge the legitimacy of the colonising culture. 
Through this silencing white privilege remains secure and race inequality is kept in place. In 
her critique of the Australian national flag, Foley conducted a survey in 1994. The focus of her 
research was to explore Aboriginal responses to the possible merger of the Aboriginal and 
Australian national flags.25 Foley wrote to between sixty and seventy different Aboriginal 
groups and received answers from approximately 40 per cent. Overall, the responses called for 
the removal of the Union Jack, and for the Aboriginal flag to remain an exclusive symbol of 
Aboriginal identity. As outlined by Foley reactions to the survey included the following:  
 “Have something that symbolizes the whole Australia, not something that 
separates our two cultures”.  
 “Anything is better than the Union Jack”.  
 “I believe in no uncertain terms that the Union Jack must go … the large star 
representing the states, again as a symbol of colonisation, should go” (1996a: 
180).  
Of the mooted cultural exchange of the Union Jack with the Aboriginal flag, Foley writes, 
[A] few people noted that to replace the Union Jack with the Aboriginal flag was merely 
to exchange the flag of one cultural group for another, which would be equally divisive 
in a flag that should be representative of us all and not single out any one cultural group 
for special treatment (1996a: 181).  
                                                 
25 The proposal being to replace the Union Jack in the upper left corner with the Aboriginal flag. 
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Foley’s use of the term “special treatment” as something to be avoided in a flag warrants 
comment given the “special treatment” favouring white Australia that is encoded in the current 
national flag. Foley argues that her sample is, “of course, far too small to generate any findings 
that can be extrapolated to the broader Aboriginal community” (1996a: 180). What can be 
“extrapolated”, however, is that since at least 1994 there has been a specific call by Aboriginal 
people for the Union Jack to be removed from the Australian national flag, and that this request 
has not received considered attention.  
The literature reveals that there is a gap in the research relating to the relationship 
between flags and national identity. Whitney Smith (1975) contends that the origins, forms, 
functions and messages of flags are little understood. William Crampton argues that writers 
have neglected “the important role of non-verbal, non-abstract, symbols, [and] the idea that 
these can be consciously and deliberately employed in a coherent programme for the 
establishment of a national identity” (1994: 6). Karen Cerulo (1993) points out that research 
into symbols is in its infancy and that reactions to national symbols have been under-
researched. In order to recognise the power that symbols exert over the national audience 
Cerulo states that a thorough social and symbolic investigation is required. Once the 
representational force of national symbols is better understood, questions pertaining to power 
and national identity can be further investigated. Catherine Palmer (1998) claims theoretical 
debates about the social processes which have constructed national identity are limited, as key 
theorists have failed to address the ways in which the nation is daily maintained.  
More recently, Thomas Eriksen and Richard Jenkins assert that “national differences in 
the meaning, political significance and uses of flags are rarely studied at all” (2007: xiii). They 
acknowledge that while the political and symbolic importance of flags has been recognised by 
scholars of nationalism, there has been a lack of in-depth studies relating to the influence of 
flags on national identities. They argue that flags have been poorly theorised and are “only 
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mentioned in passing in most social science studies of nationalism” (Eriksen and Jenkins 2007: 
xiii). Edwin Crump (2012) states also that flags as symbolic devices are under-researched. 
Social psychologist David Butz (2009) concurs, noting that little research has been conducted 
to garner the implications of flag exposure. Butz stresses the particular need for field research 
“to examine the function and implications of national symbols in areas where differing group 
identities are strong, as such investigations may reveal their truly divisive nature” (2009: 799). 
The importance of having a deeper understanding of the responses elicited by national symbols 
has significant consequences. In fact Butz asserts that there are “real-world” implications 
associated with investigating national symbols for both the public policy and social inclusion 
arenas which, “will be useful for future legislative decisions and efforts to create identity-
inclusive national symbols” (2009: 800). The critical application of vexillology deepens our 
understandings about the power exerted by flags, “in creating and changing individual and 
group identities, in maintaining or challenging the power structure in any given society” 
(Guenter 2001: 205). Elizabeth Kwan (1994a) claims that while the Australian flag has been 
mentioned by Australian historians of nationalism, its role has not been explored, an argument 
she has reiterated in recent times, “Australian flags’ symbolism and the perceptions of those 
flags are both areas needing research and analysis” (2015 pers. comm., 5 Oct).  
In Australia, the national flag has been employed as an unambiguous signifier that 
heralds hegemonic understandings of national identity as it simultaneously connects the nation 
to Britain, as both the “mother land” and the colonising force. From the outset, Australian 
national identity was and remains to some extent, implicated by British nationalism. As Richard 
White has argued, “Australia has long supported a whole industry of image-makers to tell us 
what we are” (1981: viii). Notions of national identity, White claims, need to be explored in 
order to ascertain, “what their function is, whose creation they are, and whose interests they 
serve” (viii). White puts forward a number of arguments in which national identity, as a 
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phenomenon of the modern western nation, has been created and is manipulated by those in 
power. Ideals of national identity, according to White, have been created through relationships 
of reciprocity and validation between those who have historically defined Australian identity 
– the intelligentsia (writers, journalists, artists and academics) and the economic power-
brokers. National identity therefore serves a social function and it is in the dominant interests 
to control it.  
In 1968, eminent Australian anthropologist, William Stanner delivered the Boyer 
Lectures in which he examined the status of Aboriginal people and their relationship with the 
wider white population. In recent decades Stanner’s lectures have come to occupy a central 
place in academic discourse and debates regarding race relations in Australia. His term “cult 
of forgetfulness” is renowned and has without doubt had a significant impact on revisionist 
histories. Stanner identified both the structural inequality within Australian society and the 
amnesia that accompanies it, 
[I]t is a structural matter, a view from a window which has been carefully placed to 
exclude a whole quadrant of the landscape. What may well have begun as a simple 
forgetting of other possible views turned under habit and over time into something like 
a cult of forgetfulness practiced on a national scale (1974: 24-25). 
 
Michael Billig perceives “forgetfulness” as a deliberate omission underscored by ideological 
intent and he argues that social scientists have knowingly overlooked how the nation is 
reproduced,  
… the sociological forgetting is not fortuitous; nor is it to be blamed on the absent-
mindedness of particular scholars. Instead, it fits an ideological pattern in which ‘our’ 
nationalism (that of established nations …) is forgotten: it ceases to appear as 
nationalism, disappearing into the ‘natural’ environment of ‘societies’ (2013: 38).  
 
Billig examines how the dominant values of nation are perpetuated on a daily basis and the 
ease with which society becomes indoctrinated. He seeks to unravel the concept of nation 
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which exists, he contends, in the collective thought process of nationalist rhetoric and practice. 
To draw attention to this is a challenge, for apart from the days of overt, staged nationalism, 
and times of crises, nationalism is so laboriously repeated and so deeply embedded within the 
day to day cultural landscape that it’s rarely given a second thought.  
Under the Blanket of Whiteness 
Moreton-Robinson claims that in Australia “[W]hiteness is both the measure and 
marker of normality ... In its corporeal form, whiteness is a signifier of many things – including 
nationhood” (2008a: 66-67). The Australian national flag is the primary symbol of nationhood 
and is thus the most significant form of white Australian cultural capital: a material device the 
national flag is recognisable, portable, inexpensive, accessible, and can be found in all manner 
of places. An examination of the flag therefore demands an investigation into how whiteness 
operates both at a material and philosophical level in the day-to-day socio-cultural milieu. 
George Yancy comments that “undoing whiteness is inextricably linked to undoing those 
structural power relationships that continue to privilege whites” (2008: 242). Richard Dyer 
states that, “[T]he point of looking at whiteness is to dislodge it from its centrality and authority, 
not to reinstate it” (2003: 305). In this work whiteness is understood as an invisible set of 
practices that endows inherent and routinely unacknowledged privileges upon its recipients.  
Moreton-Robinson sees whiteness as a condition that operates discursively to reproduce 
itself: “whiteness”, she argues, “is constitutive of the epistemology of the West; it is an invisible 
regime of power that secures hegemony through discourse and has material effects in everyday 
life” (2011a: 75). As a normative set of practices whiteness routinely goes unchallenged by 
those who benefit from it, because, as Marcia Langton asserts “white Australians do not see 
themselves as having a ‘race’” (1999: 35). Therefore to be “involved in the process of 
racialising whiteness” (Moreton-Robinson 1999: 29), is not only a commitment to combatting 
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racism (McKay 1999), but it also enables a critical understanding of whiteness as a form of 
agency which is manufactured to maintain the hierarchy of racial privilege.  
In her influential work, Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris (1993) explores how 
whiteness became a valuable form of property through the oppression of Indigenous people 
and the appropriation of their lands. She argues also that whiteness has been ‘created’ through 
practices based on racial exclusion and subjugation. Whiteness is omniscient, structural and 
pervasive, forged from the appropriation of Indigenous lands. Harris asserts, 
[W]hiteness has functioned as self-identity in the domain of the intrinsic, personal, and 
psychological; as reputation in the interstices between internal and external identity; 
and, as property in the extrinsic, public, and legal realms. According whiteness actual 
legal status, converted an aspect of identity into an external object of property, moving 
whiteness from privileged identity to a vested interest (1993: 1725).  
 
Harris draws attention to the legal structures which legitimate and protect the inherited 
expectations of whiteness. She states that whiteness as property, “is a ghost that has haunted 
the political and legal domains in which claims for justice have been inadequately addressed 
for far too long” (1993: 1791). Harris understands whiteness as an insidious force, both tangible 
and intangible, a condition that permeates the nation based on the principle of ownership 
through racialised notions of privilege. In relation to the construction of national identity, 
Harris argues that whiteness is a central feature. 
In Australia, the centrality of whiteness in the construction of nation has been 
sanctioned by the law. Since first contact, laws have been set in place and enacted to enhance, 
protect and serve the vested interests of white authority. From Cook’s foundational act of theft 
and the construct of terra nullius, to the White Australia Policy,26 Australia was conceived and 
legally ratified for “the white man”, as evidenced by the Bulletin magazine. With the 
                                                 
26 The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 is commonly referred to as the White Australia Policy. From 1901-1973 
the White Australia Policy sanctioned a white Australian nation.  
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emergence of the new Australian nation in 1901 the Bulletin (published for over one hundred 
years), set about constructing corresponding understandings of national identity, “Australia is 
our country … It represents, in a sense, the last chance of the white race … there is no other 
place on earth where a new and purely white community can be reared …” (the Bulletin 1906 
qtd. in Crowley1973: 96). In order to establish and secure this racialised order throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, racially discriminatory domestic policies of ‘Protection’ 
and ‘Assimilation’ were employed to constrict and control all facets of life for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. In the twenty first century, white policies of repression have 
continued, sanctioned by both sides of politics.  
For example the Liberals, under the leadership of John Howard, led the Northern 
Territory Intervention27 a policy that continues, albeit under a different name of ‘Stronger 
Futures’ endorsed by both Labor leaders, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard. Policy continues to 
dictate issues of ‘race’ in the Australian nation and as such, renders it a modern day anomaly. 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States, like Australia, are considered ‘settler’ colonial 
states, however Australia stands apart as it has no treaty with Indigenous people. Fiona Nicoll 
explains that “the racialised trope of perspective pushes Indigenous sovereignty claims towards 
the pole of ‘subjectivity’ while granting the everyday imposition of white sovereignty an aura 
of ‘objective authority’” (2011: 20). Ongoing practices and policies of whiteness ensure that 
Indigenous sovereignty remains circumscribed. This is a systemic failure. As Yancy notes, 
                                                 
27 The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 was passed 18 August 2007. It was a reaction 
to the Little Children are Sacred report which identified a wide range of criminal and predatory abuse against 
children. All the claims were “fused together to create the impression of a storm of paedophilia” (Rundle 2007: 
43). The responsible Minister, Mal Brough admitted he did not read the Act of 500 pages before it was passed, 
and incredibly the word ‘children’ does not appear. The magnitude of the measures enforced were drastic. Among 
other things the Racial Discrimination Act was suspended, income protection introduced, and the Community 
Development Employment Scheme was abandoned. Aboriginal lands were seized for up to five years, the use of 
alcohol and pornography was restricted (80% of homeland areas were already voluntarily alcohol free and there 
was no evidence of serious pornography use). The Howard Government did not consult with Aboriginal people 
or child protection experts, instead it sent the army into the Northern Territory to deal with the ‘National 
Emergency’ (Concerned Australians 2010). Ten years on and the intervention has been assessed as a $587 million 
failure which achieved nothing, “locals still faced low employment, substandard education and inadequate food, 
housing and health facilities” (Koori Mail 31 May 2017: 13).   
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“whiteness continues to be a living, breathing historical construction, a social ontological 
performance that has profound, pervasive, and systemic oppressive consequences for nonwhite 
people” (2004: 14). 
Dyer states, “[A]s long as race is something only applied to non-white peoples, as long 
as white people are not racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm” (1997: 
1). Whiteness is a ubiquitous force that interrelates with sets of social and institutionalised 
practices and so has the capability to unify diasporic sections of the population. Dyer claims 
that whiteness “as a coalition” is more effective than class in “uniting people across national 
cultural differences” (1997:19). In this “coalition” of cultural amalgamation race is seemingly 
absent. White people are multifariously stereotyped in terms of reference according to: nation, 
class, sexuality, ability and gender. “Whiteness” Dyer argues “generally colonizes the 
stereotypical definition of all social categories other than those of race” (2003: 307). Yancy 
contends that all whites, even the most poor who share similar class and economic struggles to 
those of blacks, are better placed in society, “to be a poor white does not mean that one inhabits 
a space of ‘post-whiteness’” (2004: 7). Furthermore, “[U]nder the system of white hegemony, 
poor whites also manage to reap aesthetic and psychological rewards as a result of possessing 
the valued property of whiteness” (Yancy 2004: 8). These insights provide the space to further 
understand the modus operandi of whiteness and to disrupt that which is routinely accepted. 
Or to put this more eloquently, 
[W]e must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally 
accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; 
we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of 
one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they 
reign (Foucault 1997: 22).  
 
Larissa Behrendt argues “[I]t is only when we understand how the ideologies of 
colonialism have permeated today’s institutions that we can begin to break the grip of the 
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historical legacy” (2003: 8). Behrendt also claims that “seemingly neutral institutions are 
actually charged with colonial ideologies, legacies and a psychological terra nullius that cause 
disparate outcomes” (2003: 21). Behrendt highlights how apparently innocuous products of 
nation are in fact “charged” with racism. As the most prominent signifier of nation, nationalism 
and national identity, the national flag occupies a very specific place in the repository of 
everyday symbols. The flag’s ubiquity ensures that it is ‘flagged’ permanently across the 
nation, in every town and city, in every institutional site, at all manner of celebrations and 
events, a potent reminder, emblematic of ‘who we are’, and equally, who ‘we’ are not: a symbol 
of both racial superiority and racial subjugation. 
Yancy asserts that “[T]he social ontology of whiteness is a species of racism” (2004: 
14). In marking whiteness as a species, Yancy brings it to ‘life’ and thus whiteness is imbued 
with a corporeality that refutes notions of it as casual, passive or inert. Conceived of as a living 
entity, whiteness embodies agency; thus, it has the capacity to flourish, or to die. Yancy states 
that white people routinely evade “discussing their own social, political, economic, and cultural 
investments in whiteness” (2004: 4). Yancy argues here that habitual avoidance is an activity 
that the “species” of whiteness must perform in order to perpetuate white privilege; in other 
words, without the activity that ensures the survival of the species, whiteness could disappear. 
Therefore, as he further argues, “whiteness will never be innocent” (2004: 6). Whiteness must 
always and necessarily be activated by avoidance – and by a range of oppressive practices that 
ensure its supremacy. Yancy states that whiteness “systematically excludes, derails, polices, 
segregates, and murders” (2008: 238). Colonial systems of governance are grounded in 
widespread oppression. Ruth Frankenberg asserts an investigation into colonial history 
identifies how and why,  
race, culture, and nation slide so smoothly one into another in the present, providing 
alibis for each other in contemporary social, cultural, and political discourses about 
race, nation, identity, ownership, and belonging (1997: 9). 
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An analysis of Australia’s political, economic and social history demonstrates that the 
construction of whiteness and nation are tightly connected. The modern Australian nation, 
forged from the matrix of white patriarchal sovereignty and nationalism is thus conceived “as 
norm, as transparency, as national/natural state of being” (Frankenberg 1997: 16). Louise 
Chiodo notes, “[T]o be white in Australia is to occupy a position of structural advantage and 
perceived race neutrality that often remains unmarked and unnamed” (2015: 43). Chiodo 
highlights the lack of Indigenous presence in the planning of urban, institutional and civic 
spaces, arguing that these spaces are a “significant form of cultural capital … [which] reflect 
and reaffirm ideas about whiteness, Australian-ness and possession” (2015: 43). The nation’s 
flag, which adorns many of these sites of cultural capital provides a powerful visual 
augmentation of white sovereignty. 
Moreton-Robinson notes that while whiteness has been theorised as various forms of 
power, rarely “are the theoretical focuses drawn to the social constructions of white identity” 
(2015: xviii). An examination of these forces, she argues, will enable whiteness to be analysed 
in ways other than from the perspective of cultural difference. In addition, if theorising 
incorporates Indigenous sovereignty and a colonial nation-state then, “a different picture of 
analysis emerges. The existence of white supremacy as hegemony, ideology, epistemology, 
and ontology requires the possession of Indigenous lands as its proprietary anchor” (Moreton-
Robinson 2015: xix). White patriarchal sovereignty is understood as a regime of power that 
has its origins in the illegal possession of Aboriginal land. White Australians therefore “receive 
unearned social benefits as the inheritors of a racially based system of wealth and privilege … 
built upon the European invasion of Indigenous lands” (McKay 1999:4). Moreton-Robinson 
asserts that the modern Australian nation and its identity were constructed through the 
disavowal of Indigenous sovereignty, thus “[R]ace indelibly marks the politics of possessive 
39 
 
investments in patriarchal white sovereignty, which are often invisible and unnamed in 
everyday discourse and academic analyses” (2007: 101). 
Moreton-Robinson claims that “[P]atriarchal whiteness operates possessively as a raced 
and gendered epistemological a priori within knowledge production as universals, dominant 
norms, values and beliefs” (2011b: 414). In Australia the stalwart institutions of the nation 
remain firmly in the grip of a white patriarchal social order. Andrew Bragg, member of the 
Australian Republican Movement, draws attention to Australia’s top 200 companies of which 
only 5 per cent of the CEOs are women. Furthermore, he notes the reluctance to endorse women 
in leadership roles is matched by a reticence to engage with an Australian republic. Despite the 
fact that “business gets symbolism” he claims, “there are virtually no public utterances from 
business leaders on the dated symbols of a foreign hereditary head of state, knights and dames 
or the Union Jack” (2016:14). As Bragg points out, relationships of power are intricate. This 
example demonstrates how Australian patriarchal institutions are affiliated with the British 
monarchy and its symbols which raises the supposition that the symbols of British authority 
continue to reinforce the power and legitimacy of Australian powerbrokers.  
As an unnamed inherited phenomenon, whiteness extends a sense of normalcy, and so 
for many white people whiteness deflects criticism. What results from this is a ‘whiteness as 
rightness’ ideology which sets in motion a general acceptance of white ways and ‘things’ – 
celebratory days and symbols, for example. Any perceived threats to the status quo are met 
with resistance. Whites “will defend its values and place negative sanctions upon Indigenous 
people who contradict or expose the hypocrisy of white values in practice” (Moreton-Robinson 
1999: 33). Former Federal Liberal MP Dennis Jensen publicly criticised programs designed to 
improve outcomes for Indigenous people which led to the following exchange on Twitter, 
“Hell, how long ago was colonialism? Get over it … every country in the world has 
been successfully invaded in the past!”  
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@TheKooriWoman28 responded: “Do I snap my fingers and forget 213 years of 
oppression Mr Jensen? Which has created effects that are still being played out.”  
Dr Jensen responded: “It is time to unify Australia, not divide based on a victim 
mentality. What do you do when knocked down, just blame … So you have personally 
lived 213 years? Work out ways to maximise your own life experiences, you can’t for 
deceased ancestors” (qtd. in Harrison: 2013: 5). 
 
These comments by a serving Federal parliamentarian exemplify how whiteness provides a 
“culturally-constructed centrality” from which a white person, “evaluates and judges” (Yancy 
2004: 9). Jensen uses a common colonial strategy: he dismisses the ongoing effects of invasion 
while simultaneously laying the blame for disadvantage with Aboriginal people. While 
relationships of power between white Australia and Indigenous people have altered over the 
course of colonial history, whiteness has effectively kept, and continues to keep Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people on the periphery of nation-building and decision-making.   
Since first contact Indigenous people have studied white people. Moreton-Robinson 
claims that whiteness is “ever present in the psyche of Indigenous people, but not because of 
its absence” (1999: 35). Where white citizens fail to see their whiteness, Indigenous people are 
acutely aware,  
[W]e are positioned as not being entitled to an equal share in the resources of Australian 
society as our interests are not included within the sphere of the interests of the nation. 
Indigenous people know that white culture does not respect, value or view as legitimate 
and valid our knowledges and rights on our own terms (Moreton-Robinson 1999: 35). 
 
The habitual neglect of the white citizenry to disseminate whiteness not only reinforces white 
privilege but it also affords little space for scrutiny. Nicoll (2011) argues that very few white 
people have an embodied ontological awareness of being in Indigenous sovereignty; rather, 
they form an opinion which refuses to engage with Indigenous discourses and thus they assume 
                                                 
28 “Koori” is used to describe an Aboriginal person who comes from New South Wales and Victoria.  
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a standpoint on Indigenous sovereignty. Being in Indigenous sovereignty Nicoll explains, 
requires us to understand ongoing Indigenous sovereignty struggles and the racialised nature 
of Australian historiography. She argues that those who understand the history of Australia, 
the ongoing violence and failure to engage with sovereign owners, become “exposed to the 
alienating experience of being subjects of a white nation which denies there ever was a war, let 
alone that it is continuing”, through knowledge, “the embodied white subject … exists on the 
ground of race relations rather than hovering above it” (2011: 30). Whiteness is thus a 
comfortable site of privilege that does not advocate for its citizens to be in Indigenous 
sovereignty, nor does it welcome change or promote self-reflection. This fait accompli can be 
countered Nicoll asserts, through acts of Indigenous resistance to white sovereignty and by the 
enduring presence and agency of Indigenous sovereignty. She claims that Indigenous 
standpoints provide the space for white subjects to “unlearn” white privilege (2011: 29). 
Langton argues that “Australians do not know and relate to Aboriginal people” and she 
asserts that the “most dense relationship is not between actual people, but between white 
Australians and the symbols created by their predecessors” (2008: 119). Moreton-Robinson 
claims that white race privilege needs, “to be owned and challenged by white feminists engaged 
in anti-racist pedagogy and politics” (2000: 351). This is the space of power and tension, and 
in order to understand it more fully I now engage with the work of Martin Nakata whose often 
autobiographical style of theorising sits in contrast to that of white academia: a point illustrated 
by Nicoll who notes that while the white patriarchy dominates Indigenous affairs, “the first 
person singular and plural will tend to be conflated with the object rather than the subject of 
research” (2000: 374). Moreton-Robinson asserts that discourses of whiteness produce 
‘knowledges of deficit’ and position Indigenous people as “always lacking” (2008b: 130). 




Lifting the Blanket of Whiteness  
Martin Nakata’s scholarship provides the opportunity for non-Indigenous subjects 
(researchers, educators and the wider population) to include Indigenous Knowledge29 into the 
everyday. Nakata’s methodology creates space for generating new knowledge and 
understandings that draw attention to issues which might not have been given prior 
consideration by the wider population, perspectives that relate to the Australian national flag 
for example.30 A critical engagement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander standpoints 
therefore encourages new knowledge by “bringing in accounts of relations that ‘knowers’ [non-
Indigenous people] located in more privileged social positions are not attentive to” (Nakata 
2007: 12).31 
Colleen McGloin engages with the work of Nakata in an attempt to better understand 
his call for white Australians to be more self-reflexive. Nakata calls for “non-Indigenous 
academics to become conversant with his methodologies, and for them to begin engaging at 
the level of dialogue with the issues he raises in his work” (McGloin 2009: 36). McGloin argues 
for non-Indigenous academics to connect with Nakata’s methodologies in order to understand 
“how to embed Indigenous knowledge into academic disciplines, curricula … and by 
extension, into public discourse” (2009: 40). McGloin also notes the value of experiential 
knowledge as a pedagogical tool. The importance of experiential pedagogy is twofold, not only 
is it an effective tool to teach non-Indigenous people, but, as Nakata argues, it is also a way to 
“do” Indigenous Knowledge, “Indigenous epistemological basis of knowledge construction 
                                                 
29 Capital letters are used in keeping with Nakata’s work. Nakata notes Indigenous Knowledge with an upper case 
‘K’ is used to identify with an epistemological understanding of knowledge systems; a lower case ‘k’ identifies 
fragmented articles of a knowledge system (2002).  
30 See Appendix B.  
31 Over the course of my research I found that when I discussed my work with non-Indigenous friends or peers I 
received a consistent response, which in effect stated, “I have never thought about the national flag in terms of 




and the ways of “doing” knowledge are … in ways of story-telling, of memory-making, in 
narrative, art and performance …” (Nakata 2007: 10). For non-Indigenous researchers, 
Nakata’s approach to race theory provides a basis for the real, lived realities of Indigenous 
subjects to teach the on-going effects of colonial racism. 
Nakata deconstructs Western structures of knowledge production in order to explore 
the duality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous systems of thought and knowledge. The 
deconstruction of western ways of ‘knowing’ provides a means to challenge dominant 
discourses and discriminatory representations. Nakata initially argued against the principle of 
marginalised people explaining their life experience to the wider population, he questioned, 
“why people from dominant groups couldn’t understand my position by reflecting on their own 
actions” (1993: 53). A lack of self-reflection further skews power towards non-Indigenous 
people. If viewpoints of the dominant group are considered normative then they ‘naturally’ 
require no comment, in contrast counter-perspectives inevitably attract attention and therefore 
demand explanation. As a means to counter dominant ways of ‘knowing’, personal experience 
is employed to “bring home very powerfully the implications and effects that flow on to peoples 
lives from institutional and governmental practice” (Nakata 1993: 53).32 Nakata asserts, “I 
choose to inter-weave my personal story into my more academic work, rather than abide by 
Western academic or literary protocols” (2008b: 135). Nakata’s perceptions of the white world 
are based on his life experience and family history, which result in, “what is now a very political 
and critical stand that I take towards academic work” (1993: 56). And he states, “you can see 
why my standpoint must necessarily be differently located from the standpoint of western 
                                                 
32 Nicoll testifies, reading Ruby Langford Ginibi’s Don’t Take Your Love to Town, she explains, “I expected to 
consume an autobiography but instead found myself encountering a text that was a revelation of the harsh realities 
of Indigenous existence and an injunction to do something about them” (2000: 370). 
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educators …” (1993: 61). At the intersection of Indigenous and western domains, lies a 
complicated space of tension and conflict, theorised by Nakata as the “cultural interface”.  
The cultural interface is a site of both friction and potential productivity that provides 
a way to understand the very real and polarised ambits of western and Indigenous 
epistemologies. Nakata conceptualises the cultural interface as the beginning point which 
considers how, 
Knowledge systems as they operate in people’s daily lives will interact, develop, 
change, and transform. It accepts that all Knowledge systems are culturally-embedded, 
dynamic, respond to changing circumstances and constantly evolve. It is not strictly 
about the replacement of one with the other, nor the undermining of one by the other. 
It is about maintaining the continuity of one when having to harness another and 
working the interaction in ways that serve Indigenous interests, in ways that can uphold 
distinctiveness and special status as First peoples (2002: 286).     
 
Nakata draws attention here to the cultural interface as a site of potential change, based on an 
understanding and experience of colonialism and its effects on Indigenous people in the 
everyday, and the need for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ knowledge to be 
afforded an equal and respected status. 
Theoretical Approach 
Discourse Analysis  
I want to unravel the national flag’s capacity for imparting particular types of 
knowledge about who or what we are, or who we can be or might be in terms of national 
identity. The flag as a textual symbol creates a very particular reality in Australian public life. 
However, its meanings are not fixed: on the contrary, the flag undergoes many transformations 
in its efforts to (re)invigorate national sentiment. These are not renovations of the flag itself, 
but of its uses and applications, the debates, statements and discussions which keep it alive. 
Despite sporadic and what appear momentary shifts in the discourses surrounding the flag, in 
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its current form, the national flag maintains a particular set of colonial meanings which carry 
with it the material presence of knowledge systems, founded on racial, religious and cultural 
superiority.  
Discourse analysis reveals how dominant values and knowledges can be (re)produced 
and (re)distributed with uncanny ease. As Foucault ascertains, “… there is no knowledge 
without a particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the 
knowledge that it forms” (1997: 183). White has argued that in Australia knowledge production 
was inextricably linked with relations of power and reciprocity, this in turn defined hegemonic 
values and sustained notions of what is accepted as true or false. Foucault identifies these 
systems of thought as being located in the fields of general history, the analysis of which, 
seeks to discover that whole domain of institutions, economic processes, and social 
relations on which a discursive formation can be articulated; it tries to show how the 
autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the status of pure 
ideality and total historical independence; what it wishes to uncover is the particular 
level in which history can give place to definite types of discourse, which have their 
own type of historicity, and which are related to a whole set of various historicities 
(1997: 164-165).  
 
Drawing from Foucault I will identify the sets of statements which accrue around the 
national flag in its many and varied contexts in order to discover not only its primary and 
obvious intentions, but also to reveal its capabilities for exclusion. Discursive practices in the 
Foucauldian sense are the foundation upon which bodies of knowledge emerge. They are the 
organising principles of an episteme and play an active role in determining both language and 
thoughts. These principles form the basis from which knowledge about objects of inquiry come 
into being and how, once inserted into discourse, what we ‘know’ becomes ‘naturalised’, 
unquestioned and certified as ‘truth’. Foucault alerts us to follow, 
the thread of analogies and symbols, [to] rediscover a thematic that is more imaginary 
than discursive, more affective than rational, and less close to the concept than to desire; 
its force animates the most opposed figures, but only to melt them at once into a slowly 
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transformable unity; what one discovers is a plastic continuity, the movement of a 
meaning that is embodied in various representations, images, and metaphors (1997: 
150).     
 
In deploying a Foucauldian analysis of the discourses that construct and maintain nationalism, 
I will simultaneously consider the opposing episteme of Indigenous knowledge to counter the 
embedded hegemonic understandings in the national flag. When considering oppositional ways 
of knowing, I will attempt not only to deconstruct some of the powerful symbolism of the 
national flag, but also to foreground the possibility for a counter discourse that emphasises a 
different conception of flag and nation based on some of the philosophical principles of 
inclusion and cooperation that have ensured the enduringness of Indigenous cultures. The 
“representations, images and metaphors” of the national flag are its textual symbols, and they 
transmit various messages, including those of whiteness and national exclusion. 
Banal Nationalism 
Billig’s concept of “banal nationalism” makes it possible to theorise the ways in which 
members of established democratic nations are unconsciously enculturated with national 
identity on a daily basis. Billig’s application of the word ‘banal’ ought not to be confused with 
meaning harmless or trite. On the contrary banal nationalism in this context refers to an 
insidious and pervasive practice. Banal nationalism maintains and (re)produces national 
identity through widespread and commonplace ideologies and habits, “[I]n routine practices 
and everyday discourses, especially those in the mass media, the idea of nationhood is regularly 
flagged” (Billig 2013: 154). Banal nationalism’s focus is on the unconscious aspects of 
nationalism; reading a newspaper or listening to the weather for example, are so routine that 
they draw no attention. Billig argues, “the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place 
in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not 
consciously registered as reminding” (2013: 8).  
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Billig draws attention to how the nation is routinely flagged via the sports pages of 
newspapers, “[E]very day, the world over, millions upon millions of men scan these pages, 
sharing in defeats and victories, feeling at home in this world of waved flags” (2013: 122). 
Billig notes the extant relationship between sport, war and masculinity. He argues that the 
bonds created through sport helps to prepare citizens to be ‘armed’ and ready to fight for the 
protection of their nation, “[O]n foreign fields, the men win their trophies, or lose their honour, 
doing battle on the nation’s behalf” (Billig 2013: 122-123). Sport, he argues, not only echoes 
warfare, but is a symbol from which to understand war. Metaphors of war are frequently 
deployed in sporting commentary: ‘charging’, ‘shooting’, ‘attacking’ and ‘firing’. Routine 
reminders which serve to prepare the populace for future conflict, when “our country needs us 
to do-or-die. The call will already be familiar; the obligations have been primed; their words 
have long been installed in the territory of our pleasure” (Billig 2013: 125). 
Banal nationalism co-exists, and most significantly, underpins the more conscious, 
readily recognised forms of nationalism. In other words, the banal signifiers of national identity 
fortify the more visible aspects of nationalism which emerge on national days and in times of 
crises (Skey 2009). Apart from brief, overt outbursts, nationalism in established western 
nations is conceptualised as a phenomenon which usually belongs to emerging nations and is 
thus considered to be emotionally and politically charged. Understanding nationalism in this 
way is deceptive and has been facilitated by an abundance of historical literature and imagery 
focusing on the triumphant establishment of nations across the world. Theories of nationalism 
have thus entered the realm of ‘common sense’, where taken-for-granted assumptions about 
the naturalness of nations presides. Billig claims that nationalism is a form of social life which 
needs to be believed in and replicated on a daily basis in order for the nation to be (re)produced, 
and he argues, “[N]ationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is 
the endemic condition” (2013: 6). 
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Billig’s work on national flags distinguishes between flags that are consciously waved 
and saluted, and flags which are not. Waved flags are traditionally associated with nationalism 
and habitually demand an outward show of emotion. In contrast, unsaluted and unwaved flags 
demand little or no attention. Billig asserts that of all the signifiers, it is the unwaved flag which 
is the metonymic image of banal nationalism. Unwaved flags are tacit symbols which litter the 
subconscious landscape as they routinely ‘flag’ the nation. Unwaved flags adorn the everyday. 
They are found on flagpoles scattered throughout the land and are highly adaptable. I have seen 
the national flag on shop fronts, stationery, clothes, linen, trucks, cars, footwear, jewellery, 
tattoos, on greeting cards, exercise books and electronic devices. The unwaved flag “attracts 
no special attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be 
identified as a problem” (Billig 2013: 6). This statement establishes that a relationship exists 
between the flag and the populace which appears to be unproblematic.   
Unwaved flags as banal reminders of nationhood meld into the cultural landscape and 
as Palmer notes, they work to “gently remind people of who they are rather than leap out with 
flashing lights, brass bands and calls to defend the nation” (1998: 181). The proliferation of 
routine ‘flaggings’ assures the national flag’s place in the Australian landscape as a symbol 
whose very power lies in its inconspicuous insertion into the everyday The pervasiveness of 
unwaved flags, adorning such a vast range of everyday cultural paraphernalia, comprise 
perhaps the most crucial component of national indoctrination. In other words, I would suggest, 
in their seeming unobtrusiveness lies their proselytising force.  
Drawing on and extending Billig’s thesis not only highlights the ways that citizens are 
indoctrinated with national ideals on a daily basis, but also provides a framework from which 
to hypothesise the reasons why non-Indigenous debates which surround the national flag 
routinely fail to incorporate Indigenous perspectives. Billig argues that scholars, in particular 
social scientists, have frequently overlooked the banal reproduction of national ideals, “[T]he 
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gaps in language, which enable banal nationalism to be forgotten, are also gaps in theoretical 
discourse” (2013: 8). In order to rectify this neglect Billig calls upon social scientists to 
“distance ourselves from ourselves and from that which we routinely accept as obvious or 
‘natural’” (2013: 15). This means, as a non-Indigenous researcher I must critically engage with 
nationalism and whiteness as an ideological force that permeates all discourses and is encoded 
in sets of practices which regulate the body politic according to principles of same / Other, 
them / us. These are principles which demand constant repetition in order that ‘we’ know who 
‘we’ are and what ‘we’ stand for. Challenging the assumptions associated with the ‘naturalness’ 
of nationalism opens up debates about legitimacy. In Australia the continent was taken without 
consent or a treaty, as a result, “the Australian nation-state has a legitimacy problem that 
remains unresolved” (Brennan et al 2005: 5).  
As banal nationalism has been neglected by scholars, Billig asserts that the unwaved 
flags have been neglected by the citizenry, “… flags each day hang limply in public places. 
These reminders of nationhood hardly register in the flow of daily attention, as citizens rush 
past on their daily business” (2013: 38). Butz (2009) argues that banal or pervasive flag display 
may be responsible for an unconscious and automated increase in feelings of national belonging 
for some, but not for others. Crucially, he states “repeated exposure to symbols that threaten 
racial identity may have important implications for psychological well-being” (2009: 794). 
Butz’ hypothesis correlates with those articulated by Indigenous leaders. Parliamentarian Linda 
Burney, for example claims, 
I do find it difficult, and have always found it difficult to accept that Union Jack in the 
corner, and my view is that wouldn’t it be wonderful to have an Australian flag that 
represents the colours and the diversity and the depth and the ancientness of people in 




Anthony Mundine, a boxer and activist is committed to uniting Australia. He states that the 
Union Jack  
symbolises the invasion, the murder, the pillaging, and on and on. I think we need to 
address that – it’s dividing Australia, rather than uniting Australia … At the moment, I 
can’t fly it. And I want to fly the Australian flag. I want to fly it for the Australian 
people. But let’s do it together (qtd. in Jackson 2012: 7).  
 
Lead singer of Yothu Yindi, Mandawuy Yunupingu was an Elder and educator who worked 
tirelessly in the fight against white Australian racism. Yunupingu is remembered by his brother, 
Djungatjunga Yunupingu, who acknowledges that “his brother was a rock star, but more 
importantly an advocate of reconciliation and education equality who wanted one flag for 
Australia” (Johnston 2013: 5). At Yunupingu’s memorial an Indigenous elder stated, “[L]et us 
all raise one flag, so we can all call Australia home” (qtd. in ABC News 2013b). Burney, 
Mundine and Yunupingu testify that the Australian national flag in its current formation 
disallows notions of national belonging and ‘unity’. Eriksen argues that if a country is largely 
homogenous then the national flag may ‘unify’ at the cost of “categorically excluding the 
minorities” (2007: 5). It could be argued that the Australian flag “categorically” excludes 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, who comprise three per cent of the population, as 
the flags’ colonial imagery, values and status remain ineluctably woven into the fabric of the 
white Australian nation.  
Findings from an American study indicate that an axiomatic relationship between 
American-ness and whiteness influences a diverse range of perceptions which surround the 
American national flag. Using Billig’s thesis of banal nationalism, Manuel Madriaga (2007) 
explores the significance of the American Flag33 in determining which members of the 
community are included or excluded. This study is useful, however, it is important to note that 
                                                 
33 In keeping with Madriaga’s work I use a capital ‘F’ when writing about the American Flag. 
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it has its limitations. Of the 25 respondents 10 were white, 9 were black and 6 were Latino. All 
were male military veterans. Madriaga notes that a similar study could be undertaken in the 
United Kingdom, “where people of colour stand out as not being British” (2007: 67). Madriaga 
claims that national symbols displayed on a daily basis are a persistent reminder of the extant 
boundaries found within the populace. National symbols transmit notions of ‘us’ and ‘them, 
signals of identity which, Madriaga argues, have racial overtones. Madriaga also asserts that 
there is an official or public face of the Flag which in theory binds all Americans together, 
irrespective of race or ethnicity. It is this face of the Flag in which whiteness goes unmarked 
and unnoticed which,  
makes it difficult for people of colour to participate meaningfully within the American 
collective. Their subjectivities are restrained and hidden in private behind ‘white 
masks’. Being racialised and having to wear a ‘white mask’ in public can skew one’s 
attachment to the symbolic ideal of the Flag (Madriaga 2007: 54 emphasis in the 
original).  
 
In Madriaga’s study, the black respondents demonstrated an attachment to the 
American Flag, yet their responses were influenced by issues of race and injustice. One 
respondent states, “… to me, the American Flag means freedom, freedom of expression even 
though it has a lot of flaws in race relations and stuff like that …” (2007: 59). Madriaga notes 
the black respondents all “straddle the public and private faces of the American Flag, where 
senses of similarity (us) and difference (them) go hand-in-hand” (2007: 59). This was not the 
case for the white respondents, all of whom shared an “attachment to a past in which the Flag 
was praised and its symbolic significance was not questioned” (Madriaga 2007: 57). Madriaga 
finds that for the white respondents race was not an issue, and notions of whiteness were absent, 
“[T]heir interpretations [of the Flag] were ‘race’-neutral, leaving ‘whiteness’ unmarked” 
(2007: 56). Madriaga demonstrates that there is an indicative link between whiteness, the Flag 
and American-ness. For the white respondents, there was no apparent link between the Flag, 
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and racial difference. However, non-white respondents were compelled to “discuss their racial 
and ethnic distinctiveness while discussing their allegiance to the Flag. By doing so, they not 
only flag their Otherness. They also flag ‘whiteness’ in notions of American-ness” (Madriaga 
2007: 67). 
In Australia racism in favour of whites tends to go unremarked, as returning to Foley 
demonstrates,  
we need to remember that the concept of Australia as a nation is greater than the sum 
of its individuals and communal parts. It includes also our particular way of life, which 
is directly connected to our British heritage, whether we are black or white and whether 
we like it or not. 
A national flag is symbolic of the cohesion which exists between those individuals and 
communities and represents the collective ethic that has developed over time. Thus, we 
need to take care that we do not lose sight of the essence of the nation in the quest to 
satisfy and recognise particular groups within it (1996a: 196).  
 
Foley states that the Australian nation and British heritage are synonymous. She cautions 
against losing sight, or perhaps letting go of this “essence”. By urging us not to “satisfy and 
recognise particular groups” within the nation, Foley seeks to assimilate all to the collective 
ethic of “our British heritage”. By failing to recognise white Australians as a “particular group” 
Foley confirms Madriaga’s findings. She conceives white Australians, and by default the flag, 
as being raceless. 
In her discussion of the Australian national flag Foley recognises that the “feelings” of 
Indigenous people are fundamental when considering to retain or reject the Union Jack. Foley 
recognises that the Union Jack must be a “positive affront” for Indigenous people, some of 
whom consider the Union Jack to be the “Butcher’s Apron” as it “is covered with the blood of 
the dispossessed Aboriginal people” (1996a: 98). This horrific analogy, Foley argues, must 
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surely be reason enough to dispense with the Union Jack. However, to counter this argument 
she states,  
[W]hile it is undeniably true that the Union Jack symbolises British invasion and 
dispossession, it is also true that it symbolises a political and judicial system that now 
enables the Aboriginal people to voice their grievances openly without fear of reprisal 
and with the definite hope that their grievances will be addressed (1996a: 98). 
 
What Foley fails to consider are the systems of governance which were in existence and had 
flourished for millennia before Cook. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander nations were 
sophisticated, sacred and sustainable, as evidenced by the Encounters: Revealing Stories of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Objects from the British Museum exhibition.34 The 
objects on display, including the Gweagal shield and spears taken by either Cook or Banks at 
Kurnell, were on loan, returned to Australia for the first time since 1770. June Oscar, states that 
the artefacts, 
draw attention to the unsettled and emergent dialogue that is ever unfolding between 
our Indigenous nation’s claims to self-determination and sovereignty, which we have 
never relinquished, and the Australian nation-state’s imposed governmental and 
legislative authority over the entire continent (2015: 26). 
 
From Foley’s perspective however, it is evident that whiteness is the considered norm; the 
platform from which opinions and practices surrounding the national flag and its nation are 
justified.35  
  
                                                 
34 Encounters was held at the National Museum Canberra from 27 November 2015 to 28 March 2016.  
35 Browsing Canberra’s Parliament House gift shop in September 2015 I noted copies of Foley’s book (1996) 




The various approaches to analysis discussed in this chapter will be deployed 
throughout the thesis. Understanding the relationships between nation, whiteness and identity 
makes visible the scope and scale in which citizens are shaped in everyday life. As the epigraph 
details, the deployment of banal nationalism is imperative to the national agenda as it underpins 
the more common understandings of nationalism and facilitates with ease its (re)production. 
Bhabha notes that people form “a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference: their claim 
to be representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification and discursive address” 
(1994: 208). The replication of the nation emerges from a diverse, but hegemonic, range of 
routine practices, symbols and everyday discourses. Billig comments, “[N]ational identities are 
rooted within a powerful social structure, which reproduces hegemonic relations of inequity” 
(2013: 175). “… hegemonic relations of inequity” are mirrored in the Australian national flag, 
where under the guise of history, sentiment and tradition we find whiteness, nation and identity 
inextricably woven into its fabric. Clearly national symbols have the potential to impede 
feelings of identity and belonging. With this in mind, and in order to develop a more in-depth 
understanding of the parasitic relationship which binds nation and symbol, I now turn my 
attention to the creation of the modern nation. Through the work of various theorists of nation 











CHAPTER THREE: Whose Nation Australia? 
Today, nearly all my people live in shambling, broken-down places with poor houses, poor 
roads, bad schools, little or no health care, with whitefellas in a welfare industry who service 
us when they can, if they want. We are captives of welfare, which means we are wards of the 
state relying on handouts from public servants to get by, and therefore our lives are controlled 
by governments and public servants who can do what they want, when they feel like it. And 
people suffer from their neglect - just look at our communities and the lives too many of our 
people are forced to endure. Although the wealth of the Australian nation has been taken from 
our soil, our communities and homelands bear no resemblance to the great towns and 
metropolises of the modern Australian nation.  
                                                                                          (Galarrwuy Yunupingu 2008: 39-40). 
 
Introduction   
The modern western nation was forged during an era of political and social unrest. The 
years between 1700 and 1914 saw agricultural, industrial, political and scientific revolutions 
sweep through Europe.36 These revolutions were the catalyst for change out of which the 
dominating framework of “the West” emerged. Western principles were then dispersed across 
the globe as Europe claimed vast areas for itself through colonisation. This was the era of 
European domination. It was a time of discovery and power which began to cement the idea of 
nation as a western stronghold of superior order. Edward Said claims,  
… so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an 
assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently 
inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West (2003: 40-41).  
 
                                                 
36 Three political revolutions are considered to be landmarks for the beginning of the modern political era: the 
English Revolution 1688-1689, the American Revolution 1776-1783, and the French Revolution 1789-1799. All 
three events changed the history of the world and are considered ‘true’ revolutions because they transferred power 
from some people to others, either by force or the threat of force (Roberts 1985). The English and American 
Revolutions focused on questions of sovereignty, and the need to defend existing legal, practical and customary 
freedoms. The English Revolution resulted in one monarch being replaced by another. The American Revolution 
was more forceful. The deposition of the monarchy resulted in the establishment of a republic, and in 1783 the 
British were forced to recognise the independence of the United States of America. The French Revolution was 
different. It occurred at a time when the French monarchy was powerful on the international stage. However, it 
took place in a country where many conditions of the Middle Ages were still prevalent. This revolution ended 
feudalism and the privileges enjoyed by nobles and Church leaders alike. It reformed administration, provided 
education and equality for the people. The French Revolution showed the world a new way of thinking about the 
possibilities of social change and “identified politics as the proper instrument for achieving such change, for 
challenging and infringing vested rights and interests” (Roberts 1985: 284-285). 
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In 1815, Europe had colonised approximately 35 percent of the world. By 1914, this figure had 
increased to 85 percent (Said 2003). The modern Australian nation was officially created 
during this time as the British Parliament passed legislation permitting Australia to govern as 
an independent nation. On 1 January 1901, the six British colonies federated and became the 
Commonwealth of Australia. In Part One of this chapter I engage with a range of theorists who 
provide various ways of understanding how and why the modern nation evolved. These have 
been selected according to their usefulness in providing a comprehensive understanding of the 
formation of the modern nation, and also, for their ability to impart a more cogent view of 
Australia’s construction as a colonised nation-state. In Part Two, I proffer a counter discourse 
of what constitutes nation through the perspectives of Aboriginal theorists, leaders and 
community Elders who question the legitimacy of the Australian nation state.   
PART ONE: The Creation of the Modern Nation 
Ernest Renan 
In 1882 Ernest Renan delivered a lecture in France titled Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? 
(What is a nation?). Renan asserts that it was the French Revolution which allowed France to 
own the concept of nationality, “[W]e should not be displeased if others imitate us in this. It 
was we who founded the principle of nationality” (1990: 12). With the rise of French 
nationalism came the associated symbols of the French Revolution: the French national flag 
and national anthem, “La Marseillaise” were both adopted in 1794 and are recognised as being 
the source for national flags and anthems as we know them today.37 In his quest to identify 
what a nation is, Renan hypothesises that in themselves, language, religion and geography are 
insufficient explanations. He speculates that nations such as France, England, Germany and 
Russia will continue for centuries as individual historical units, no matter what will befall them, 
“the crucial pieces on a chequerboard whose squares will forever vary in importance and size 
                                                 
37 Exceptions to this are the Dutch flag (see Chapter Five) and British national anthem. 
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but will never be wholly confused with each other” (1990: 9). If on one hand, geography, 
religion and language do not fully explain what a nation is, yet on the other, the assertion can 
be made that nations such as England, Russia, France and Germany will remain as individual 
units for centuries to come, one therefore has to consider what the other components are, in 
order to fully understand the phenomenon of the modern Western nation-state. 
Language and race, Renan notes, invite people to unite but do not compel them to. 
Renan claims that languages are historical formations and race should have no applications in 
politics, “to make politics depend upon ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to a chimera” 
(1990: 14). An excessive preoccupation with language and race, Renan asserts, is fraught with 
danger, 
[S]uch exaggerations enclose one within a specific culture, considered as national; one 
limits oneself, one hems oneself in. One leaves the heady air that one breathes in the 
vast field of humanity in order to enclose oneself in a conventicle with one’s 
compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; nothing could be more disturbing 
for civilization (1990: 17). 
 
Renan promotes the importance of diversity as he argues against monocultures. Renan’s belief  
that nationality can no longer be defined by religion draws attention to the fact that in the 
modern nation, theological dogma has been replaced by a ‘state religion’. Examples of this new 
religion include what Renan calls the “cult of the flag” (1990:17). This analogy is corroborated 
by Smith who states “as the highest expression of nationality, the flag is likely to be the center 
of a cult, replacing the king or high priest who received adulation in prenationalist days” (1975: 
56). Renan argues that to reject the “cult” is akin to a refusal to engage in military conscription. 
Through Renan’s work, we begin to understand how a simple piece of cloth has the power to 
amalgamate citizen to state.  
Renan contends that historical error is crucial to nation building. This argument is 
compounded by his assertion that the analysis of history has the potential to undermine the 
58 
 
principle of nationhood, “[I]ndeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which 
took place at the origin of all political formations” (1990: 11). According to this standpoint, a 
collective forgetting about violence is a necessary tenet from which national stability and social 
cohesion can be established. Renan notes the importance of community bonds and geographical 
features but he states, they are not enough to define a nation, 
[M]ore valuable by far than common customs posts and frontiers conforming to 
strategic ideas is the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and of 
having, in the future, [a shared] programme to put into effect, or the fact of having 
suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together. These are the kinds of things that can be 
understood in spite of differences of race and language … suffering in common unifies 
more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value 
than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort (1990: 19). 
 
Following Renan, the importance of truth-telling and addressing “national memories” is 
significant in that this provides a framework for acknowledgement and responsibility from 
which a colonising culture might begin to rectify the wrongs of its past.  
Renan likens the nation to a soul, a spiritual principle consisting of two elements; one 
lies in the past and the other in the present. The former refers to a collective legacy of national 
memories, which, when combined with the latter, create “the essential conditions for being a 
people” (1990: 19). It is here, in Renan’s discussion of the present, that he introduces the 
concept of ‘will’ and ‘consent’: “the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of 
the heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (1990: 19). Renan’s formula for 
nation-building constructs the nation according to a set of what he sees as ethical principles 
founded on inclusion, consent, and sharing, where recognising the wrongs of the past, as well 
as the successes, and considering the future as a ‘shared’ endeavour are fundamental to nation 
building.   
Ernest Gellner  
Ernest Gellner ranks as one of the most influential theorists of the nation (Bosworth 
2007; Sutherland 2012). Gellner’s work on nationalism, 
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still represents the single most important attempt to provide a theory of nationalism as 
a whole. It is one grounded in an overall vision of human history and an insistence on 
the uniqueness of the modern world (Breuilly qtd. in Gellner 2006: liii). 
 
In Nations and Nationalism (1988) Gellner establishes that nationalism emerged not only from 
the throes of revolution and colonisation but also as a response to a population explosion in a 
rapidly urbanising world. In order to sustain economic growth a labour force was required that 
needed to be both mobile and literate. As a result, education became a state responsibility and 
an obligatory norm. Under these conditions the ubiquitous role of the state flourished and with 
the establishment of pervasive “high cultures” (standardised literacy and education-based 
communication systems) nations began to be conceptualised and defined in terms of culture, 
which 
constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently 
identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy … 
under these conditions only, nations can indeed be defined in terms both of will and of 
culture, and indeed in terms of the convergence of them both with political units. In 
these conditions, men will to be politically united with all those, and only those, who 
share their culture. Polities then will to extend their boundaries to the limits of their 
cultures, and to protect and impose their culture within the boundaries of their power. 
The fusion of will, culture and polity becomes the norm, and one not easily or frequently 
defied (Gellner 1988: 55 emphasis in the original).  
 
 
When the modern Australian nation was born, colonial values, “will, culture and polity” fused 
to become an indomitable force. Prior to 1900 there was no actual nation of “Australia”, there 
were six colonies: New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, 
Victoria, and Tasmania. All were governed by Britain as separate countries. After a ten year 
debate the colonies federated, and on 1 January 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia was 
proclaimed, “Australia was the first nation in history to vote itself into existence” (Hartcher 
2017: 30). At this time, 98 percent of the population was white. In order to maintain the status 
quo, and to protect Australia from perceived threats, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, 
known as the White Australia Policy was implemented. The alignment of Commonwealth and 
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culture was substantiated by the nation’s political agenda. The White Australia Policy was not 
officially abolished until 1973, the official authority of white rule was thus inscribed in a 
binding legal statute until then, to echo Gellner, “[I]t is precisely by binding things together 
that traditional visions perpetuate themselves and the prejudgements contained within them” 
(1988: 22).   
Gellner states that nationalism is “the external manifestation of a deep adjustment in 
the relationship between polity and culture” (1988: 35). Nationalism’s strength lies in its ability 
to be routinely accepted as a natural phenomenon, and when the principles of nationalism 
combine, only then the nation is created, 
[N]ations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-
delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing 
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-
existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one 
(Gellner 1988: 48-49 emphasis in the original).  
 
Gellner argues that formal exclusion is a central tenet of nationalism upon which political 
legitimacy relies. Australia’s “political legitimacy” has been established by the socio-legal 
exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Indigenous people have been 
systematically excluded from all political processes and were not given citizenship rights until 
1962, nor counted in the census (which has been held every five years since 1911), until 1967. 
As I write, nearly 120 years after Federation, Indigenous people have yet to be ‘recognised’ in 
the Australian Constitution, and repeated calls for a treaty, or treaties, remain unanswered. 
Understanding the historical realities which constructed the Australian nation, reveals how “a 
dominant identity generates an image that fosters ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’, inclusion and 
exclusion, presence and absence” (Behrendt 2003: 56). It is also through the process of 
acknowledging colonial history that I can begin to understand the force of the nation’s most 
strident emblem, to borrow from Gellner, “it is by insisting on prising things apart that we have 




Eric Hobsbawm, a British Marxist historian is renowned for his work on nationalism. 
He identifies the nation as a modern and historically recent phenomenon. Hobsbawm asserts 
that nationalism precedes the nation and is in principle a set of relations between national and 
political units. The modern nation, shaped during the era of the French Revolution, is 
understood by Hobsbawm as being multi-faceted, a place where territory, politics and social 
aspirations intersect. After the revolution, politics were democratised and the allegiance once 
afforded to secular or religious rulers was no longer guaranteed. The people demanded to be 
heard, and through their elected state representatives they had a voice. In return, the state 
needed the people for both money and protection which was obtained by way of taxes and 
soldiers. Over time, agents of the state became more invasive and infiltrated every stratum of 
society,   
[I]n the course of the nineteenth century these interventions became so universal and 
so routinized in ‘modern’ states that a family would have to live in some very 
inaccessible place … not to come into regular contact with the national state and its 
agents (Hobsbawm 1995: 80-81).  
 
Agents of the state were employed at schools, post offices, railways, and in the police and 
military forces ensuring regular contact with the people. Their powers were reinforced through 
compulsory primary school attendance, military conscription and the keeping of state records. 
The everyday practices that took place between state and citizen shaped society in multiple 
ways; from birth to death the citizenry was regulated to prescribed national ‘norms’ that would 
count, record and manage their everyday lives, “[G]overnment and subject or citizen were 
inevitably linked by daily bonds, as never before” (Hobsbawm 1995: 81).  
This was a time of social restructure, a time to create, “to ‘educate our masters’, to 
‘make Italians’, to turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ and attach all to nation and flag” (Hobsbawm 
1995: 91). Social changes coincided with emerging notions of race which sustained ideologies 
of racial supremacy. It was during these times that, 
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the citizens of a country became a sort of community, though an imagined one, and its 
members therefore found themselves seeking for, and consequently finding, things in 
common, places, practices, personages, memories, signs and symbols (Hobsbawm 
1995: 90).  
 
The states used their influence to communicate with their citizens particularly through primary 
schools, “to spread the image and heritage of the ‘nation’ and to inculcate attachment to it and 
to attach all to country and flag …” (Hobsbawm 1995: 91). Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century Hobsbawm asserts that nationalism’s basic loyalty was “not to ‘the country’, but only 
to its particular version of that country: to an ideological construct” (1995: 93).  
Hobsbawm identifies Australia as a nation-state “whose specific national 
characteristics and criteria of nationhood have been established since the late eighteenth 
century” (1995: 78). Since this time public symbols and ceremonies have been created to 
produce a sense of nation-ness which supported the colonial agenda. Through the 
indoctrination of shared beliefs and like-minded values, a diverse population coheres in an 
illusion of unity. Through various institutions and mediums, national values and beliefs are 
discursively fostered and transmitted. Nationalism is thus fabricated through a regime of social 
engineering, and through the invention and use of artefacts.38 Supporting Renan’s argument, 
Hobsbawm argues that nations have been created by historical error and that nationalist 
historians have falsely documented their nation’s story. In other words, “[N]ationalism requires 
too much belief in what is patently not so” (Hobsbawm 1995: 12). Hobsbawm contends that 
nations are a “dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be 
understood unless also analysed from below” (1995: 10).  
  
                                                 
38 Australian nationalism is currently in the process of being both re-imagined and re-constructed. In April 2017 
the Coalition Turnbull government proposed tightening eligibility for Australian citizenship with the introduction 
of a more rigorous English language and Australian values citizenship test. 
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Benedict Anderson  
Benedict Anderson argues that nation, nationality and nationalism are social structures, 
the result of historical events which when merged with political and ideological forces, 
command “profound emotional legitimacy” (1991: 4). Anderson proposes that the nation is “an 
imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1991: 
6). It is “imagined” because of the impossibility for the members of the nation to ever connect 
with or know their fellow compatriots, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (1991: 6). It is imagined as “limited” because every nation, no matter its size, has 
“finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (1991: 7). It is imagined as 
“sovereign” because the concept of the nation was created in the age of Enlightenment and 
Revolution at a time when the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained hierarchical dynasty was 
fiercely contested. The resulting sovereign state is the “gage and emblem of this freedom” 
(1991: 7). The nation is imagined as a “community” because it is perceived to provide “deep, 
horizontal comradeship” despite the reality of inequality and exploitation (1991: 7). The power 
of nation-ness, Anderson claims “is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of 
our time” (1991: 3).  
Historically speaking the events and consequences of British settlement in Australia are 
recent and they occurred at a time of great social and political change. For example, with the 
onset of the American Revolution the British could no longer transport their convicts to the 
American colonies and required another repository to house its burgeoning ‘criminal’ 
population. Australia was thus established as a British penal colony yet colonisation was also 
driven by Britain’s desire for land and its potential wealth. The Australian nation was forged 
out of colonising acts and the imposition of social, political, economic and legal structures that 




Anderson argues that once the nation has been constructed in the imagination it is then 
plied, manipulated and transformed through repeated messages inscribed in the national 
consciousness which inspire a “love” of nation. Anderson states that devotion is captured from 
national subjects via “[T]he cultural products of nationalism – poetry, prose fiction, music, 
plastic arts – show this love very clearly in thousands of different forms and styles” (1991: 
141). Anderson’s insight into cultural artefacts highlights how they work to attach citizens to 
nation. Anderson makes it clear that there is a diverse, yet relentless, bombardment directed at 
national citizens to ensure they do not, or cannot, forget who they are and where they belong. 
This fundamental principle of nationalism is addressed in the following chapter.  
Australia: the ‘imagi-nation’ 
There is a substantial amount of evidence pointing to the various foundations of nation-
making. Despite critiques of Anderson’s work,39 many theorists have built on the concept of 
an “imagined community” to explore the exigencies of modern-day nation building. Billig 
argues it is the imagined nation which gives nationalism a “strong social psychological 
dimension” that “is part of a wider ideological, discursive consciousness” (2013: 10). White 
claims similarly that “‘Australia’ for the most part is something we carry around in our heads” 
(1997: 13). Sarah Maddison adds, “Australia, exists more in the hearts and minds of its citizens 
than it does in any constitution or parliament” (2011: 23). Australia, as an “imagined political 
community”, is channelled through the minds of like-minded citizens who hold fast to notions 
of shared experiences and have or have not comparable values and aspirations. In other words, 
the concept of shared or national values so often cited in these times in relation to revised 
citizenship requirements, for example, is able to seamlessly incorporate notions of dissent as 
expressions of democratic standards. This broadening of the “imagined community” can be 
                                                 
39 For example Konstantin Sietzy (n.d) argues that pre-modern communities were just as likely to be imagined 
as modern nations. 
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tightened at will to exclude if expressions of difference exceed the imaginary possibilities of 
those who orchestrate the nation’s values. 
Maddison claims that white Australians are challenged and disturbed by that which 
unsettles the comfortable notions of their imagined community. They prefer not to confront the 
violent way in which the modern Australian nation was created as the realities of colonisation 
produce feelings of national insecurity and a lingering collective guilt. These anxieties have 
been transmitted inter-generationally and are fortified “by a form of defensive nationalism that 
will not allow an honest attempt to redress past wrongs” (Maddison 2011: 24). Defensive 
nationalism is procured by a strong desire to protect the hegemonic imaginings of Australia 
and it shields like-minded citizens from both responsibility and action. Expressions of 
defensive nationalism are seen as hostile by Maddison, who alerts us to the flag-waving 
hysteria of Australia Day40 which she claims, given its chosen date is an incongruous attempt 
to reinforce positive notions of Australian-ness. Historical denialism, another form of defensive 
nationalism is “a tool of racial politics” (Beresford 2012: 332; see also Renan 1990; Hobsbawm 
1995). Historical denialism continues to inform the national imagining, and, following Billig, 
must be understood as part of Australia’s “wider ideological, discursive consciousness”. 
Moreton-Robinson states that the manipulation of history and historical denial serve to 
legitimise the argument that “there was no theft, no war and no need to have a treaty” (2007: 
100).  
Australian national identity is inseparably linked to its colonial history, its myths and 
imaginings which are bolstered by celebratory national dates and symbols. To challenge them 
is contentious. As Maddison notes, there is a price to pay for questioning national mythologies 
which, she argues, can incur the label of being “un-Australian” (2011: 34). To be labelled ‘un-
                                                 
40 26 January is known as “Australia Day”, it marks the arrival of the First Fleet who landed in 1788 and 
established a British penal colony. For many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people this day is known as 
“Invasion Day” or “Survival Day”, and is a day of profound grief and sadness.  
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Australian’ is to be marked by the inherent penalty of social exclusion; to be ‘un-Australian’ is 
to be outside of the body politic. In contrast, she argues that Australians who choose an identity 
“saturated” by colonial history “continue to stand in solidarity with past generations and the 
crimes they have committed” (2011: 28). Maddison draws attention here to the importance of 
our present day responses to the past, and her thinking can be transferred to our present day 
responses to the flag.  
National imaginings have long been a fundamental driver in the creation of the 
Australian nation, and the national flag has been “saturated” accordingly. In its current 
formation the national flag promotes a colonial identity and a white history. Despite professed 
claims of ‘unity’, the national flag remains a territorial signifier in the ongoing battlefield of 
Australian identity: it stridently separates ‘us’ from ‘them’. To connect with and broaden our 
understandings of the concepts of ‘Australia’ and Australian national identity allows new ways 
for the nation to be re-imagined. For Kayleen Malthouse and Terry O’Shane a re-imagined 
Australia, with Constitutional recognition for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people for 
example, conjures,   
an opportunity to make this land of the fair go truly fair for all Australians. We have 
the opportunity to change for the better the way we do business in Indigenous affairs 
… so that all our grandchildren grow up in a better and fairer Australia (2017: 24).  
 
Timothy Brennan  
Timothy Brennan’s essay (1990) The National Longing for Form discusses how the 
novel was produced and worked in conjunction with the newspaper to ‘create’ the nation. With 
the demise of the authority of both Crown and church a new regime of power relations emerged, 
the full force of which was directed towards the colonised world, 
… the world became Europe’s ‘little circle’ – just as beleaguered and constrained as 
the ethnic and linguistic sub-communities had been under the rule of the imperial 





Brennan argues that the nation-state was not invented in Europe and then transported to the 
colonial outposts. He claims that the nation-state was in fact, “forged in acts of separation from 
the European centers of Madrid and London” (1990: 58). Brennan also suggests that although 
nationalism evolved from the imperialist countries, they were unable to articulate national 
aspirations until the era of colonisation. With colonial expansion came new opportunities to 
construct and cement the idea of the nation-state. Brennan asserts that “European nationalism 
itself was motivated by what Europe was doing in its farflung dominions” (1990: 59). Echoing 
Renan’s earlier observation Brennan notes that a nationalist doctrine replaces the social 
function of religion.  
Brennan draws attention to the selective nature of nationalism. Since the Second World 
War, as interest in nationalism grew, Brennan argues that Europe conveniently developed 
amnesia and the terms of nationalism were reversed. Nationalism was no longer “freedom from 
tyranny” it was “the embodiment of tyranny” (Brennan 1990: 57). Nationalism became 
associated with social unrest and extreme right-wing politics due to the rise of imperial 
nationalism and post-colonialism. The former saw extreme group loyalties in countries such as 
Italy, Germany and Japan strengthened by repressive dictatorial movements and the latter sees 
the legacies of colonialism rarely acknowledged in European responses to Third World issues. 
Theorists of nationalism demonstrate various understandings of how the modern nation-state 
is created. Many of the principles articulated can be applied to colonised contexts but there are 
limitations unless full consideration is given to the historical rise of “the West” as a conceptual 
– and arguably geographical – formation that has come to dominate thought about so-called 





Stuart Hall  
Stuart Hall’s thinking about the construction of “the West” is significant for two 
reasons. First, Hall provides a way to understand how “the West” evolved to dominate the 
globe. Second, Hall gives an astute analysis of how national cultures work to preserve the 
nebulous concept of “the West”. Hall identifies “the West” as an historical construct which 
arose from the break-up of feudalism and emerged from specific economic, social, political 
and cultural developments. He argues that it was through the formation of discourses that 
western claims of superiority were bolstered, “Europe began to describe and represent the 
difference between itself and these ‘others’ it encountered in the course of its expansion” 
(1994a: 291 emphasis in the original). According to Hall, “the West” represents a complex 
system of meanings and encompasses any society characterised as modern, advanced, 
developed, industrial, urban, secular, and capitalist, regardless of its geography. “The West” is 
as much an idea, as it is a location. In contrast to Anderson’s “imagined community” which 
designates a specific geographical and cultural boundary, “the West” is a movable entity that 
contracts and expands according to socio-political and economic markers that designate who 
and what can be included. Hall notes that the idea of “the West” did not reflect an already 
established society; it was however, “essential to the very formation of that society” (1994a: 
278). “The West” is thus a concept which functions in various ways to embody sameness or to 
‘siphon off’ difference.  
To elaborate, first, “the West” classifies the world into binary groups of ‘western’ or 
‘non-western’ according to, as noted, perceived or real similarities and differences. “The West” 
is also employed as a tool to influence structures of thought and knowledge; Western thinking 
has a long, established historical presence in the imaginings of “the West”. Second “the West” 
is encoded in imagery, represented by verbal and visual language that constitute an 
amalgamation of what different places, people, cultures and societies ‘are’. Third, “the West”, 
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as an image and a discourse operates as a benchmark and facilitates ways to measure and 
compare different societies. Finally, “the West” functions as an ideology that provides all 
‘Others’ an example of ‘Enlightened’ culture. Nations belonging to “the West” are perceived 
as modern, economically, socially and politically, and as such, are ideologically sanctioned as 
superior to those who do not belong. Said’s work on Orientalism (2003) provides an argument 
pertaining to the West in relation to the East which underscores Hall’s thesis. Hall’s work 
expands, however, by noting how national cultures emerge to bestow a strident sense of identity 
on citizens based on the cultures of ‘others’. Different societies were constructed as the 
antithesis of “the West”, and quickly became central to the discourse relating to notions of 
“civilization, refinement, modernity and development in the West. ‘The Other’ was the ‘dark’ 
side – forgotten, repressed and denied; the reverse image of enlightenment and modernity” 
(Hall 1994a: 314). The discourses which surround this concept of “the West” still hold 
considerable influence even though the world order is shifting in the new millennium. As Hall 
notes, discourses “go on unfolding, changing shape, as they make sense of new circumstances. 
They often carry many of the same unconscious premises and unexamined assumptions in their 
blood-stream” (1994a: 314).  
Hall stresses, despite the general assumption that nationality is an inherent part of the 
human condition, cultural identities are not genetic. National cultures, he explains, are created 
not only by cultural institutions, but also by symbols and representations. Hall claims that 
symbols are intrinsic for national culture, which is in turn, the principle source of cultural 
identity, and he argues that national culture is a discourse which is used to organise and 
influence our actions and understandings. National cultures are a discursive formation “cross-
cut by deep internal divisions and differences, and ‘unified’ only through the exercise of 
different forms of cultural power” (Hall 1994b: 297). Hall dismisses ideas of the nation as a 
unified cultural identity consisting of “only one people, one culture or ethnicity. Modern 
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nations are all cultural hybrids” (1994b: 297 emphasis in the original). The promotion of 
national identity as a unifying force, Hall asserts, is in fact, an application of cultural power.  
Hall argues that a nation is more than just a political entity; rather it is discursively 
shaped by a range of signs from which ‘meanings’ are produced. A nation’s people are its legal 
citizens, who, via the medium of national culture that manifests in art, literature, music, and 
the day to day trappings of cultural expression, facilitate the national concept of what, for 
example, it means to ‘be’ Australian.41 To borrow Hall’s ideas about the construction of 
national culture, the narration of the Australian nation, 
provide[s] a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national 
symbols and rituals which stand for, or represent , the shared experiences, sorrows, and 
triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation (Hall 1994b: 293 emphasis in 
the original).  
  
Hall asserts that shared imaginings enrich our ‘humdrum’ existence as they connect, “our 
everyday lives with a national destiny that preexisted us and will outlive us” (1994b: 293). This 
is an important point. Hall is alerting us to the need for ceremony, performance, imagery and 
public display – all of the paraphernalia that constitute shared imaginings of nation and that act 
to reassure through their repetition.  
Homi Bhabha 
Homi Bhabha’s work (1990) begins to uncover some of the symbolism inscribed in 
nation through literary narrating strategies. Bhabha claims that nationalist discourses work hard 
to sell the nation as a, “continuous narrative of national progress, the narcissism of self-
generation” (1990a:1). However there is an ambivalence associated with this practice, which 
Bhabha asserts, ‘haunts’ the idea of the nation. Bhabha recognises that the “marginal or 
‘minority’ is not the space of a celebratory, or utopian, self-marginalization” (1990a: 4). To 
                                                 
41 Bill Fairbanks co-founded the Green Australia Party in 1989 and helped to establish Landcare Australia, “[H]e 
also discovered Matthew Flinders’ little known 1804 map in England. Realising that Flinders had called the 
continent “Australia”, Fairbanks promoted this first naming as “Australia’s Birth Certificate” (Tanner 2015: 35).  
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work in this space, to provide counter-narratives, is to contest the normalising tendencies of 
the dominant group which claims authority over the (re)production of the national interest. 
Counter-narratives facilitate ways to study, “the field of meanings and symbols associated with 
national life” (Bhabha 1990a: 3). Counter-narratives also provide a “substantial intervention 
into those justifications of modernity – progress, homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep 
nation, the long past” (Bhabha 1990a: 4). National symbols and narratives carry with them a 
potent mix of emotions; they are laced with tradition and sentiment, exclusion and myth. 
Therefore new and more inclusive ways which seek to re-locate and re-imagine the Australian 
nation often generate discomfort and anxiety for those who have a vested interest in the 
dominant imaginings of who and what we ‘are’. 
Bhabha connects the diasporic experience of European mid-nineteenth century mass 
migration and colonial expansion to the project of nation building, and he asserts that “[T]he 
nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin, and turns that loss into the 
language of metaphor … of home and belonging” (Bhabha 1990b: 291). As people migrated 
en masse to emerging nations, many held fast the memories and traditions of their homeland. 
Claire Sutherland notes the “collective memory they perpetuate may refer to a past, idealised 
or even imagined home” (2012: 139). Imagined migrant memories carry with them the 
potential to be transferred inter-generationally. Such memories are powerful and have the 
capacity to produce emotional, economic, cultural and political affiliations to the perceived 
‘homeland’. Bhabha’s understanding of diasporic communities ‘haunting’ the concept of 
nation can also be transferred to the reality of colonisation that made diasporic, through 
enforced relocation and removal from traditional homelands, many Aboriginal communities 




PART TWO: Counter-Australia 
Terror-Australis: A ‘Haunted-Nation’ 
Prior to colonisation the Australian continent was occupied by Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people whose population densities varied depending on the location. The land 
mass comprised of many nations and there were some 250 distinct Indigenous languages with 
over 600 dialects spoken (Peterson et al. 2005). Following white invasion, Aboriginal people 
were forced off their lands and subjected to a regime which ruptured their connections to 
country and resulted in the destruction of a way of life (Coe 2014). The effects of enforced 
relocations have been transmitted through the generations to produce disparate health and 
wellbeing outcomes for many Indigenous people. This situation is compounded by Australia’s 
reticence to acknowledge its violent past,  
[A]s a nation, Australia suffers because it has never confronted the fact that an entire 
continent was taken from its Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Too few 
Australians are able to examine our shared colonial past seriously without averting their 
gaze from the unpalatable facts (Pascoe & Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Studies [AIATSIS] 2012: 84). 
 
Present day white Australia has inherited great wealth and privilege from a brutal history, a 
reality that undermines the national pride often aspired to in nation-building, as Hage argues 
“it should be noted that whatever traces of colonial confidence existed in Australia are built on 
genocidal practices, and so remain haunted by these constitutive deeds” (2003: 51). The 
dispossession of Aboriginal people of their lands is a form of genocide which continues to mark 
the nation. 
In Western Australia at the beginning of the twentieth century Aboriginal people who 
were deemed sick were rounded up by policemen and other officials “over an area of hundreds 
of thousands of square miles. Regardless of tribe and custom and country and relationship, they 
were herded together” and sent to isolated islands in chains, “the women on Dorre′ and the men 
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on Bernier” (Bates 1944: 97). A century later, the ongoing practice of genocide through the 
removal of Aboriginal people from their land is still part of the official agenda. In Australia 
there is no state recognition of national genocide.42 Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, of Doomadgee 
Aboriginal Community in Queensland states “[T]he genocide, the acts of genocide are 
continuing in every law and legislation white Australia makes for us and every time they take 
more of our land” (qtd. in Balint 2014: 235). Jennifer Balint argues that if the consequences of 
state actions, “contribute to ongoing destruction of a people” and if there is “no recognition of 
their impact, there can be no break with the past” (2014: 248).  
Dodson contends that the current battleground for cultural assimilation is located in the 
vast regions of northern and central Australia, where Indigenous people “maintain their 
languages, own their traditional lands under Western legal title, and practice their customs” 
(2007: 22). He also states that the “recurring denigration of Aboriginal culture and existence 
highlights how short we Australians have fallen in terms of mutual respect for each other, and 
sustains the blot on our national soul” (2007: 22). Jon Altman and Boyd Palmer claim that 
Indigenous people maintain strong connections to their country and “many have special 
relationships with one or more particular places, often known as homelands” (2005: 148). 
Homelands remain fundamentally important to Aboriginal people, particularly in the Northern 
Territory, Western Australia and outlying parts of Queensland, these regions are frequently 
called ‘remote’ or ‘very remote’ areas.43 As I write homelands in Western Australia are under 
serious threat of closure. John Pilger argues that “traditional life”  
is anathema to a parasitic white industry of civil servants, contractors, lawyers and 
consultants that controls and often profits from Aboriginal Australia …The homelands 
are seen as a threat, for they express a communalism at odds with the neo-conservatism 
that rules Australia. It is as if the enduring existence of a people who have survived and 
                                                 
42 See below and also Chapter Seven. 
43 Speaking at a forum “Women Speak Out For Treaty” at the Redfern Community Centre, Aboriginal Elder, 
Auntie Rosalie Kunoth-Monks drew attention to the fact that “remote communities” are not remote to the people 




resisted more than two centuries of massacre and theft remains a spectre on white 
Australia: a reminder of whose land this really is (2015: 12). 
 
Western Australia is Australia’s richest state, yet in October 2014, without consulting 
Aboriginal community members, then Premier Colin Barnett announced that as a result of 
Federal Government cuts to funding services, his government could no longer afford to provide 
the basic services of water, power, sanitation, rubbish collection and schools to some 274 
homelands with an estimated population of 12,000 (Koori Mail 19 November 2014: 7). Former 
Prime Minister Abbott stated “[I]t’s not the job of the taxpayers to subsidise lifestyle choices” 
(qtd. in Pilger 2015: 12). Abbott’s statement ignores the intrinsic connection between 
Aboriginal people and their country, which is not a “lifestyle choice”, as the testimonies of 127 
Aboriginal people from central Australia published in Every Hill Got a Story – We Grew up in 
Country (2015) demonstrate. Compiled and edited by Marg Bowman, the book cover states  
Nyinanyi ngurangka – being on country – is not a ‘lifestyle choice’ but a hard-won 
right, a spiritual and cultural duty, a constant battle, a source of happiness and 
opportunity and the meaning of life all at the same time (qtd. in Koori Mail 26 August 
2015: 13).  
 
Abbott’s comments imply there is a real problem with Aboriginal people living on their 
lands because it is at the expense of the wider community. He fails to acknowledge that “health 
and cultural outcomes are better for Aboriginal people who are able to continue living in their 
communities” (Bainbridge 2015: 5). His comments are also at odds with the findings of the 
Closing the Gap Prime Minister’s Report of 2015 which states quite clearly, 
[C]onnection to land, culture, spirituality, ancestry, family and community are all 
important to the social and emotional wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples. Poor social and emotional wellbeing reduces the likelihood of people going to 
school, getting jobs or accessing health services. It also increases the likelihood of 
having alcohol and other substance abuse problems (Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet 2015: 30) 
 
The continuing dismissal of Aboriginal people by the Australian state stands in direct contrast 
to Bhabha’s vision for a future in which we not only “change the narratives of our histories, 
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but transform our sense of what it means to live, to be, in other times and different spaces, both 
human and historical” (1994: 367 emphasis in the original).  
Australia has no post-colonial pact with Indigenous people which Hage states “has left 
Australian culture with a continuous sense of unfinished business” (2003: 51). Moreton-
Robinson claims that refusing to recognise Indigenous sovereignty is “unfinished business” 
which “continues to psychically disturb patriarchal white sovereignty” (2007: 93) and Dodson 
argues, “we are a nation trapped by our history and paralysed by our failure to imagine any 
relationship with First Peoples other than assimilation whatever its guise” (qtd. in Gilmore 
2009: 11). These scholars highlight the significant effects associated with the ongoing failure 
of the Australian nation-state to address, recognise or engage with Indigenous sovereignty – 
the nation as a whole is therefore haunted, undermined, and national confidence tainted. Pascoe 
expresses thus the discomfort which haunts the white Australian nation, 
[T]oday’s conscience is a small voice but it whines inside us like a dentist’s drill and 
we try to dismiss that annoyance by dulling the pain rather than correcting the cause. If 
it was a rotten tooth we’d tear it from our head (2007: 113).  
 
The Australian nation has long been imagined as both egalitarian and legitimate. Yet 
the nation has been founded on ethnocentric histories which reflected the world view of the 
writer and perpetuated stereotypes through distortion. According to Pat Cavanagh, “Aboriginal 
people have undoubtedly been treated badly by Australian historians. They have been ignored, 
stereotyped, patronised and certainly underestimated by successive generations of historians” 
(1999: 157). The principles of historical (mis)representation can also be adapted to other areas, 
and in particular to the “successive generations” of Australian politicians who have routinely, 
and continue to undermine Indigenous rights in the political agenda of nation building,  
… we are tired of being treated like political footballs. We are tired of our wins being 
short-term and short-lived. We are tired of politicians who wear blinkers with respect 
to our rights, and tired of our gains being flicked away on government whim, or when 
governments or policies change (Malthouse and O’Shane 2017: 24). 
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The actions of the present are a continuum of the past. However, with a treaty or written 
agreement Dodson asserts that “many of the causes of past and present discord, and division 
between all of us diverse peoples in the one land, might be resolved” (2007: 21). Until this 
happens, the modern Australian nation remains ‘haunted’, terrorised by its deeds, both past and 
present, 
[A]lthough their scars are less obvious, white Australians have also been injured by the 
illegitimate means by which this country was founded. The trauma will not begin to 
heal until we create ground rules for how to live together. For that reason, a treaty is 
inevitable (Watson 2013: 21).  
 
Nicole Watson’s argument is instructive. She highlights how the nation as a whole, remains 
damaged through the foundational lie of terra nullius. Watson argues that a treaty will begin 
the healing process. 
“Always Was, Always Will Be Aboriginaland” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 50-51).  
The epigraph to this chapter demonstrates that the modern Australian nation provides 
for its citizenry in different ways. In the twenty first century the repercussions of colonisation 
continue to be the cause of real life problems for many Aboriginal people. Aboriginal 
understandings of nation prior to colonial invasion were at odds with the introduced European 
ideas of nation and country where a land mass constituted a nation, as opposed to a language 
group (McGloin 2008). McGloin elaborates on the notion of “country” as this applies to 
Aboriginal people, 
 “Country” in the indigenous context refers to a cultural and spiritual place of origin. It 
can refer to land or sea. “Country” incorporates cultural values and practices, stories 
and histories. The term “country” does not carry the meanings associated with a nation 
state. It is, however, a political entity in that it denotes a place that ascribes identity and 
stewardship, and dictates the Law and the obligations of its indigenous custodians. 
Country encompasses the geographical location of spiritual belief and communal 




Djambawa Marawili, an Elder of the Madarrpa people states the Aboriginal communities that 
manage to retain notions of “home” and “country” pass on those politics of identity and 
stewardship and apply their own spiritual and legal doctrines: “We are of the country”, which 
was given by “our ancestor to our grandfather, to our father and to us. And now I have to hand 
it over to the future generations. For us we cannot leave this country” (Marawili qtd. in Chenery 
2015: 29). This understanding of country encompasses a range of interrelated knowledges, for 
example: legal knowledge, cosmology, knowledge of the ocean, the land, the spiritual world 
and so on; it formulates a body of knowledge crucial for the survival of Indigenous people in 
Australia for some sixty thousand years. “Country” according to this knowledge is where one 
comes from, or connects to, and is supposed to be in order to fulfil a role in the social life of 
that place. Understood in this way, country represents a place of social, cultural and spiritual 
responsibility where knowledge of survival is paramount. This does not suggest that there was 
no form of cultural pride in belonging to a particular place or language group. Nor does it imply 
that the social order was without conflict. What it does indicate, though, is a lack of Bhabha’s 
“ambivalence” grounded in a concrete understanding of belonging, of where one ‘fits’ and 
where one’s duties and social responsibilities are to be carried out. Country in this context is a 
way of being based on, and informed by, cultural survival over millennia.  
For Aboriginal people the land was experienced as “a nurturing force and a home shared 
with everything that grew, moved and breathed within it” (Burnum Burnum1988: 12). The 
continent was imbued with both similarity and difference pertaining to a landmass which 
accommodated hundreds of separate nations, each with differing languages and dialects, 
traditions, and cultures. The complexity of Aboriginal social and economic organisation, and 
the networks of communication, rights and obligations proffered a balance patently different 
to that of the invading British “with their wide commercial and industrial motivations and 
patchy interest in the social welfare of the citizens” (Burnum Burnum1988: 30). Out of this 
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schism the white Australian nation grew, buttressed by longstanding policies of exclusion 
which habitually focused on, and were directed against Indigenous people. Since first contact, 
and in the wake of the longstanding nature of colonial relations Aboriginal leaders and activists 
have been constant in their resistance to the imposition of colonial rule and the illegitimate 
seizure of their lands.  
Ghillar, Michael Anderson of the Euahlayi Nation 
As issues of legitimacy and sovereignty remain unresolved, Ghillar, Michael Anderson 
of the Euahlayi Nation, spokesperson for the Sovereign Union and co-founder of the 1972 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy44 continues his long fight for Indigenous rights. Forty years ago, 
Anderson admitted he was having trouble getting the Australian government and white 
community to accept Aboriginal people on their own terms. Anderson blames the British, 
“…because the British have always, everywhere they went, used colonisation to split 
communities” (1975: 20-21). Anderson’s argument can be extended to the British flag. The 
Union Jack is Britain’s most prominent symbol and in the Australian context was both a 
primary tool and weapon of British colonisation. It could be argued, then, that the symbolic 
purpose of this flag has indeed been to “split communities”. The maintenance of the Union 
Jack on the Australian national flag indicates that there is a duality attached to this honoured 
section. For some the Union Jack acts as a hypervisible signifier of colonisation which signals 
division, yet for others it is the source of national pride.  
Anderson refutes the territorial integrity of the Australian State. He claims, “… neither 
the British nor the Australians can provide any documentary evidence of our Peoples ceding 
our sovereignty, or acquiescing to the invaders” (2013a: 17). In asserting the wrongs of the 
British tenure of Australia, the Euahlayi people have written to the Queen of England declaring 
their independence, as well as their pre-existing and continuing statehood. The Euahlayi have 
                                                 
44 See Chapter Six. 
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requested “the documents, where war was declared against the Peoples of the Euahlayi Nation 
or where … the Peoples of the Euahlayi voluntarily ceded their sovereignty to Great Britain” 
(Anderson qtd. in Bagnall 2013a: 7). As the Euahlayi Nation stretches from New South Wales 
into Queensland, Anderson has also demanded that both the New South Wales and Queensland 
governments provide written evidence which detail the transfer of title deeds from the Euahlayi 
to the Crown. 
Anderson was impelled to take action in an attempt to make the Australian governments 
concede that Aboriginal lands, “were stolen as part of the invasion of the country by white 
colonialists” (Bagnall 2014a: 3). Geoff Bagnall argues that Anderson’s assertion of 
independent sovereign rights strikes at “the very core, the very foundation of the white colonial 
settlement of his peoples’ country” (2014a: 3). Documentary evidence has not been provided 
and the official response of New South Wales states “[T]he Euahlayi People are ‘oppressing’ 
the State of New South Wales, according to a Supreme Court judgment” (Bagnall 2014b: 3). 
The seemingly straightforward request for documentary evidence to show how and when the 
Euahlayi Nation was legitimately acquired by the Crown was unforthcoming with the court 
deeming the subpoena “too broad” and “an abuse of process” (Bagnall 2014b: 3). Anderson 
argues if the Crown had genuine title to the land of the Euahlayi people, “they would be only 
too pleased to hold it up in neon lights for all to see rather than consider the subpoena 
oppressive” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014b: 3). Given the nature of British colonisation and its brutal 
history, “oppression” seems an extraordinary turn of phrase to use against the Euahlayi people. 
Habibis and Walter explain, 
[L]anguage is an important source of cultural power and it is through its use that images 
of hierarchy are fixed. Language carries meanings and emotions. It forms the basis of 
social definition and social action, and is reflexive, acting back on the subject while 




The word “oppression”, as used by the Supreme Court, is an example of the State’s re-
appropriation of the terms of reference deployed to describe the lived realities of many 
Indigenous people. Its use brings into play relations of power which must be continually re-
asserted in order to maintain hegemonic control and justify legitimacy. In this case the sanctity 
of State of New South Wales is positioned by the Court as ‘threatened’ by the Euahlayi whose 
claims for documentary evidence are determined to be “an abuse of process”. Anderson’s 
appraisal of the institutions of white power is forthright. He states that the courts “belong to 
the system” which was “set up by the establishment that stole the land and preside over their 
laws” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014a: 3). As a result Anderson argues “the nature of Australian society 
and its laws are a fraud and they operate a nation state on lands seized not by consent but by 
murder” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014b: 3).  
Anderson clearly calls into question the legality of the Australian nation-state which he 
argues was founded by brutal acts of dispossession and is underpinned by a lack of 
documentary evidence. Anderson also draws our attention to how, at an international level, 
Australia has managed to secure and legitimate its status as a nation through the High Court: 
first, as signatory to the Treaty of Versailles45 and second, as signatory to the United Nations 
Charter46 (Bagnall 2013b). Anderson argues that these are tenuous claims of sovereignty and 
comments on the irony of a nation which purports peace throughout the world, yet fails to 
enforce the same principles at home. He claims that Australia’s determination to hold 
international despotic leaders to account for war crimes committed against their own stands in 
sharp contrast to its domestic policy. In 1999, both the Federal and High Courts ruled “there 
was no law against genocide on its own soil, nor does it have any effective remedies for crimes 
                                                 
45 The Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 and outlined conditions of peace in the aftermath of the First World 
War. The Treaty of Versailles was the first political treaty signed by Australian officials who were directly 
involved in the process. This was a major step for the recognition of Australia as an independent entity under 
international law (MoAD 2011b). 
46 Australia was a contributor and founding member of the 1945 United Nations Charter which pledges to aspire 
to international peace and security.   
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against humanity” (Anderson 2012: 9). According to these bastions of power, there was no 
genocide. As a method of resistance and a means to assert the truth, Anderson calls on the 
youth of “every individual Aboriginal nation” to “engage with their Elders to locate the 
massacre sites of their people and, like at Myall Creek47 … establish memorial parks at these 
locations in memory of the slain” (qtd. in Koori Mail 20 November 2013: 22). 
Anderson also questions the Australian government for recognising the rights of 
immigrants and not those of Indigenous people. In an Open Letter to the former Governor-
General, Quentin Bryce, he asks why it is that political parties continue to pursue agendas of 
assimilation which force Aboriginal people to integrate into the white hegemonic world of 
Australian beliefs and customs which is, 
absolutely contradictory when we consider the Jews, Catholics, Anglicans etc. who 
have their own private schools. Moreover, they have their own churches, mosques 
synagogues and temples where they pray and observe their own religion. As Aboriginal 
Peoples we are not afforded the same courtesies and respect (2013b: 28).   
 
Anderson’s argument draws attention to the ‘hierarchy of racism’ which seeks to position 
Indigenous people at the lowest level. Four decades earlier, renowned Aboriginal activist 
Charles Perkins had articulated similar concerns. Perkins highlights the status of race relations 
which were extant in the aftermath of the 1967 Referendum and the 1973 dismantling of the 
White Australia Policy. He notes that white Australians rarely socialise with Aboriginal people, 
however, they will mix with and welcome people from other nations. Accordingly migrants, 
“complicate the race situation in this country before a solution can be worked out for the 
existing situation” and Perkins predicts, “Aboriginals could become third-class citizens instead 
of second-class” (1975: 98).48  
                                                 
47 The massacre at Myall Creek, near Inverell NSW occurred in 1838. A group of armed land owners and their 
hired hands brutally “murdered twenty-eight men, women and children, shooting them at point blank range or 
hacking them to death with swords” (Grassby and Hill 1988: 42).       
48 The term ‘Fourth World’ is now used to describe chronic levels of disadvantage experienced by some 
Indigenous people who live in First World nations. Australia is a wealthy First World country, however, abject 
poverty and disparity in terms of health are a daily reality for many Aboriginal people as the epigraph states. 
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Roberta Sykes (1989) agrees that the denial of opportunities at every level of the social, 
political and economic domain have positioned Aboriginal people at the bottom of the ladder 
and she argues that new migrants identify with hegemonic ideals and practice them in order to 
enhance their social position, “…any situation which prevents them from being at the bottom 
is obviously in their best interests” (1989: 20). Sykes’ claim represents the ways in which racial 
hierarchies come into play to reproduce dominant racialised ideals about who can and cannot 
assimilate and under what conditions. The notion of racialised “ladders” that situate various 
cultural and racial groups on various “steps” has long been a metaphorical usage that has served 
the interests of white Australia. While arguments about where one ‘sits on the ladder’ persist, 
white interests are assured and uninterrupted, and claims that the formation of nation 
constitutes an act of genocide remain obfuscated. Stan Grant asserts that Australia has 
“welcomed waves of migrants” yet Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people “remained a 
reminder of what was lost, what was taken, what was destroyed to scaffold the building of this 
nation’s prosperity” (2015). The impact of this for Indigenous people has been enduring,  
[T]he “wealth for toil” we praise in our anthem has remained out of our reach. Our 
position at the bottom of every socio-economic indicator tragically belies the Australian 
economic miracle (Grant 2015).  
 
The current socio-political climate rests heavily upon past practice. White Australians and 
many migrants reap the benefits provided to them by a nation which “has been established 
through the deprivation, misery and suffering of Blacks” (Sykes 1989: 20). Aboriginal Nations 




The Sovereign Union 
Sovereign Union “is a liberation struggle” which could only begin when the evil in the 
Australian flag, the Union Jack, had been returned from whence it came49 (Sovereign Union 
2016). The Sovereign Union is an umbrella organisation for the Aboriginal nations who have 
declared their independence50 and for those nations which aspire to so. Sovereign Union is 
resurrecting self-governing Aboriginal nations and asserting continued sovereignty over lands, 
natural resources and waters. The Sovereign Union was formed in 1999 and its extensive 
website is both informative and comprehensive.51 In contrast to the Freedom Movement, which 
challenges the white establishment at every opportunity, members of the Aboriginal 
Sovereignty Movement are not required to denounce any prior citizenship claims. Sovereign 
Union is a movement of assertion, of claiming authority and sovereignty, which was never 
ceded, over defined territory.  
The Yidinji Nation and the “Crown’s Rubik’s Cube” 
The Yidinji Nation calls on the “foreign entity”, Australia, to legitimise itself by 
entering into a treaty with the Yidindji government (Howden 2015a: 3). Jeremy Geia, a former 
television journalist, who now identifies by his tribal name, Murrumu Walubara Yidinji, was 
compelled to take action after years of “reporting the same story about Indigenous disadvantage 
and despair” (Brewster 2015). Murrumu argues that the ongoing disparities faced by 
Indigenous people are the result of the complex system of white power, which he labels, the 
“Crown’s Rubik’s Cube” (Brewster 2015). In other words, the echelons of white power are 
impenetrable, unnavigable and virtually impossible to negotiate. Murrumu has renounced his 
Australian citizenship, his Australian passport and bank accounts and avoids Australian 
                                                 
49 See Chapter Seven. 
50 At the time of writing First Nations Sovereignty has been declared by the Murrawarri Republic, the Euahlayi 
Peoples Republic, the Republic of Mbarbaram, Wiradjuri Central West Republic and the Djurin Republic of the 




currency. The Yidinji people have their own driver licencing system, passports, birth 
certificates and numberplates.  
Like the Euahlayi, the Yidinji people are demanding tangible evidence which proves 
the Australian and Queensland governments have rights over their land.52 Their requests to see 
the documents which detail how their land was originally acquired by white Australia have 
been met with silence, “[I]t’s not much of a question to ask. Just give us a look at the 
paperwork” however, the powers that be, “refuse to write back to us” (Gaan-Yarra qtd. in 
Bagnall 2014c: 2). In the process of asserting their Sovereign Rights, the Yidinji have 
relinquished all legal ties with the Commonwealth of Australia and intend to make history by 
entering into the first Indigenous treaty with Australia. A treaty would “overcome the legal 
conundrum of operating on Yidindji territory without consent” (Howden 2015a: 3). For 
example, the Yidinji State claims that the Cairns Courthouse is on Yidinji land and it 
incarcerates people over which it has no jurisdiction (Bagnall 2014c). Furthermore, the Yidinji 
associate the Commonwealth and State coats-of-arms as symbols of ownership. They call for 
their tribal symbol to be flown over the Cairns Courthouse in acknowledgement of their 
sovereignty, “[W]e made the demand if they want to stay here, they should fly our symbol of 
authority” (Gaan-Yarra qtd. in Bagnall 2014c: 2). 
At this interface the tensions of intercultural relations are palpable, and yet the Yidinji 
maintain if the Australian government would sit down and talk about entering a memorandum 
of understanding with the Yidinji government, “[T]his could be a blueprint for true 
reconciliation” (Murrumu qtd. in Howden 2015a: 3). Reconciliation in this context is not used 
according to the white precepts of reconciliation; rather, the term is deployed subversively and 
infers that for the Yidinji, “true reconciliation” is achievable on their terms through social 
                                                 
52 Yidinji territory stretches south of Port Douglas, through to Cairns and inland across the Atherton Tablelands 
and 80 kilometres out to sea.  
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justice (see Hollinsworth 2006: 252-253) and by recognising Yidinji claims of sovereignty. 
Murrumu’s call is endorsed by constitutional law expert and chair of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, Professor Megan Davis, who argues that there is 
“nothing stopping the Commonwealth from today entering into a treaty with the Yidindji 
government” (qtd. in Howden 2015a: 3).  
Murrawarri Republic 
Years of political procrastination and ineptitude brokered the Murrawarri Peoples push 
for independence, and on 30 March 2013, the Murrawarri Peoples Council was formed.53 The 
Murrawarri Peoples wrote to the Queen to inform her “that the clan groups of the Murrawarri 
Republic had declared their continued independent statehood” (Koori Mail 22 May 2013: 28). 
The council asked the Queen to produce documentary evidence to show how “sovereignty, 
dominion and ultimate title was obtained over the Murrawarri nation and its resources” (Koori 
Mail 22 May 2013: 28). There was no response. The silence has been interpreted by Murrawarri 
Republic leader, Fred Hooper, as an affirmation that the Murrawarri Nation continues to be a 
“free and independent state” (qtd. in Koori Mail 22 May 2013: 28).54 The Euahlayi, Yidinji 
and Murrawarri Nations have all adopted their own national flags as emblems of their 
sovereignty.  
The above examples of Aboriginal Sovereign Nations provide a different way of 
understanding the Australian nation whose geographical landmass once comprised of hundreds 
of nations but is now recognised as a singular nation state. As a result, very real questions 
pertaining to ownership and legitimacy emerge. Given the involvement of the state in the life 
of its citizenry (see Hobsbawm 1995), it seems implausible that requests demanding tangible 
                                                 
53 The Murrawarri Republic covers an area of 81,000 square kilometres in an area which extends from Northern 
New South Wales into Queensland.  
54 Most recently 23 Aboriginal Nations from north, north-west, upper western and western New South Wales and 
southern Queensland have signed a multilateral treaty. The treaty, signed at the Aboriginal Embassy, asserts the 
nations’ sovereign status. Fred Hooper, chair of the Northern Basin Aboriginal Nations (NBAN) affirms that “the 
treaty states First Nations people never ceded their sovereignty or titles to the Crown of the United Kingdom” 
(qtd. in Flynn 2017: 14).  
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evidence of how and when Aboriginal land was transferred into a white possession are unable 
to be produced. The years of illegal acquisition of land in Australia were paralleled with the 
colonial project of ‘civilising’ and fundamental to this process was a system of meticulous 
record keeping. Indigenous leaders who are calling for documentary evidence relating to the 
transfer or acquisition of their lands by the British have been whitewashed by elicited responses 
which range from silence to accusations of “oppression” and “abuse of process”.  
Conclusion55 
This chapter brings together a range of approaches that deal with the concept of nation, 
a concept that holds the flag as its most prominent symbol of identification. Although there are 
disparate views and approaches presented here, there are indeed many similarities which 
position the nation-state as a modern, Western entity that has long enjoyed a place of privilege 
in the hearts and minds of its citizens. As a final counterpoint to many of the theorists’ 
standpoints on what constitutes nation, I have included a discussion about Indigenous concepts 
of nation and country. Having drawn out some of the ways in which the nation is produced and 
reproduced, the next chapter will examine how the Australian nation is discursively sustained 





                                                 
55 Since the time of writing this chapter, the political landscape has rapidly changed. Understandings of 
‘democracy’ are being re-assessed. War and poverty have resulted in millions of people seeking refuge in western 
nations around the world. As a consequence mass migration has uneased the western world which perceives its 
values, traditions and ways of life as being under threat. This is turn has led to the rise of far right wing 
conservatism and a new style of xenophobic nationalism. Underpinning this is an increasing disenchantment for 
national politics and the systems of governance which frequently appear to work for the vested interests at the 
expense of the voting majority.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: Maintaining an Australian State … of Mind   
And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern ‘nation’ consists of such 
constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably 
tailored discourse (such as ‘national history’), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately 
investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’.  
    (Hobsbawm 2005a:14). 
 
Introduction 
It is the case that many of the key scholars who have theorised the nation have neglected 
to consider the ways in which nationalism – the maintenance and promotion of the nation – is 
daily sustained (Palmer 1998; Billig 2013). Chapter Four will focus on this issue with an 
exploration into some of the more specific ways that the Australian nation has been constructed 
and is maintained. An examination into the seemingly banal signifiers of nation; place names 
for example, disclose much about the racialised and gendered nature of Australian nationalism. 
My analysis also foregrounds the production of what, I argue, is a discursive and for the most 
part, uncritical acceptance of Australian nationalist sentiment. I also include a discussion about 
Australian literature in order to emphasise its particular role and influence over the creation of 
modern day Australian traditions and identity. Despite modern Australia being a ‘young’ nation 
the country has been immersed in a range of traditions, so I begin this chapter by re-engaging 
with Hobsbawm and his work in this field. 
Nationalism and Traditions 
The emergence of tradition was generated as a response to a rapidly changing world. 
The revolutions which swept throughout Europe created significant social upheaval and as a 
result, old methods of ruling and securing loyalty required new approaches which saw the state 
play an increasing role in shaping the lives of its citizens. Traditions, both official and 
unofficial, enhanced and promoted social cohesion, structure and identity. New ceremonies and 
public holidays, national monuments, heroes, symbols and clubs became part of the social 
engineering process that was required to sustain the modern nation. Hobsbawm’s work on this 
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topic is significant. He draws our attention to a responsive public for whom the invention of 
tradition signified a ‘civil’ religion as it provided a tangible alternative to the “ancient social 
cement, [of] church and monarchy” (Hobsbawm 2005b: 269). 
By the end of the nineteenth century the majority of European states and American 
republics had developed their national paraphernalia,  
[T]hey had capitals, flags, national anthems, military uniforms and similar 
paraphernalia, based largely on the model of the British, whose national anthem 
(datable c. 1740) is probably the first, and of the French, whose tricolour flag was very 
generally imitated (Hobsbawm 2005b: 266-267).  
 
These national insignia provided a tangible way to reinforce the concept of nation. Offering a 
range of constants in a world of rapid change, tradition structured its people and grounded 
society accordingly. Hobsbawm observes that invented tradition, 
is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted 
rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and 
norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with … a 
suitable historic past (2005a: 1).  
 
To secure legitimacy, the modern nation relies upon the uncritical acceptance of its importance 
and superiority. This acceptance is augmented by the maintenance of traditions which imply 
antiquity and invariance.56 Colonial Australians were unable to employ a claim to antiquity as 
was asserted by much of Europe and so they deployed a different strategy or “set of practices” 
that would give primacy to the ‘new’ nation. Settler narratives and mythologies based on 
pioneering, stoicism and conquest were invoked,  
… great things have happened. The huge unknown continent of the South has been 
conquered by the explorer and the pioneer. War has been waged, not with men but with 
nature: and no war ever waged has made more demand on human courage, endurance, 
self-reliance, sagacity (Wood 1913: xiv-xv).  
 
                                                 
56 Note for example how the ANFA draws attention to the ‘age’ of the Australian flag.  
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The British race was portrayed as triumphant in both the taming of nature and the establishment 
the Australian nation. George Wood notes, “[I]t is as if a deliberate experiment was being tried 
to test the quality of the British race in the most unfavourable circumstances that could be 
invented” (1913: xiv). Wood refers to the fact that initially colonial Australia was populated 
by British criminals and soldiers who struggled with an unfamiliar environment. Out of great 
adversity Wood asserts that subsequent generations worked hard towards developing the 
“gradual evolution of a little British society learning at the ends of the earth to live the British 
life in the midst of unprecedented difficulties” (1913: xiv). This was, according to Wood, “one 
of the great exploits of the British Race” (1913: xvi). Wood demonstrates how ideas about the 
triumph of the British race were mobilised to discursively shape the Australian nation in regard 
to racial superiority, which facilitated “legitimate ownership and formation of the nation with 
whiteness and nationality woven tightly together” (Moreton-Robinson 2000: 349).  
Colonial Australia could neither make claims of antiquity, nor could it profess a 
revolution, the importance of which is illustrated by John Roberts who notes that all 
“revolutions try to find new principles for legitimising authority” (1985: 281). Wood reflects 
that for Australia this was a difficult task, “[W]e miss the great battles for great causes; the 
heroisms and the martyrdoms; the inspiration of the lives of famous men” (1913: xiii-xiv). For 
colonial Australians there had been no great war from which to glorify death, sacrifice, duty 
and heroism, there were no “wars of defence, for the continent was protected by the fleet of 
Nelson; no racial conflict, for the people were as entirely British as the people of the British 
Isles” (Wood 1913: xiii). Wood’s testimonial provides evidence of the emergence of the 
enduring mythology of the ‘peaceful settlement’ on which the nation has been discursively 
constructed.  
The lack of conflict is conceptualised by Noel McLachlan who argues that nationalism 
and “blood sacrifice” are inextricably linked and this argument goes some way to explain 
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Australia’s longstanding attachment to Anzac Day, “… the blood sacrifice seems to have been 
the vital thing. In December 1915 one officer talked proudly of Australia having leapt into 
‘Nationhood, Brotherhood and Sacrifice in one bound’ as if they were equally important” 
(McLachlan 1989: 198). This is a direct reference to the Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps, the Anzacs, who landed at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. The First World War (1914-
1918) provided the fledgling Australian nation with the opportunity to enter the battlefield of 
the world-stage. Under the command of an English officer, General Birdwood, the Anzacs 
joined the Allied forces (British, French and Italian troops) in a campaign to seize the Gallipoli 
Peninsular from Turkish forces. This was an ill-fated exercise. The Anzacs were landed in the 
dark and at the wrong place. They came ashore just after dawn, at what is now known as Anzac 
Cove, and were under immediate attack. After eight months of battle and heavy losses the 
Anzacs, in defeat, were evacuated. The tenacity shown by these soldiers, however, helped forge 
the Anzac legend, 
[T]he spirit of Anzac was created on that beachhead and has become indelibly engraved 
on the nation’s heart. The Anzac is epitomised in the good-humoured Aussie larrikin; 
the irreverent, dismissive of authority, hard working, fast shooting, reliable, 
trustworthy, charming, guileless and ultimately expendable Australian ‘good bloke’ 
(Hocking 2007: 153).  
 
Australia, as a young and modern nation needed a focus for national pride. The Anzac tradition 
was quickly established. 25 April has been commemorated as Anzac Day since 1916. Anzac 
Day and Australia Day are both celebrated as national days that are marked by a proliferation 
of national flags. These national occasions make a significant contribution to the durability of 
a national mythology that, following Brennan, “thrives on a selective and ethnocentric history” 
(1990: 58). 
Nationalism prospers on myth, tradition and social practices which infiltrate the 
everyday. It is pervasive, varied, and repetitive and relies for its efficacy on propaganda, 
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[A]s we cheer our athletes, hail our business achievements, express our national family 
values, vote for our politicians, salute our flag, draw spiritual meaning from our 
countryside and claim eternity for ourselves, we distort history. We lie (Bosworth 2007: 
12). 
 
Seemingly ordinary social activities are commonplace. They are however, far from innocuous 
when understood as practices designed to maintain wide-scale compliance to the national ideal. 
Richard Bosworth notes that, “[P]ersuading contemporaries that the nation is as likely to be 
wrong as right remains a vexing task” hindered by “popular parlance, and presumably the 
popular mind that lies behind it, [that] accepts the nation as self-evident and all-embracing” 
(2007:13). Billig argues that nationalism is a theory of a world being ‘naturally’ divided into 
communities which is complicated by the fact that nationalism does not have to be experienced 
theoretically, “[W]ith the triumph of nationalism, and the establishment of nations across the 
globe, the theories of nationalism have been transformed into familiar common sense” (2013: 
63). Therefore, the distortion of history, a constituent element of nationalism, is often not 
recognised, nor conceptualised as a distortion by citizens who are daily imbued with the 
routines of nationalism. One of the more banal (using Billig’s sense of this term) features of 
nationalism is the encoding of nomenclature into the colonised landscape.  
Nationalism and Names  
In the preface to the second edition of Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson notes 
that while the original version (1983) had considered the influence of “time” on understandings 
of nationalism, it had failed to note its “necessary coordinate: the changing apprehensions of 
space” (1991: xiv). In the second edition, Anderson makes note of the power and influence of 
maps on the national imagination. As visual illustrations of the geo-political space, maps 
“profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion” (Anderson 
1991: 164). Roberts claims that maps are more than statements of fact since they translate 
“reality into forms we can master; they are fictions and acts of imagination communicating 
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more than scientific data. So they reflect changes in our pictures of reality” (1985: 194). The 
invention of the chronometer in 1761 facilitated the global classification of imperial possession. 
Territory was reconfigured. The earth, now viewed as a geometrical grid, was under 
surveillance, “‘filling in’ the boxes was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and 
military forces” (Anderson 1991: 173).  
Paul Carter argues that to possess a country with names is as effective “as a general 
deploying his troops” (1987: 119), while Jay Arthur notes that “[C]olonisation is an event in 
language as well as in space” (2003: 17). In Australia, myriad place names symbolise 
colonisation as they eradicate previous Aboriginal connections. The colonial practice of 
naming is thus a multi-faceted tool that constitutes an assertion of possession through the 
linguistic reconfiguration of the landscape. Colonial names reflect the invasive nature of white 
settlement and, at the same time, bolster the myth and tradition-making industries by feigning 
a sense of belonging to places which were previously void of any valid connection.  
James Cook was meticulous in ascribing place names to Australia. During the four 
months spent on Australian waters, he named more than one hundred capes, isles and bays, 
with over one third of the names referring to the British nautical, political and aristocratic 
patriarchal elite (Carter 1987). In effect, Cook provides us with “a white geo-historical” 
travellers discourse (Carter 1987: 328) Carter conceptualises Cook’s naming system in 
Ptolemaic terms. Ancient Greek mathematician and astronomer, Ptolemy, theorised that the 
earth was fixed, and at the centre of the universe. Celestial objects therefore, orbited around 
the earth. In Carter’s analogy Cook, as the “earth”, is encircled by successive spheres of names 
(1987: 5). The furthest flung names to ‘orbit’ Cook belong to the British royal house. For 
example in Queensland the Northumberland Islands and Cumberland Isles celebrate the names 
of King George III’s younger brothers. The succeeding circle contains the names of the 
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politicians who were influential at the time of the Endeavour’s57 sailing; Rockingham, Grafton 
and Shelburne. The next sphere belongs to the Lords of the Admiralty: the men who showed a 
particular interest in the Endeavour find their way onto the Australian landscape via places 
such as Cape Sandwich, Cape Palmerston, Edgcumbe Bay and so on. Inside this ring of names 
come the luminaries with whom Cook was professionally affiliated, Hawke and Howe for 
example. Closer still are the names which refer to Cook’s own career; even the names of vessels 
on which he served, Three Brothers, Grenville and Eagle have been indelibly stamped onto the 
Australian landscape. The innermost circle belongs to the history of the voyage itself and is 
complimented by events, crew members (Sutherland for example, see Chapter One) and related 
imagery. Cook’s place names were tools for the future, “their very accuracy invited further 
exploration, pre-empted premature possession. They … created a cultural space in which places 
might eventually be found” (Carter 1987: 32). Cook’s mode of naming shows us that Australia 
was founded on the gendered and racial premise of patriarchal white sovereignty.  
In Chapter One I noted that Cook did not lay claim to the east coast of Australia until 
he came to Bedanug (Possession Island). This was because when he arrived at Bedanug, Cook 
felt certain that no other European had visited. It was here that he planted the British flag and 
claimed and ‘named’ the east coast of the continent, New South Wales, for the Crown, “…in 
the zigzag map created by his passage, Possession Island, far from appearing peripheral, stood 
as a symbolic centre, a jewel crowning his outline of names” (Carter 1987: 27). Cook did not 
return to Australia, but in 1788, the First Fleet, under the command of Arthur Phillip, landed 
and established a British colony. The tradition of patriarchal naming was quickly resumed. 
Phillip named the first settlement “Sydney Cove”, in honour of the Secretary of State for the 
                                                 





Colonies, Lord Sydney.58 Lord Sydney’s vision for the new colony was to provide for the 
“importation of 200 women from Tonga, New Caledonia, and other islands as wives for the 
convicts” (Holthouse 1969: 12). Sydney’s fantasy that “the union of convict men and island 
women would result in a new breed of human beings” (Berzins 1988: 97) is indicative of the 
white patriarchal sense of entitlement upon which the nation was founded. Phillip rejected 
Sydney’s plan, arguing that the “island women would ‘pine away in misery’” instead he “urged 
the [British] government to send more women” (Berzins 1988: 99).  
From the outset, the colonists struggled to articulate their new environment. Arthur 
argues, that in Australia, 
[T]he language sees double; two landscapes, one present and one ‘remembered’. The 
double vision results in expectation and disappointment. The words look for what is not 
there, for the other country that didn’t happen” (2003: 24).  
 
Where rivers and lakes, plants and climate failed to meet colonial expectations, place names 
were different. Indelibly stamped in the cultural memories of all citizens, place names, whether 
on road signs, street signs, or on maps, construct a necessary distortion that permits the re-
imagining of the landscape. In addition, Australian waters have also been linguistically 
colonised. Augustus Agar draws attention to the fact that Bass, a naval doctor ‘discovered’ and 
named a strait of water after himself, and Flinders, a young naval lieutenant, ‘gave’ his name 
to an island,  
[T]hus for all time the name of a British sailor signposts each sea gateway to Australia, 
while the Cook Strait, which marks the main entrance to New Zealand, commemorates 
the great navigator of the Antipodes (1962: 80). 
 
Anouk Ride finds Australia’s colonial names “absurd”, 
[W]hen you are in the middle of the central Australian desert or a northern rainforest, 
placenames like these [Guilford, York, Avon Valley Park] recalling the countries and 
                                                 
58 Australian state and territory capital cities: Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth, Brisbane, Hobart and Darwin 
have all been named after, or influenced by the British patriarchy (see Reed 1992).   
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towns where white settlers were from – can seem silly, an absurd attempt to mark an 
unfamiliar landscape with something more ordinary (2007: 2). 
 
Moreton-Robinson is more forthright, “[T]he persistent presence of English names continues 
to convey a sense of Anglocentric whiteness’s divine right and entitlement to Australia” 
(2011a: 86).  
New South Wales surveyor general, Thomas Mitchell took charge of the land by 
recording it on a map. By naming geographical features Mitchell “placed a symbolic British 
flag on each of them. The land was charted, ordered and labelled, becoming a colonial 
possession” (Birch 1997: 24). In 1836, north of the Murray River, Mitchell witnessed his men 
chase and kill a group of Aboriginal people. This moment of brutality was memorialised and 
mapped by Mitchell who named the massacre site “Mt. Dispersion”59 (Birch 1997: 25). Burney 
claims that the Australian landscape “is scarred with signposts of horror” and she questions 
“what this has done to the collective psyche of mainstream Australia” (2000: 74). 
“Poisoned Waterholes Creek” and “Massacre Island” are in Wiradjuri country (central 
New South Wales), local Narrandera Elders describe them as “literary tombstones” (National 
Indigenous Times 10 July 2013: 5). These place names stand in testimony to the violence of 
colonisation. Oral tradition states that Aboriginal people were deliberately poisoned, 
… they wandered sick along the water’s edge … they died all along the creek bed, and 
so it became known as Poisoned Waterhole Creek … Some of them got away … They 
drove them into this island, trapped them there, and murdered them (Kabaila 1995: 93).  
 
‘Gin’s Leap’ is an escarpment south of Narrabri in northwest NSW. It is a popular roadside 
stop, yet conjecture exists about its name. White history mythologies ‘Gin’s Leap’ as having 
been named after a young Aboriginal couple who were forbidden to marry. White myth claims 
                                                 
59 ‘Dispersal’ is a euphemism commonly used to describe the massacre of Aboriginal people, “‘[D]ispersals’ have 
been part of the European cultural lexicon in Australia since 1788 … ‘dispersal’ included killings on a very large 
scale and over a long period of time” (Owen 2016: 145). 
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that as they were being chased by their families, so the ‘star-crossed lovers’ leapt to their deaths. 
The Aboriginal version of history states that ‘Gin’s Leap’ is a massacre site, “where 43 women 
and children were herded to the top and forced to jump” (Graham 2013: 12). Local Aboriginal 
woman Jody Sevil notes,   
[T]he name is awful. It’s very derogatory.60 I’ve had people say to me, ‘Oh but it’s 
history’. Well I’m sorry some people feel so comfortable in history, but I think people 
get too relaxed with their own racism … We don’t have Redneck Hill, but we’ve got 
Gin’s Leap. It’s just crazy (qtd. in Graham 2013: 12).  
 
Sevil claims that to return to the traditional Gomeroi name of ‘Cooloobindi’ would enrich the 
whole town and might provoke a national movement to be rid of the racist place names which 
litter the landscape. Moreton-Robinson points out that Indigenous resistance is “produced 
through the continued practice of naming the landscape, which in turn affirms Indigenous 
ownership” (2011a: 86). 
In contrast to the names associated with atrocities committed stand the names of British 
royalty. When Cook seared royal names into the Australian landscape he started a tradition 
which continues to this day. Thirty kilometres north of Adelaide lies the suburb of Elizabeth. 
After the Queen’s 1954 tour of Australia, the South Australian government sought her 
permission to name a suburb in her honour. In 1963 the Queen returned to Australia and visited 
her namesake. She unveiled a fountain outside the “Elizabeth Civic Centre” and some 17,000 
children came to celebrate. Half a century later, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge (Prince 
William, second in line to the throne, and his wife Kate) visited the suburb of Elizabeth. They 
unveiled a plaque and ‘renamed’ the area “Prince George Plaza” in honour of their 9 month 
old baby, who is third in line to the British throne, “[W]hen the royal couple appeared … the 
14,000 crowd, mainly women and holidaying schoolchildren, went wild” (Murphy 2014: 3). 
                                                 




The royal couple also visited Taronga Zoo, Sydney where the bilby enclosure has been renamed 
“the Prince George Bilby Exhibit” (Dumas 2014: 7).  
In Coraki, north-east NSW, a proposal to incorporate street signs with the local 
Aboriginal language was rejected after Richmond Valley Council “took the view that it was a 
divisive issue” (Koori Mail 7 October 2015: 16). The proposed names included Bundjalung 
words for six local animals, which Coraki primary school students had been taught by local 
Elders. Letters requesting feedback about the dual-naming project were distributed to all Coraki 
residents. Over 90% of the responses were negative. The council’s general manager was 
surprised “at the vehemence and violence of the negative response, which included threats to 
staff members and use of firearms” (Koori Mail 7 October 2015: 16). Bundjalung Elder, 
Russell Kapeen, identifies the need to educate the wider population, “[W]e weren’t going to 
take away the name of Queen Elizabeth Drive, just hang another sign underneath, with the 
Bundjalung name and telling people what the names mean” (qtd. in Koori Mail 7 October 2015: 
16). Resistance to change, as demonstrated by the non-Aboriginal residents of Coraki, reveals 
that white Australia’s insecurities are reflected by a determination to own and endorse colonial 
symbols in all their formations.  
Nationalism and Monuments and Buildings  
Colonial monuments and buildings are visual signifiers of British power and authority. 
In England, the trend for these symbolic markers was forged during the Victorian era (Victoria 
was born 24 May 1819 and died 22 January 1901). From 1908 – 1947 a statue of Queen Victoria 
stood outside the Irish Parliament in Dublin, Ireland. Political unrest instigated the statue’s 
removal and it was placed into storage. Forty years later, in 1987, the unwanted statue of Queen 
Victoria was gifted to the city of Sydney, New South Wales, and placed on a stone pedestal 
outside the “Queen Victoria Building”. Ride argues that the history Australia has selected to 
remember is curious. Queen Victoria oversaw the British Empire which facilitated, “the 
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transport of thousands of convicts to Australia, millions of her own people working themselves 
into early graves and the suppression of Indigenous cultures from Australia to Africa” (Ride 
2007: 91). The buildings and monuments which colonise the landscape have also been 
bolstered by the invention of public ceremonies. For example, to celebrate the late Queen 
Victoria’s birthday ‘Empire Day’ (24 May) was introduced to Australia in 1905. Kwan (2006) 
argues that this is an example of Australian society struggling to come to terms with its identity. 
In 1901, Federation had encouraged Australians to imagine themselves as a distinct and 
emerging nation. The promotion of ‘Empire Day’ contradicted this stance.  
The colonial past can be re-invented with surprising ease. In 2005 a statue dedicated to 
the founder of Townsville, Robert Towns was installed in the city which angered some of the 
locals who argue that the effigy “honours the memory of a man who was heavily involved in 
the brutal system of indentured labour that established Queensland’s sugar, maritime and 
pastoral industries” (Wilson 2013: 9). Hector Holthouse notes that Towns introduced the 
system of indentured labour which in turn led to the widespread exploitation of South Sea 
Islanders,  
[I]n the four and a half years that followed Towns’ introduction of the original sixty-
seven kanakas61 in 1863, a total of twenty-two voyages to the South Seas brought to 
Queensland 2,107 natives, mainly from the islands of Mare, Efate and Tanna (1969: 
38).  
 
Wilson (2013) states that under the indentured labour system some 55,000 South Sea Islanders 
were bought to Australia on 62,000 contracts. 95 per cent were male. Thousands died, and 
many never returned to the islands of their birth, “Towns, who died in 1873, gave his name to 
Townsville, but visited the city only once after it was founded in 1866” (Wilson 2013: 9). 
Protestors, many of whom are descendants of the indentured labourers, want the statue of 
Towns removed as they consider him “a blackbirder and slave trader” (Wilson 2013: 9). 
                                                 
61 Kanakas: A Melanesian word meaning “man” (Holthouse 1969: 3). 
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In 2010, an iron statue four metres tall, was unveiled in the Northern Territory town 
centre of Mparntwe (Alice Springs). The statue of explorer John Stuart was commissioned by 
the Freemasons to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Scottish-freemason’s arrival in 
the area. The traditional owners of Mparntwe have called on the council to have it removed. In 
a joint statement Elders, traditional owners and concerned residents articulate several concerns, 
[S]o why have they put up a huge statue of a man with a gun? What message does this 
send to the children? This man murdered our people… The statue is also a symbol of 
the warfare that took place over many years as this country was stolen from us. It brings 
up so many bad memories of our great grandfathers and grandmothers that were 
killed… The statue is also a symbol of the attitude that white people can rule over 
Aboriginal people. We are still being dominated by men with guns – the police who 
harass and discriminate (Koori Mail, 10 September 2014: 8).  
 
Tony Birch argues that historical distortion is “a form of radial conservatism: the history is not 
unknown, but is repressed by building monuments to murderers” (1997: 27). Trauma and 
brutality are bypassed, smothered by effigies which glorify colonial masculinity and conquest. 
From these examples it is evident that the statues of Australian colonisation do not hail from a 
bygone Victorian era. Statues of conquest are being re-born, a twenty first century colonial 
project which visually transmits the violence of the past into the present.62 The presence of 
colonial symbols and names as cultural representations of the Australian nation have the 
capacity to evoke trauma and anger. They can provide a distressing reminder of past atrocities, 
as Gary Foley confirms.  
Foley writes of his time at Melbourne University, “I …found myself disturbed every 
day by having to enter buildings that were named after people who I knew I didn’t like” (2012: 
24). Foley refers to the “Baldwin Spencer” and “Richard Berry” buildings. Spencer was an 
anthropologist who became the first special commissioner and chief ‘protector’ of Aboriginal 
people in 1912. Foley argues that Spencer was complicit in developing the relationship between 
                                                 
62 Both statues discussed are recognised as controversial (Monument Australia 2017)  
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Australian anthropology and the state policies of genocide. Berry, Professor of Anatomy at 
Melbourne University from 1903 – 1929, was an influential campaigner of eugenics. He was 
also an avid ‘collector’ of Aboriginal skulls and body parts. Foley notes that over the years 
various groups of Aboriginal students and academics have called for the Richard Berry building 
to be re-named.63  
Bronwyn Fredericks testifies that symbols of place and space are politically charged. 
She notes that buildings named after prominent political, religious or academic figures can 
become, “social texts that convey messages of belonging and welcome or exclusion and 
domination, and produce and reproduce power and control relations” (2015: 82). Buildings, 
place names and associated symbols bolster the hegemonic narratives of nation. They are the 
statements of ownership – tangible structures which attempt to bypass Indigenous sovereignty. 
Raymond Firth argues that symbols have been invented by people who “acquire them by 
learning, adapt them, [and] use them for their own purposes” (1975: 427). This hypothesis 
helps to explain how Australian colonial symbols continue to serve the dominant interests. To 
understand the function of symbols helps to explain the reticence for change: symbols 
constitute a powerful mechanism for vested interests of a particular view of nation. Firth also 
explains that symbols of power are most prominent in the public domain. 
The Australian War Memorial (AWM) in Canberra is the national site of remembrance 
that pays homage to the armed forces and those who fought and died in the ‘theatre’ of war. 
The memorial is located on an elevated site and is in direct alignment with both old and new 
Parliament House. Of the latter,  
when all the doors from the cabinet room through to the Great Hall and out to the main 
entrance are opened, the Australian War memorial can be seen, a reminder to MPs of 
the consequences of their decisions (Peatling 2017: 7). 
 
                                                 
63 In December 2016 the Richard Berry building was finally renamed. It is now known as the Peter Hall building 




The AWM is an iconic building; it is a shrine, a museum, an exhibition hall and place of 
research. According to Anderson, “[N]o more arresting emblems of the modern culture of 
nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers… they are … saturated with 
ghostly national imaginings” (1991: 9 emphasis in the original). Brendan Nelson, Director of 
the AWM claims that the War Memorial is central to our understanding of history, it is “the 
soul of the nation” (qtd in McQuire 2013: 8). Furthermore, Nelson asserts, “[A] people that 
neither knows and nor, more importantly, understands its history, in my view, is dangerous” 
(qtd. in McQuire 2013: 8). There are growing calls for the War Memorial to recognise the 
Frontier Wars,64 “[T]he next step in being fair and equitable is acknowledging those brave men 
and women who made the absolute sacrifice in defending their homes during the frontier wars” 
(Waters 2017: 24). Nelson claims that the Frontier Wars have no place at the AWM. The 
memorial, he argues, “is about Australians going overseas in peace operations and in war in 
our name as Australians” (qtd. in McQuire 2013: 8). The Australian War Memorial Act 1980 
states its official role is to develop a memorial for Australians who have died: 
1. On or as a result of active service. 
2. As a result of any war or warlike operations in which Australians have been on 
active service. (Oakley 2014: 22). 
In the lead up to the centenary of the First World War, and to enhance the nation’s 
understanding of the experience, $32 million was committed to upgrade the War Memorial’s 
First World War galleries. Paul Daley questions why memorial officials continue with an 
Anzac-centric focus and “stubbornly exclude the fierce battles for sovereignty between 
Aboriginal Australians and pastoral settlers across the frontier, which are at the dark heart of 
Australia’s nationhood” (2013: 18). Foley (2014a) states that the failure by Nelson and the 
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AWM to acknowledge the Frontier Wars is indicative of the broader national discomfort. As 
Maddison attests, “[W]hite Australia was settled on a land that did not belong to us. Deep in 
our hearts every Australian knows this to be true” (2011: 3). Maddison also claims that the 
Australian nation, both collectively and inter-generationally, has failed to respond to the 
wrongs of our past; dissenting voices are dismissed and calls for change are not considered as 
being in the ‘national interest’. Resulting tensions and unresolved issues continue to shape 
Indigenous – non-Indigenous relationships. Maddison argues that new ways of thinking and 
speaking about the past are vital for “a more just Australia and a more confident Australian 
national identity” (2011: 7). 
As stated, Nelson claims that it is dangerous for a people not to know or understand its 
history, yet he refuses to include the Frontier Wars into the “soul of the nation”. This 
contradiction reveals how dominant ways of thinking can infiltrate, distort and continue to 
claim authority over the (re)production of national history, knowledge, and identity. In his 
discussion into the politicisation of Australia’s historical memory, Foley (2014a) notes that 
Nelson and the Commonwealth War Graves Commissioner, Mike Rann, are former politicians. 
Both play a key role in the memorialisation landscape, therefore, as Foley argues, “it is little 
wonder politics dominates discussion about what we should be remembering and 
commemorating” (2014a: 19).  
The official failure to recognise the Frontier Wars at the War Memorial is replicated in 
Anzac Parade, Canberra’s ceremonial thoroughfare. Opened on 25 April 1965 to commemorate 
the 50th Anniversary of the Anzac landing in Gallipoli, Anzac Parade is adorned with statues. 
There is, however, no memorial to honour the war service of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander service men and women, who defended a country that did not include them in the 
census until 1967,  
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[they] left these shores, truly their Country, to fight for an Australia that did not 
recognise them as citizens and on their return denied them soldier settlement blocks and 
all of what was offered to their non-Indigenous mates (Bagnall 2014d: 5).  
 
The War Memorial’s Indigenous Liaison Officer, Gary Oakley, calls the neglect a “crime”. He 
wants an Indigenous Memorial to also be included “in the sightline between the War Memorial 
and Parliament House … There needs to be some national focus point, some point where all 
Indigenous Australians can say this is where we’re honoured” (qtd. in Bagnall 2014d: 5).  
Where calls for a national memorial for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander service 
men and women have gone unheeded, and colonial violence is deemed as conflict not war, the 
Australian nation reveres and remembers the ill-fated campaign of Gallipoli. At 4.28am on 25 
April 2015, a life-size bronze statue of Lieutenant Duncan Chapman was due to be unveiled in 
Queens Park, Maryborough, in Queensland when one hundred years ago to the minute it is 
thought that Chapman was the first Anzac to set foot on the beach at Gallipoli. Stones and sand 
from Gallipoli have been incorporated into this memorial. (Monument Australia 2015). 
Ethnocentric history-making perpetuates biased national imaginings as Behrendt argues, “[A] 
distorted history creates a distorted national image and romanticising history to promote a 
fictitious national image helps no one” (2003: 75).  
Nationalism and the Printed Word 
When nationalism and literature combined, an inseparable partnership was formed that 
“created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology 
set the stage for the modern nation” (Anderson 1991: 46). The rise of the modern nation was 
accompanied by the emergence of the novel as a popular genre. Nations were represented in 
particular ways according primarily to those whose works were published. Australian colonial 
literary output became organised around a set of white masculinist principles that both 
constructed and validated the nation through ideologies of colonial struggle, geographical 
location, and male work and leisure practices. White colonial women were represented in early 
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literature as adjuncts to a burgeoning white male national culture. The novel joined the 
newspaper as the major vehicle of the national print media and as a result, language was 
standardised and literacy flourished. People were now able to imagine themselves part of a 
special community, “[R]ead in isolation, the novel was nevertheless a mass ceremony; one 
could read alone with the conviction that millions of others were doing the same, at the same 
time” (Brennan 1990: 52). In Australia House, London, Bernd Lohse reports, 
[Y]ou feel you can see the fingers of the exiled Australians tremble as they unfold the 
Sydney Morning Herald or the Melbourne Argus… Like folded flags the front pages 
are clasped to their bosoms and the scrawny, tanned Queenslanders, the easy-going 
Western Australians, the correct “British” citizens of Melbourne, and the more lively 
cosmopolitans from Sydney are as one (1959: 2).  
 
Since the early nineteenth century the Australian print media have employed language 
and images to reproduce dominant ideologies and to categorise Aboriginal people, these 
representations have been reinforced over time to become entrenched in the Australian psyche. 
Charles ‘Chicka’ Dixon argues the media encourages the stereotyping of Aboriginal peoples, 
“they zoom in on the negative side whenever they put up Aboriginal stories … They never 
show the positive side you notice?” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 124). Amy McQuire (2014) also draws 
attention to the historic role of the Australian media in reducing Aboriginal people to the types 
of stereotyping which would be unacceptable in other countries, including post-apartheid South 
Africa. McLachlan argues that the press is “the single most powerful engine of nationalism” 
(1989: 300). Billig contends that “the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the 
newspapers” (2013: 94). Shyamla Eswaran (2014) states that Australian media ownership is 
among the most concentrated in the world. She claims that Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation is hostile to Aboriginal rights and John Fairfax Holdings, which owns eleven out 




Nationalism and the Sydney Gazette 
Australia’s first newspaper was the Sydney Gazette (1803 – 1842). The paper was 
tailored to suit colonial interests and all articles were vetted by the government prior to 
publication. The Gazette’s readership comprised of a small elite, Anglican clergy, landholders, 
lawyers, and merchants; these were the early power-brokers of Australia who were quickly 
able to highlight difference and substantiate their claims of white male prerogative. Aboriginal 
people were not afforded a voice. Journalism researchers, Meenakshi Ganjoo and Karla Fritis 
note “the paper almost denied their existence except when they resisted forcible colonisation 
or became sad by-products of it” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 50). In 1806 there were just three reports 
mentioning ‘Aborigines’ [sic], and each focused on conflict and aggressive behaviour. Ganjoo 
and Fritis claim, Aboriginal people “were portrayed as “barbarians”, “savages”, “hostile 
natives”, “banditti” and “criminals”, a theme that continued until the paper closed down in 
1842” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 50). Frankenberg (1997) asserts that the naming of ‘others’ was part 
of the self-justification process of colonisation. Stereotypical practices were further bolstered 
by race related literature and theories of science which permitted notions of white superiority 
to work in conjunction with the production of Australian nationalism. 
The Sydney Gazette depicted the white settlers as civilised adventurers, while reports 
concerning Aboriginal hostility and resistance served to both warn and justify. On one hand 
white settlers needed to be warned about what the ‘Aborigines’ [sic] were capable of, and on 
the other, their brutal retaliation was to be justified. Ganjoo and Fritis argue, “[T]he 
dispossession, destruction and despair suffered by the Aborigines was either completely 
overlooked or trivialised” (qtd. in Plater 1994: 53). Over time as the newspaper industry and 
freedom of the press expanded, “[J]ournalism had a new and strident tone, often rude and 
vulgar, and not at all respectful of authority” (Miller qtd. in Plater 1994: 57). The Bulletin, 
published each week from 1880 – 2008 was Australia’s longest running magazine.  
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Nationalism and the Bulletin 
The Bulletin was conceived in response to an Australia where the squatterdom,65 
bolstered by British sentiment sought to rule New South Wales, where the under-dog had no 
influence in government and the shadow of convict shame hung over the community, 
“Australia was in the hands of a distinct plutocracy” (Hopkins 1929: 228). An atmosphere of 
inferiority presided as the founding editor of the Bulletin, J. F. Archibald ascertains, 
[T]here was no health in the public spirit socially and politically; all was a mean 
subservience to a spirit of snobbery and dependency … Sydney socially limped in apish 
imitation after London ideas, habits, and manners. Politically and industrially it was the 
same. And over all brooded in law courts, press, and Parliament the desolating cruelty 
inherited from ‘The System.’ Sydney invited revolt from existing conditions, and the 
Bulletin was the organ of that revolt (qtd. in Hopkins 1929: 82).   
 
From the outset the Bulletin combined the poet, the artist and the thinker, “[W]hat they 
proclaimed from the housetops in a spirit of daring and self-sacrifice became the opinions of 
the street and the workshop” (Hopkins 1929: 229). The Bulletin became a “mental necessity to 
numbers of people, and its red cover was as familiar in the professional man’s club as in the 
shearer’s hut” (Palmer 1968: 115). Embedded and perpetuated via the medium of print, Bulletin 
ideals were transmitted through the generations and throughout the land. In fact the Bulletin 
was known throughout the English speaking world, and, Dorothy Hopkins (1929) claims, the 
magazine reflected the Australian national spirit and Australian characteristics like no other. 
The Bulletin was a paper written by its readers, the wheat-grower, the ornithologist, the 
bullock-driver; from all over the continent Archibald encouraged men to express themselves.  
Out of the Bulletin a style of literature grew which is credited as being the first 
imaginative response to life in Australia. Archibald discovered Henry Lawson and Banjo 
Patterson. Patterson’s “‘Man from Snowy River’ became a national figure, as definite as if his 
features had been struck out from the marble with a chisel” (Palmer 1968: 119). Enid Heddle 
                                                 
65 Pastoral magnates. 
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explains, “[T]he Australian character was fixed in print for us by the stories of Henry Lawson 
… and the poetry of … Banjo Patterson” (1949: 18-19). The Bulletin was pivotal in 
transmitting an Australian identity that linked it to the ‘outback’ and to the ‘bush’. A feature of 
the paper was its “Aboriginalities” page. This was the metaphoric ‘campfire’ around which 
readers gathered to swap stories and experiences. The tenor of the paper was “tough and 
masculine, leaning to the macabre in humour, the sardonic in general treatment of a theme” 
(Palmer 1968: 117-118). The Bulletin campaigned against the monopolies of wealth, power 
and privilege as it engaged in extreme chauvinism and racism. Marguerite Mahood states that 
the positioning of others as ‘cheap European paupers’, ‘chows’, and ‘Oriental niggers,’ 
was the dark underside of the Bulletin as it was of the Australian character and the 
period. It echoed the careless talk of the contemporary man in the street whose 
experiences were invited as contributions, to be transformed by editorial skill into vivid 
paragraphs (1973: 179).  
 
As a method to capture and reproduce public opinion this invitation, “to capture the careless 
talk of the contemporary man” allowed negative stereotyping based on race and gender to 
flourish. The Bulletin set about, “creating the image of what it believed was the essence of 
Australianness and denigrated everything and everyone that did not sit within its nationalistic 
image” (Sager 2014: 13).   
As noted, white Australians could not lay claim to antiquity, tradition or revolution. 
They were part of “a society that lacked history, other than the original purpose of harbouring 
a lawless rabble of humanity expelled from their homeland” (Sager 2014: 13). For generations 
of Australians, born from convict stock, survival became a primary and unifying signifier of 
identity, “[T]he rugged, resourceful men who had tamed the wild interior were offered as 
examples that described what it was to be Australian” (Sager 2014: 13). Triumph over adversity 
was an agenda which the governments fostered; they needed the land to be tamed, cultivated 
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and populated. It was through the romanticisation of the ‘outback’ that new settlers were 
tempted to buy land, and thus much needed funds flowed into the treasury.  
The writers of the Bulletin shaped the nation with their ideas and opinions, yet it was 
the artists who, “set the whole continent laughing” (Palmer 1968: 116). Livingston Hopkins, 
or Hop as he was known, came from America and joined the Bulletin in 1883. Hop became the 
most famous and popular comic artist. He produced over 19,000 works in a career spanning 
thirty years. Mahood (1973) states that political cartoons provide information which relate to 
the thinking of the day and they offer historical evidence that documents human reactions to 
daily events. Dorothy Hopkins, Hop’s daughter, asserts “[G]ood cartoons may be regarded as 
the milestones on the road of national events. Historically they are instructive …” (1929: 103). 
Hopkins also claims that Hop helped to ‘create’ history and “will be remembered by thinkers 
and scholars as much as by the cockies and the shearing-shed hands” (1929: 239).  
The early years of the Bulletin were turbulent, “[W]ith the birth of a national spirit all 
sorts of problems asserted themselves” (Hopkins 1929: 104). Hage claims that Australia was 
“peculiarly … timid for a nation about to ‘gain’ its independence” (2003: 52). The reasons for 
this are varied. New South Wales developed an aversion to its convict past and a growing 
resentment developed towards the Imperial Government. The super-aristocratic airs assumed 
by some of the early governors were galling and contempt for all things Australian by the 
Briton ‘at home’ was a further humiliation. Location was also a factor. The new Australian 
nation was a British colony set in the Asia-Pacific. Not only was it was geographically distant 
from Britain but it also envisaged a very real threat of an ‘Asian invasion’. These insecurities, 
Hage argues, are reflected in the White Australia Policy which sought to protect and privilege 
white identity. Following Hobsbawm, the modern Australian nation is an example of a nation 
that relied “for its self-definition … on its enemies, external and internal” (2005b: 279 emphasis 
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in the original). Hopkins claims that during these times, Hop’s cartoons were brilliant even 
though he sought not to differentiate 
between the admission of Chinese and Kanakas as indentured labour. Out of this 
turmoil grew a definite White Australia policy, and no editor would now dare to suggest 
the opening of any part of this island continent to dark races even under the most 
restrictive conditions (1929: 104).  
 
White Australian nationalism “encoded many meanings, and worked as a unifying ideology 
for otherwise disparate and conflicting interests” (Moran 2005: 171). The Bulletin worked in a 
similar way. It united a diverse masculine population, all the while promoting its patriarchal 
ideology via its masthead, which from 1908 to 1961 shouted: “Australia for the White Man”.  
The White Australia Policy, introduced in 1901, was accompanied by the first public 
display of the new ‘national’ flag. These two introductions to nationalist discourse would shape 
the way Australia projected itself as a nation throughout the twentieth century. Despite the 
Bulletin’s masculinist orientation and its overt support of nationalism, its nationalist leanings 
were of a particular type more oriented towards a republic. The Bulletin saw the new flag as an 
ill-equipped symbol, an emblem of infantilism that failed to show autonomy,  
the future emblem of the Commonwealth is vulgar and ill-fitting, – a staled re´chauffe´ 
of the British flag, with no artistic virtue, no national significance … Australia is still 
Britain’s little boy. What more natural than that he should accept his father’s cut-down 
garments, – lacking the power to protest, and only dimly realising his will. That bastard 
flag is a true symbol of the bastard state of Australian opinion, still in large part biassed 
by British tradition, British customs … (Bulletin 28 September 1901 qtd. in Crowley 
1973: 19).  
 
The new flag, the Bulletin, states is indicative of a nationalism which clings to Britain in order 
to define itself. It is a nationalism of subservience, and it held little meaning to the republicans 
who imagined a truly independent Australian nation. This debate is a continuing source of 
frustration, “Australia can never define itself on its own terms while it defers to an inherited 
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monarchy of a nation locked in our past and dictating our future” (Sydney Morning Herald 2 
January 2016: 2). The Bulletin also identifies the Australian public as being apathetic, 
[P]robably seven in ten of Australians or British-Australians are conscious of no 
offence in the monstrosity that has been foisted upon them for a symbol… they cannot 
see for themselves … The flag represents the old generation, the old leaven (Bulletin 
28 September 1901 qtd. in Crowley 1973: 19).  
 
The Bulletin forecasts that new generations will bring with them a “new spirit” to politics, art 
and literature and, “[W]ith the New Leaders will come a New Flag” (qtd. in Crowley 1973: 
19). The “New flag” remains a long-held aspiration.  
Nationalism and Colonial Literature 
Despite the Bulletin’s vision for the following generations to be charged with a “new 
spirit”, Australia continued to be dominated by its ties to Britain which resulted in “a curious 
sense of inferiority” compounded by the fact that, “little Australian writing was thought worth 
publishing without the promise of sales in England” (Pike 1970: 227). Douglas Pike states the 
pioneer writers of Australian literature told a simple story. They detailed the various qualities 
of the early Governors and glorified the ‘superhuman’ explorers. They wrote about the 
squatters, the land and the gold rush. This was a national story which “omits more than it tells” 
(Pike 1970: 224; see also Heddle 1949). This was a ‘his’ story, which Pilger argues was devoid 
of “blacks, women and other complicating factors” (1990: 31). As Foucault observes, the 
writing of history, “is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of 
documentation with which it is inextricably linked” (1997: 7). Similarly, what is omitted – the 
“complicating factors” – contribute in their silence to the oeuvre of ‘knowledge’ that constitutes 
a nation’s history.  
In response to a 1931 London exhibition of Australian books, the Times Literary 
Supplement notes that A.W. Jose calls for Australian literature to be “to the great stream of 
English literature a new in-running river, not what Australians call an ana-branch, a river that 
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has diverged higher up and merely rejoins the parent” (qtd. in Miller 1940: 13). Morris Miller, 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Tasmania responds,  
we cannot dispossess ourselves of our literary heritage. We speak the English tongue 
and write in the English language. Again, we remain in a British Commonwealth; we 
may claim sovereignty, but are not an imperium. And although we aspire to a measure 
of independence as a nation, we do so as a unit within a larger whole under the all-
pervading Crown. Literature is susceptible to political influences, and is not wholly 
separable from the tradition of race … we are not in the position to set up an 
independent household (1940:14 emphasis in the original).  
 
Miller’s reply draws attention to the overarching reach of British influence and notes its 
corresponding effect on the development of Australian literature. He suggests that Australian 
writers who live far from the old and cloistered British world must, “strike out for themselves, 
to battle for positions which are usually of their own making, to knock about in all kinds of 
jobs, to make a living as they go” (1940: 16). In recognising the fighting spirit of Australian 
writers, Miller urges them not to lose sight of where they come from, 
[H]owever strongly we may assert nationalism, whether in literature or politics, – and 
we must present a united front to the world as Australians, – yet nationalism is not 
inconsistent with pride of locality, be it city, country, or State, within the 
Commonwealth (1940: 6). 
 
Miller makes two important points: first, he highlights the interconnectedness of politics, 
literature and the creation of nationalism. Second, he articulates the need for a form of 
nationalism which presents a “united Australia” to the world, yet harnesses regional 
individualities. In other words, Australian nationalism is a diverse concept which can be 
fostered through literary prowess and drawn from a range of sources. From the bush to the 
beach, from the country to the cities, the Australian nation was being forged by ‘battling’ 
Australian writers. Perhaps the most significant of these was Henry Lawson, and although he 
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died in poverty in 1922, he was (and remains) recognised as a national symbol and received a 
state funeral. 
Henry Lawson 
Henry Lawson was born into abject poverty on the goldfields of central west NSW in 
1867. Lawson’s mother, Louisa Lawson, was, “[C]onsumed with bitterness at the degradation 
and harshness of the bush” she left Lawson’s father in 1883 to “eke out a life as a seamstress” 
(Luck 1992: 127). Louisa Lawson became an influential leader of the women’s movement and 
publisher of Dawn, Australia’s first successful women’s magazine. Lawson was shaped by his 
mother who encouraged a love of literature, and influenced him with her progressive and 
republican ideals. Lawson’s first poems, including ‘Song of the Republic’, were published in 
the Bulletin in 1887 where his struggles were highlighted: Lawson has “an imperfect education 
and is earning his living under some difficulties as a housepainter, a youth whose poetic genius 
here speaks eloquently for itself” (Barnard 2000: 93). In 1888 Lawson’s first short story, ‘My 
Father’s Mate’ was published in the Bulletin. Lawson was saluted as a “talented bush balladeer” 
whose work “is full of humour and compassion” (Barnard 2000: 97). The 1890s was a time of 
political unrest, economic recession, and strikes. In 1892, Archibald sent Lawson into the 
‘bush’ where he spent 9 months ‘tramping’. The memories and experiences of this time would 
sustain Lawson for the rest of his career. Meanwhile, a writer who called himself ‘The Banjo’, 
was also capturing the public imagination.  
Banjo Paterson 
Andrew Paterson was the son of a station owner from Orange, New South Wales. He 
was born in 1864 and as a child encountered many characters of the bush: bullockies, drovers, 
bush horsemen and rouseabouts. He was also an accomplished equestrian (Semmler in Paterson 
1986). When he was eleven, Paterson was sent to a Sydney private school where he excelled 
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in both sport and study. Paterson became a solicitor in 1886. When the Bulletin made its debut 
in 1880, it renounced “the genteel and patronising English-ism that had reigned in Australian 
literary circles. It stood firmly against Imperialism in an era when the British Empire was 
reaching its zenith” (Paterson & Baglin 1988: 22). Archibald was tenacious in his quest to 
publish Australian writers. From 1885, and under the pseudonym ‘The Banjo’,66 Paterson 
began to make regular contributions. In 1889, and to great acclaim, the Bulletin published 
‘Clancy of the Overflow’. Paterson’s identity however, was not revealed until 1895 when 
Angus and Robinson published The Man From Snowy River and Other Verses. This body of 
work was described by the London Literary Yearbook as, “without parallel in colonial literary 
annals”, and gave Paterson a public audience greater than any other living writer, apart from 
Rudyard Kipling (Magoffin 1987: 20). Paterson was an overnight sensation, “[I]t was a nine-
day wonder in the colony that this tall, quiet and handsome young solicitor, already well known 
in Sydney’s social and sporting circles, was “The Banjo”” (Semmler in Paterson 1986: 5). 
Nationalism and the Bulletin Debate 
Despite their differing circumstances and views, Lawson and Paterson were to form a 
partnership which pitted their literary prowess, rivalry and humour against the other. Theirs 
was “a happy conspiracy between the two to inveigle a few extra pounds from Mr Archibald 
of the Bulletin” (Magoffin 1987: 22). In 1892 Lawson suggested that they competed against 
each other. The ensuing literary ‘feud’, known as the Bulletin Debate, captivated the nation.67 
As a result, the bards firmly established the bush, into the national psyche. For Lawson the 
bush was unending struggle and loneliness. For Paterson, the bush was a place to be revered, 
where the men were brave and physical. The Bulletin Debate was real-life-Australian-legend-
                                                 
66 ‘The Banjo’ was the name of a racehorse once owned by Paterson’s family.  
67 For an example see Appendix C.  
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making literature, to which the Australian public was party, it was a battle that went on for 
some time, as Paterson explains, 
… so we slam-banged away at each other for weeks and weeks, not until they stopped 
us, but until we ran out of material. I think that Lawson put his case better than I did, 
but I had the better case, so that honours (or dishonours) were fairly equal (qtd. in 
Magoffin 1987: 23-24).  
 
Lawson labelled Paterson a ‘City Bushman’ and Paterson called Lawson ‘a poet of the tomb’. 
The two were in fact friends, and Paterson acted as Lawson’s solicitor in his financial 
negotiations with Archibald (Magoffin 1987). Paterson died in 1941. His 1894 ballad 
‘Waltzing Matilda’ is known throughout Australia and many parts of the world reifying 
Richard Magoffin’s claim that Paterson’s legacy “will live forever because many of his lines 
are as fresh today as they were when they came from his pen” (1987: 25).  
It was around this time that Miller was claiming that the mythologies and romance of 
the old-world were insufficient sources of literary inspiration for Australians and he argues, 
[T]he beginnings of human enterprise in this new land of the south are wrought into our poetry 
and prose” in a variety of ways which demonstrate, “the novelty and spontaneity of life as lived 
far away from the routine and set of the old world” (1940: 15-16). The Bulletin Debate supports 
Miller’s claim; it was both spontaneous and novel, an event which stood in sharp contrast to 
the constricting standards of British literature. This was the brilliance of the Bulletin, in many 
ways a ground-breaking and empowering journal that managed to thrive in a climate that was 
dictated to by Britain. That being said, Miller contends that Australia remains unable to create 
its own national philosophy due to the nature of its acquiescent relationship with Britain. He 
states his aspirations, 
just as we have advanced beyond political subservience and entered upon an era of co-
operative independence, our literature will consolidate itself on similar lines, and it will 
certainly grow in strength corresponding with our standing as a nation (1940: 15). 
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Thirty years later and Pike notes how Australia remains confined by British norms, “some 
British training is considered essential for Australian scholars and leaders, while each visiting 
Englishman is assumed to have more knowledge than local experts” (1970: 226). Despite the 
Bulletin’s role in shaping Australian nationalism, and Miller’s aspirations for Australia to have 
autonomy, the process of extrication has been convoluted by the trend of adhering to British 
interests. And, in spite of the Bulletin’s vitriol, the British flag remained central to white 
Australia, evidenced by the fact that until 1977 Australian citizens were being reassured by the 
government that they could still fly the British national flag if they chose (Kwan 2006). The 
British component of the Australian national flag remains both prominent and honoured. I will 
elaborate on this in the following chapter. 
Conclusion  
This chapter extends some of the ways that the Australian nation has been, and 
continues to be maintained and reproduced. Australian nationalism and its associated traditions 
have been constructed and endorsed to maintain colonial power which marks and re-imagines 
the landscape as a white possession. From the rhetoric of public figures to history making, from 
place names to monuments, the nation abounds with narratives, cultural artefacts and practices 
which typically present themselves as innocuous signifiers of ‘Australia’. The banal acceptance 
of what Australia ‘is’ has also been heightened through the embedding of everyday nationalism 
into official histories by political and literary agents, most notably the Bulletin. This chapter 
has shown that in modern Australia, ‘nation’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘nationalism’ form an intricate 
web of relations that continue to reproduce the nation through a vast array of signifiers, the 
most strident of these is the nation’s flag. Through the materiality of the national flag the 




CHAPTER FIVE: High Flying Mirrors – Low Lying Heralds 
Soldiers in real battles and sportspeople in fake ones utilize the flag as the symbol of their unity 
and purpose. When they are spiritually wrapped in the flag, engendering a modern mystery of 
transubstantiation, its threads become the nation. 
                                                                                                                    (Bosworth 2007: 26).  
 
Introduction  
For many Australians, the flag is a spiritual appendage. Through this national signifier, 
highly charged emotions condense and cohere as the flag transforms to become a sacred 
symbol: the embodiment of nation. The focus of this chapter is to engage with various aspects 
of vexillology in order to develop a deeper understanding of flags and their pedagogical 
influence. I begin with an investigation into the history of flags. I then explore some of the 
myths, confusions and conflicts that surround the Australian national flag and its associated 
family, all of which fly in a hierarchy under the shadow of the British monarchy. I note that 
Australia remains ‘haunted’ by a ‘three flag crisis’, and I broaden the investigation with some 
international perspectives. This chapter also draws attention to some modern day applications 
of the Australian national flag which indicate that this symbol is invested multifariously with 
hegemonic understandings of Australian nationalism. Finally I investigate the need for a more 
thorough understanding about how flags have the capability to transmit messages of trauma, 
racial discrimination and oppression.  
The History of Flags: An Overview  
For several centuries flags have held significance as symbols of political and emotional 
power. Smith claims that flags enable individuals “to express one’s own views to others in a 
concise but dramatic form. In a word the flag is a powerful instrument for social participation 
and communication” (1975: 36). The people of China, who first made cloth from silk, are 
credited with being the first to make and utilise flags. The oldest iconographic information 
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relating to the shapes and purposes of flags in China is dated circa 1500 BC, however the 
literature indicates that the mythological Yellow Emperor, who lived over a thousand years 
earlier, had utilised a flag. Chinese society was ordered through a wide variety of these devices. 
Flags were used by the emperor, nobility, imperial armies, and regional governors. They were 
laterally attached to bamboo poles and adorned with numerous narrow ribbons on the outer 
edge to signify status: flags of the Emperor were adorned with twelve ribbons. The number of 
ribbons decreased according to rank (Znamierowski 1999).  
In Europe, at the end of the fifth century, Greek writers mention a purple flag68 which 
was used to identify the admiral’s ship in the Athenian navy. Alfred Znamierowski (1999) 
notes that the National Museum in Naples houses the oldest known European illustrations of 
flags which depict a Persian standard dating from 330BC. The Persian standard features a piece 
of cloth which hangs from a crossbar and is fastened on the underside of a lance. The cloth is 
fastened in this way to ensure that it looks draped at all times. As a mode of identification, the 
standard was also used by the Romans and named vexillum (Smith 1975; Crampton 1989a; 
Znamierowski 1999).  The word “vexillum” has its roots in the Latin vehere: to carry; thus the 
flag was always intended to be held aloft, raised, carried as a banner to be seen by others as a 
marker of identification. The vexillum, or cavalry flag, was the only cloth flag carried by the 
Romans. Throughout the Roman Empire vexilloids (objects which function as a flag, but differ 
in appearance, for example, a staff with an emblematic animal), became “portable deities” 
which “formed a link to the divinity of the emperor and the sacred devotions performed in his 
name” (Smith 1975: 37). The vexilloids of Rome were sophisticated, ornate and highly revered. 
In 104 BC, Consul Gaius Marius deemed that the eagle become the sole standard of the Roman 
legions (Smith 1975). Symbolically, as the eagle ruled the skies, so the Romans ruled the earth 
(Maitland 2015). Vexilloids and vexillum developed and fostered deep and tangible feelings 
                                                 
68 Today it is rare to find purple on flags (Knowlton 2012). 
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of belonging, loyalty and duty. The presence of, and popular attachment to symbols such as the 
Roman vexilloids and vexillum was also found in many other parts of the world. 
During the Crusades (1095-1291), mediaeval European helmets were designed to cover 
the whole face as a means of protection. With faces concealed it became necessary to establish 
a method of identification. Gordon Maitland (2015) notes that initially marks were painted on 
riders’ shields and crests adorned the tops of their helmets. Garments (surcoats) were later worn 
over the armour which displayed a symbol of identity and became known as “coats of arms”. 
From this a strict code of rules evolved and as a result, the use of symbols became a highly 
regulated practice known as “heraldry”. The word heraldry is derived from the associated 
duties a herald had to perform for his lord and this included being skilled in all aspects of 
armoury, 
[H]eraldry was the name given to laws governing the display, meaning and knowledge 
of the signs and emblems used to decorate the shield, helmet and banner, for purpose 
of identification in peacetime, at a tournament, on ceremonial occasions or in battle 
(Puttock 1988: 2). 
 
Heraldry was a powerful form of identification. Richard II (1377-99) ordered that the Cross of 
St George was to be worn both front and back on the clothing and armour of all his soldiers, 
“all who were found without this cross were liable to be killed by any of his men” (Maitland 
2015: 26). Smith (1975) explains that with the development of heraldry, large numbers of 
people were coerced into allegiance. It is evident, therefore, that for many centuries symbols 
have been used not only as a method of identification, but also as a means of coercion. 
The incorporation of symbols onto clothing is an age-old practice. In the National 
Library of Scotland, manuscripts dated 1293 and 1306 depict two kings of Scotland, John 
Balliol and Robert Bruce, holding lion standards. Standing alongside each respective king is 
his wife whose dress is an intricate and striking creation, beautifully embroidered with coats of 
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arms (Hallam 2002). This ancient form of symbolism was sacrosanct. For example, to insult a 
shield was to insult its owner; to hang a coat of arms upside down was an affront comparable 
to modern day flag burning (Hallam 2002). Heraldry was an effective form of identification 
and by the middle of the fourteenth century the practice had moved beyond that of shields and 
coats-of-arms. Manuscripts, castles, churches and tombs were littered with heraldic insignia. 
Heraldry had considerable impact on flags and personal flags proliferated as identifiers of 
kinship, origins, rank and place. Of the many symbolic applications of heraldry, it was the flag 
which transcended them all. Not only was the flag a means of promoting and reinforcing a 
social hierarchy, it was also a symbol of honour and triumph, and as Smith notes, “was 
recognized as the formal means of transferring title to land or to some privilege” (1975: 44). 
Following the Crusades, the nobility formally transformed their coats of arms into a 
hierarchical system of inherited and elite privilege. During the sixteenth century, numerous 
flags were developed for use on land and sea and while heraldic trends were waning, the 
influence of heraldry on modern day flag design and usage lingers. Smith notes the principles 
found in the earliest heraldic arms form the core of effective flag design, “flags are generally 
more effective when they are simple, employ distinctive designs and colors, remain relatively 
fixed over time, and are unlike other flags in design” (1975: 45). These fundamental elements 
of flag design are at odds with the Australian flag (and its derivatives), which carries the flag 
of another country and whose design, as discussed in the previous chapter, generated 
consternation and debate from the outset. 
Heraldic flags distinguished friends from enemies and spoke of allegiance and place. 
By contrast, national flags “signify the metaphoric kin group of the nation rather than other 
groups” (Eriksen 2007: 3). Smith asserts, “[F]ar and away the most significant innovation of 
the eighteenth century was the national flag” (1975: 52). It evolved out of political struggle and 
notions of democracy and egalitarianism. The acquisition of a national flag was a gradual 
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process which was influenced by the Dutch revolutionary Prinsenvlag69 and the mid-
seventeenth civil wars in England (Smith 1975). The Dutch flag was the first modern flag to 
abandon heraldic devices in favour of simple stripes, a format replicated in the flags created 
after the revolutions in America and France. Znamierowski notes that “with the abolition of 
monarchy, the heraldic system of identification was also rejected. The colours and designs 
acquired symbolic meanings and flags began to carry ideological and political messages” 
(1999: 18). Gabriella Elgenius states that European national flags are “intimately linked to the 
formation of nations and states” and are “used to legitimise sovereignty and to illustrate 
distinctiveness” (2007: 26). These flags reflect their origins and are symbols of revolution, 
independence, state-reconstitution or warfare. The flag of England for example is a symbol of 
warfare, and the Union Jack, which represents the United Kingdom, is a signifier of state-
reconstitution. Elgenius notes that European national flags “continue to reflect the political 
realities of nations and are introduced and promulgated during, or after, significant national 
events” (2007: 27). Ultimately she claims “national flags constitute ‘national narratives’” 
(2007: 28). National flags are thus notorious carriers of belief systems, political ideologies and 
national symbolism, and their uses and applications are widely studied in the field of 
vexillology. 
Vexillology 
Vexillology is the “scientific study of the history, symbolism, and usage of flags” 
(Smith 1975: 30). The term ‘vexillology’ is derived from the Latin word ‘vexillum’ meaning 
flag, and the suffix ‘-ology’, meaning the study of a particular field of knowledge. Whitney 
Smith coined the term ‘vexillology’ in 1957 (Guenter 2013). Don Carleton, Director of the 
Texas University Briscoe Center for American History, states that Smith, “can rightfully claim 
                                                 
69 The derivation of the Prince’s Flag, or Prinsenvlag comes from the livery colours associated with Prince 
William of Orange who led the struggle for independence from Spain in the 16th century. Followers adopted his 
colours of orange, white and blue for their flag. Around 1630, the orange band of the tricolour was replaced with 
a red stripe. The Dutch tricolour, of red, white and blue has gone on to inspire many other flags (Crampton 1989a). 
121 
 
to have founded a field of study, and shepherded it through to maturity as a community of 
scholars, publications and enthusiasts” (Briscoe Center 2014: 52). The purpose of vexillology 
was to move away from the traditional flag taxonomies, origins and histories, and to engage 
with the social sciences in order to “understand more accurately and more completely the 
nature of human society” (Smith qtd. in Guenter 2013). The Flag Bulletin has been published 
since 1961 and in 1962 Smith and Gerhard Grahl co-founded the Flag Research Center in 
Massachusetts, USA, which was the first professional vexillological institute in the world. The 
first International Congress of Vexillology (ICV) was held in 1965. This biennial event has 
been staged around the world ever since. In 2015 the 26th congress (ICV26) was held in Sydney. 
Hosted by Flags Australia delegates from 25 different countries attended. In 2013, the Flag 
Research Center Collection, known as the Smith Collection “took a crew of twelve people four 
days to pack into two 53-foot trailers” (Briscoe Center 2014: 51). The Smith Collection was 
transferred to the Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas where it will 
become available for academic research.  
Vexillology is an emerging discipline with an interdisciplinary focus. Flag research 
seeks to integrate and expand on other research done in various fields such as history, 
sociology, psychology, anthropology and political science (Guenter 2013). Smith states that 
for “the general public the significance of a [flag] design is … in the affirmation it makes about 
the propriety of the dominant ethos” (1975: 42). Smith encourages scholars to go beyond the 
superficial understandings of flags and examine their multiplicity of meanings and uses as well 
as their emotional and practical significations. Vexillology as a scholarly method facilitates a 
way of understanding the symbolic components and applications of national flags. It seeks to 
draw attention to the practical engagement with flags and their use as both private and public 
symbols of belonging and exclusion. 
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Smith argues that one of the tenets of vexillology is that “symbolic truth generally takes 
precedence over historical reality” (1975: 42). In Australia the Anglo-centric histories and 
dominant discourses of nation have been underpinned by a national flag which mirrors the 
British-Australian story as it deflects the Indigenous-Australian narrative of sovereign 
dispossession. Smith adds, “[P]opular traditions of flag symbolism are not arbitrary; they are 
promoted and reinforced (if not actually invented) by governments, their rulers finding 
advantage in one interpretation over another” (1975 42). Smith draws on Rousseau’s claim 
that, “[T]he strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms 
strength into right, and obedience into duty” (1975: 42). He states that “right” and “duty” have 
been endorsed via three key sources of authority: “tradition”, “religion” and “ideology”. It is 
in these realms that flags have been employed and manipulated to “justify the division of 
society into groups whose power decreases proportionately to the number of the individuals in 
the group” (Smith 1975: 43).  
For many people flags are seemingly unimportant forms of patriotic decoration and 
“[T]o display a flag is to participate in a group or a philosophy that spans time and distances” 
(Smith 1975: 36). However, as Smith affirms, flags “constitute factors affecting that world [the 
world of real events] directly as they manipulate and are manipulated by groups of people” 
(36). From the swastika flag of Nazi Germany, to the black flag of Daesh,70 from national flags 
to sporting emblems, flags are manipulated by groups of people to suit their interests which, 
following Smith, “express the unity and identity of one group as against all others” and are a 
way “of asserting the bonds which link people despite differences in their wealth, social 
standing, power or age” (1975: 37). Smith’s work on vexillology brings into view the use of 
flags as shields of nation, specifically as the concept of nation is theorised by many of the 
                                                 
70 In the eighth century, members of the Arab world used triangular flags that were plain black or white. Over 
time they increased the range of colours and the flags carried religious inscriptions and geometric ornaments as 
there was a religious injunction against representational art (Znamierowski 1999).  
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writers discussed in Chapter Three. Vexillology brings the flag into view not simply as a 
symbol but a material artefact of national consciousness.  
Vexillology is a platform from which to garner a better understanding of the social 
processes relating to the enculturation of national belonging, inclusion and identity. 
Vexillology enables us,  
to push further and deeper with inquiry into usage, into not only what flags look like, 
but how and why they affect people the way they do. Ultimately, vexillology should 
tell us not only about flags but about people – about the social groups that use them or 
have used them in the past (Guenter 2011: 3).  
 
In the context of the construction of the Australian nation, vexillology brings to light ways of 
‘knowing’ the flag which might not have been previously considered. To exemplify, I return 
to the work of Carol Foley. At the launch of her 1996 book, The Australian Flag: Colonial 
Relic or Contemporary Icon? Foley claims an effective and successful national flag should 
demonstrate 
the three “I”s: Identity; ideals; and information. It should give an indication of our 
heritage, our cultural background, our religion, and perhaps even our location in the 
world. In short, our flag has to represent us as a nation. To do this, it has to focus on 
our significant similarities as a people, rather than on our insignificant differences. For 
example: I am of Irish descent; others of us may be of Malaysian descent, or Greek 
descent, or Aboriginal descent, and so on. Whatever our descent, these are all 
insignificant differences when we look at our nation as a whole (1996b: 105 emphasis 
in the original).  
 
Foley’s thinking harks to the discourse of assimilation, where “insignificant differences” such 
as culture, law / lore, traditions, languages and knowledge systems must be dispersed to 
maintain ideals of whiteness. Her standpoint reflects the notion that Aboriginal experiences can 
be seamlessly collapsed into the corpus of nation for the purpose of extolling the appearance 
of national unity. This is a common strategy in nation-building, as Gillian Cowlishaw 
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comments, “[R]acism can flourish as a hidden discourse because it is hidden behind the 
assertion of equality which assumes similarity” (1997: 178). Contrary to Foley’s view, I would 
argue that cultural and racial differences are far from “insignificant”, and in fact difference is 
a necessary component for establishing a national identity which stands apart from ‘others’ and 
thus makes the illusion of a singular, cohesive identity possible.  
Foley claims, 
[O]ur flag should represent us all as Australians, not only as we were at the time our current 
flag was designed in 1901, but now. Consequently, our flag must not only be internally 
representative, it must also be of contemporary relevance (1996b: 105).  
 
This is a broad and nebulous claim that invokes a unifying ‘call to arms’ as it were that refutes 
scrutiny or investigation. Such claims function according to overarching statements such as 
that made in the previous quote: “[W]hatever our descent”. In other words, once difference is 
collapsed, unifying interpellation is made possible. Foley puts forward three arguments which 
state the case for the removal of the Union Jack: 
1. The Union Jack undermines Australian national identity as it reduces the nation “to the 
level of a colonial cipher”. 
2. The Union Jack is only representative of the Anglo-Celtic population. 
3.  “For Aborigines, the Union Jack is the “butcher’s apron” and represents the spilled 
blood of the Aboriginal people, the European invasion of Australia and their subsequent 
dispossession” (1996b: 106). 
Despite these claims, Foley states that her main issue with the Union Jack is that it compromises 
her identity as an Australian, “[T]here is, unfortunately, no doubt that our present flag wrongly 
suggests to many people that we are British. This is undesirable” (1996b: 108). Given this is 
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one of few texts written about the Australian flag which makes reference to Indigenous 
perspectives, I take liberty to quote extensively here,  
[I]t is an immutable historical fact that Australia was colonised by Great Britain. Not 
by Holland, not by France, not by Japan, but by Great Britain. 
Our whole present way of life is based on the British ethic. But I am not here to uphold 
colonialism. My point is that our British beginnings put into place a legal system, a 
judicial system, an education system and a democratic way of life that still 
fundamentally represents who we are today, irrespective of our early colonial 
relationship with Great Britain; and, irrespective of our genealogical descent. 
Our democratic way of life, which we owe to Great Britain, is the reason why refugees 
and immigrants come to Australia. It is the reason why the Aboriginal people are able 
to articulate their grievances and have some chance of redress in cases such as Mabo. 
In short, our democratic way of life is one of the very significant similarities that we all 
have in common as Australians. It is a way of life that we were, and are, willing to fight 
and die for. The Union Jack also stands for that. So am I changing your minds? Or, do 
you still want to rip it off? (Foley 1996b: 107-108).  
 
Foley’s use of Aboriginal people to support an argument for a fair judicial system is 
extraordinary and her reference to Aboriginal “grievances” having “some chance of redress” 
under white Australian law are clearly at odds with reality. Successive governments have failed 
to act, or indeed engage with Aboriginal “grievances”.71 Foley’s claim also assumes that pre-
                                                 
71 Dodson claims that for most Aboriginal people, Australia’s judicial system is a “feared and despised processing 
plant” that propels the most vulnerable and disadvantaged towards a “broken, bleak future” (qtd. in Gordon 2016: 
8). Twenty-five years after Australia’s Royal Commission into black deaths in custody Indigenous children as 
young as 10 and 11 are being held in detention and are 24 times more likely to be incarcerated than non-Indigenous 
children (Power 2016). Furthermore the continuing health disparities experienced by many Indigenous peoples 
goes beyond medical causes, Pascoe & AIATSIS (2012) state that education, employment, income and socio-
economic status are all factors which affect the health and well-being of Indigenous people. In other words it is 
the legacies of colonisation, dispossession and the continued racist political agendas which keep health disparities 
alive. Sol Bellear, Chairman of the Aboriginal Medical Service, Redfern notes that in the United States and Canada 
dozens of treaties have been signed, First Nations communities are afforded “varying degrees of genuine self-
determination, from controlling their own schooling to giving them a real capacity to generate an economic base 
… [I]n New Zealand, Maori have seven seats which sit over the entire nation, in which only Maori can vote” 
(2013: 18-19). What these nations do not have, Bellear states is “trachoma, a third world disease that has been 
eradicated in most nations. They don’t have the world’s highest recorded rates of rheumatic heart disease, another 
third world condition linked to overcrowded housing. They don’t have jailing rates of Indigenous people up to 
eight times greater than the jailing rates of black males in Apartheid South Africa. They don’t have world beating 
rates of suicide and self-harm. They don’t have life expectancy gaps between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 




colonial Australia was ‘undemocratic’. Texts such as this are made possible because terms like 
“irrespective”, “democratic way of life” and indeed the overarching signifier “Australians” are 
contextually deployed to provide the illusion of coherence and to refute tendencies towards 
scrutiny. In considering Foley’s arguments, I am drawn again to a point I made previously 
about the extent of trauma effected by the privileging discourse of whiteness, where things are 
simply stated as if fact and where the lived realities for those ‘outside’ of the mantra of 
sameness is simply absented from view. As Jackie Huggins notes, 
[T]here is no engagement, there is no respect and I agree with Patrick [Dodson] and 
Noel [Pearson] that we are in deep crisis. Sometimes I don’t feel part of this society 
because it breaks my heart to see the conditions my people are continually left in 
without any leadership from the top (qtd. in Gordon and Hunter 2016: 11). 
 
Iver Neumann claims that a flag “may mean different things to different people in different 
contexts, but it still carries with it the basic function it had on the battlefield, namely separating 
‘us’ from ‘them’” (2007: 174). The Union Jack is a symbol of the battlefield, both physically 
and metaphorically. The Union Jack heralds battles and wars and has been neatly transposed 
onto Australia’s national insignia, representing yet another British conquest where the Frontier 
Wars and the continuity of colonial violence to the present day are subsumed by its prominence.  
The Union Jack  
Analysis of the Australian national flag needs to be juxtaposed with the British flag 
given the Union Jack is a symbol upon which the construction of the Australian nation remains 
heavily dependent. The Union Jack was centuries in the making and behind every stage “were 
primitive superstitions, the perceived need for saintly blessings, and the consequent adoption 
of patron saints” (Maitland 2015: 209). St George was an officer in the Roman Army. He 
rejected the gods, healed the sick and converted to Christianity. As a result he was tortured to 
death and on 23 April 290 he died a martyr. The cult of St George spread throughout Europe, 
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where he “has long been regarded as one of the greatest of warrior saints” (Campbell & Evans 
1974: 13). During the crusades, St George was the patron saint of Aragon, Portugal, and 
England. Every English soldier wore the badge of St George in the fourteenth century. Their 
war-cry was that of “St. George!” and the flag of St George was the “flag of battle” on both 
land and sea (Gordon 1915: 47-50). Set upon a white background a vertical blood-red cross 
represents the crucifixion of St George. 
St Andrew also died a martyr. Crucified upside down on a decussate cross, a saltire, he 
died on 30 November 70AD. Some centuries later, on the eve of a battle against the Vikings, 
Angus, King of the Picts had a dream in which St Andrew appeared. The following morning 
“a silver saltire shone in a bright blue sky” (Maitland 2015: 211). As a consequence the Picts 
declared St Andrew to be their patron guide. Upon victory the vanquishers adopted the diagonal 
white cross on a field of blue as their national banner. This became the flag of Scotland in 843 
(Maitland 2015). In recognition of the union between England and Scotland, King James I 
called upon his heralds to join together the crosses of St George and St Andrew. The Royal 
proclamation of 12 April 1606 resulted in, “the birth certificate of what soon became the best-
known flag in the world” (Znamierowski 1999: 107). This was known as the Union flag which 
both Cook and Phillip employed to assert British ownership over vast tracts of the Australian 
continent.72  
The Union flag was altered in 1801 to incorporate the cross of St Patrick thus marking 
the union between Great Britain and Ireland. William Gordon argues, “St. Patrick had no right 
to a cross, as he was neither crucified nor martyred”, the rules of “tradition and custom” were 
                                                 
72 In 1967 “[T]he Council of the City of Sydney erected a flag mast to commemorate the first saluting of the 
British flag on 26th January 1788. A plate bears the following words: … This flag mast was erected to 
commemorate the location at which the first ceremony of saluting the flag by Captain Arthur Philipp [sic].R.N. 
and his company took place to mark the foundation of Australia on 26th January 1788 … The flag which flies is 




defied, for “he was not even a saint, for he was never canonised, and his sainthood, like his 
cross, is due to popular error” (1915: 60). Under the auspices of “popular error”, Gordon draws 
attention to the manipulation of both tradition and symbols (see Smith 1975; Renan 1990; 
Bhabha 1994; Hobsbawm 2005; White 2005; Bosworth 2007; Billig 2013). Rulers old and new 
have promoted, invented and tailored symbols to suit their advantage. Symbols such as flags 
enable the powerbrokers to effectively flaunt their dominion, garner public support and, when 
combined discursively with historical and “popular error”, the nation is built.  
The Union Jack, a flag commensurate with mythology is transubstantiated with 
symbolic Christian crosses,  
[T]he cross of St. George dominates the cross of St. Andrew, which in turn supplants 
the cross of St. Patrick. This design of the Union Jack remains a constant reminder to 
the ‘defeated’ nations of the superiority of the English nation (Hocking 2002: 24).  
 
Gordon Campbell and Idrisyn Evans note the difficulties with flags of war carrying crosses, 
but they argue that the cross is a Christian emblem of peace and “throughout history peace-
loving men have had to fight in self-defence and to protect their ideals from savage enemies 
who aimed at destroying them” (1974: 13). The cross was specifically employed, “it was the 
Christian emblem. They [the forefathers] aimed at making their flags symbolize the ideals for 
which they fought” (Campbell and Evans 1974: 13). The Union Jack symbolises a specific 
ideology and is an embalmed marker of Christianity.  
Crosses on flags matter. The Australian flag is replete with both saintly and celestial 
formations. White Australia’s attachment to the Southern Cross was criticised by Gordon who 
argues the constellation, “is a very small one” and “has a curious attractiveness for people south 
of the equator, and is rather embarrassing in its popularity from a flag point of view” (1915: 
107). Not content with this, Gordon complains, “how freely they [the stars] have to be treated 
to get them into the shape of a cross as they appear on the Australian flag” (108). Campbell 
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and Evans provide a different perspective arguing that the first explorers “rejoiced” in seeing 
a cross in the sky, “… the emblem of their religion, a group of stars in the form of a cross … a 
sign from Heaven that they could not travel beyond the Divine care” (1974: 100).73 The cross 
as the embodiment of Christianity has been employed to endemically shape both the fabric of 
the Australian nation and its flag.  
The Australian National Flag  
The British Union Jack was Australia’s national flag until 14 February 1954 (Kwan 
2006). The transition from Australian blue ensign to current national flag took fifty three years. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, as the colonies moved to federate, momentum 
gathered to find a new flag for the new nation. Public interest was such that the 1901 
Commonwealth government flag competition received 32,823 entries from around the world, 
all of which were publicly displayed yet subsequently destroyed by the Department of External 
Affairs (Cayley 1966). The competition rules stipulated that each competitor was required to 
submit two coloured flag sketches, one for merchant ships and one for naval and official 
vessels. Maritime flags are known as ensigns, whereas flags on land are known simply as flags. 
The winning flag “was only intended for use at sea. The Australian national flag on land was 
expected to continue to be the Union Jack” (Kelly 1994: 53). It took the panel of five judges 
less than a week to decide on the winning design. Five almost identical entries were judged 
equal first. The Union Jack sat as point of honour and the Federation Star was positioned to 
point to the centre of the blood-red cross of St George. An examination of the judging criteria 
reveals that the Union Jack, Federation star and Southern Cross were prerequisites. The judges, 
                                                 
73 Film director and cinematographer Warwick Thornton’s documentary, We Don’t Need a Map (2017) explores 
the astronomical, mythological, symbolic and spiritual meanings of the Southern Cross. We Don’t Need a Map 
provides Indigenous perspectives which relate to the Southern Cross and also investigates the appropriation of the 
Southern Cross by white Australia. This documentary includes various discussions about nationalism, discourse 
and symbols. The film opened the Sydney Film Festival in June 2017 and was first broadcast on National 
Indigenous Television [NITV] 23 July 2017.  
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all British naval officers, deemed “an Imperial Union Ensign of the British Empire” (Hocking 
2002: 30), should comprise of: 
 The Union Jack on a blue or red ground.  
 A six-pointed “star,” representing the six federated States of Australia, 
immediately under the Union Jack and pointing direct to the centre of St 
George’s Cross, and of a size to occupy the major portion of one quarter of the 
flag. 
 The “Southern Cross” in the flag as being indicative of sentiment of the 
Australian nation (Cayley 1966: 104).  
 
On 3 September 1901, Prime Minister Barton announced the winning design and the 
blue ensign, which had been pre-made, was flown for the first time. The final decision however, 
rested with Britain. On 20 February 1903, Australia was advised that King Edward VII had 
approved the design. The red field was for civil use and the blue for government use. At this 
time the Federation or Commonwealth Star had six points, one for each federated state. In 1905 
Australia acquired the British colony of New Guinea. An extra point was added to the 
Federation Star in 1908 to represent Australia’s new territory. Papua New Guinea gained 
independence from Australia in 1975 but the flag remained unaltered; the seven pointed star 
duly represents all the Commonwealth Territories.74  
Flags of the States and the Northern Territory  
In Australia the influence of the Union Jack is matched by the British blue ensign. 
Whether on land or sea, British flags shape the Australian nation, past and present. The British 
blue ensign forms the basis of every Australian state flag. The British blue ensign is also the 
template for the Australian national flag. In the context of this work, any findings pertaining to 
the Australian national flag must also be transposed to the state flags. Use of the British blue 
                                                 
74 The Australian Capital Territory (1911), the Northern Territory (1911), Norfolk Island (1913), Jervis Bay 
Territory (1915), Australian Antarctic Territory (1933), Ashmore and Cartier Islands (1933), Heard and 




ensign was increased by the Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865, which stated all vessels 
belonging to the colonies were required to use the British blue ensign with the badge of the 
colony displayed in the fly, “[T]his Act made possible the enormous future growth in the 
number of flags with the Union Jack in the canton” (Znamierowski 1999: 108). Each colonial 
badge was vetted by the British Admiralty before approval and during the nineteenth century, 
over one hundred colonial ensigns were in use. The proliferation of this ensign was a statement 
to the world that proclaimed the global presence of the British Empire.  
The six Australian state flags are embellished with colonial iconography and all carry 
the Union Jack as official point of honour. The flag of Victoria is the only state flag not to carry 
a badge. In 1870, the Victorian state flag depicted the Southern Cross with five white stars in 
the fly. An imperial crown was added to this in 1877. This was changed to the Tudor crown in 
1901 and then the crown of St Edward in 1953. When the Australian blue ensign was judged 
as the winning design in 1901, it was to the consternation of many who considered the 
Australian blue ensign to be an appropriation of the Victorian state flag. The state flag of New 
South Wales was adopted 11 July 1876. The badge which adorns this flag is blazoned with the 
gold lion of England surmounted on the centre of the red cross of St George. This emblem is 
set on a white roundel and on each arm of the cross sits a gold star representing the Southern 
Cross. 
Originally Queensland wanted a profile of Queen Victoria’s head as its state emblem. 
This was considered too complicated and so a new badge was sent to London for approval. A 
blue Maltese cross on a white roundel, surmounted by a Royal Crown was officially adopted 
on 29 November 1876. The crown was altered in 1963 in accordance with Queen Elizabeth’s 
preferred design. The colony of Western Australia was also known as the ‘Swan River Colony’. 
The flag of Western Australia was adopted on 27 November 1875 and its badge featured a 
black swan on a yellow roundel. Originally the swan faced away from the flagpole and swam 
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towards the fly. This was considered sinister in heraldic expression. Reversed in 1953, the swan 
now faces the staff and appears to the left of the viewer. The Tasmanian state flag was adopted 
on 25 September 1876. Its badge features a white roundel with a red heraldic lion, one paw 
raised, in the centre. From 1878 – 1904 the South Australian flag carried a badge in which 
Britannia is engaged in conversation with an Aboriginal man.75 The current South Australian 
flag was proclaimed on 13 January 1904. Its badge displays an Australian piping shrike (a 
white-backed magpie) on the branch of a gum tree set against a golden rising sun.  
The Northern Territory is not a recognised state. The Northern Territory flag along with 
the Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander, Australian Capital Territory, Norfolk and Christmas 
Island flags are described by Foley as “radical” (1996a: 189-195). According to Foley the 
radical “purists” reject the national flag and associated colonial colours and “adopt a totally 
different and radical design” (1996a:182). The Northern Territory flag was adopted on 1 July 
1978, when self-government was proclaimed. It was the first flag to break away from the rigors 
of colonial subjugation. The Territory flag features the official colours of Northern Territory: 
black, white and red ochre. A black panel on the left features the Southern Cross in white stars. 
Opposite this is a white Sturt’s desert rose with a black seven-pointed star in the centre to 
symbolise the Commonwealth Star surmounted on a red-ochre panel (for comprehensive 
details on the above State and Territory flags see: Cayley 1966; Foley 1996a; Znamierowski 
1999; Commonwealth of Australia 2000, 2010; Kelly 2007; Tayleur 2013). The Northern 
Territory aspires to statehood by 1 July 2018; there is supposition that this might lead to a name 
                                                 
75 The brutal and oppressive nature of colonial practice in the early settlement of Australia was of concern to the 
Colonial Office in London (Reynolds 1987). When the Province of South Australia was created officials 
demanded it be a more humane process. Under the instructions of the Letters Patent 19 February 1836, London 
insisted that Aboriginal people had property rights which were to be respected. A Protector was appointed to “to 
protect the Aborigines in the undisturbed enjoyment of the lands over which they may possess proprietary rights, 
and of which they are not disposed to make a voluntary transfer” (Klaassen 2016). Reynolds argues that statements 
from London were virtually impossible to implement, “Australian society already had a history of its own. 
Attitudes, interests and expectations were entrenched” (1987: 102). Subsequently and contrary to official 
directions, land rights for the Aboriginal people of South Australia were dismissed. 
133 
 
change or even a modification of the Australian flag. Former Prime Minister Abbott, noted for 
his support of the current national flag, stated that if the Northern Territory were to become a 
state, and if, “the Commonwealth star [on the national flag] was to be a seven-pointer star rather 
than a six-pointer star, that’s hardly a massive change”, he continued, “I would say that is an 
evolution rather than a revolution” (qtd.in Whyte 2015: 4). As stated, the Commonwealth star 
on the national flag has been a “seven-pointer” since 1908. “Evolution rather than revolution” 
however requires consideration. Abbott’s comment frames the flag as a steady signifier of 
nation, which could indeed accommodate a slight change. In contrast to this lies the inference 
that any “radical” change to the flag is tantamount to a “revolution”.  
In 1962, the Queen gave her approval for the design of a flag which incorporated the 
symbols of each Australian state. The Queen’s personal flag for Australia flies to “acknowledge 
her role of as Queen of Australia” (Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 34). Surmounting the 
symbols of each Australian state is a large seven-pointed gold Commonwealth star. Within the 
star sits the Queen’s personal device, a blue roundel charged with the letter ‘E’ set beneath a 
Royal Crown within a chaplet of roses. The Royal flag links the British monarchy to each of 
the Australian states and vice-versa; the over-arching symbolism of the state flags is that of the 
British monarchy. When the Queen visits Australia her personal flag takes precedence over the 
Australian national flag (Smout 1976)  
As noted, the state flags were mostly endorsed before the 1903 Royal Seal of approval 
was given to the Australian blue and red ensigns. Public reaction to the ‘new’ Australian 
ensign(s) was unenthusiastic, the new flag “failed to stir the general public, and was not widely 
flown” (Maitland 2015:220). In 1904, Prime Minister John Watson argued the blue ensign, 
“does not adequately symbolize our national life and is not sufficiently indicative of Australian 
unity” (qtd. in Cayley 1966: 115). Watson’s alternative, a white flag with the Union Jack in the 
centre resting on six vertical red stripes, was vehemently rejected by his peers who demanded 
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a flag without the Union Jack, “[S]o the whole question of the flag became a sorry muddle, for 
which politicians of all parties were to blame. But no new design was substituted” (Cayley 
1966: 115). This “sorry muddle” became an ongoing crisis. In fact confusion has surrounded 
the Australian flags since their inception.   
A Three Flag Crisis76  
In order to demonstrate how national identity has been both procured and affected by 
the flags of Australia, it is important to consider the confusion wrought by them as public 
emblems. Post-federation, I can identify three instances of a “three flag crisis”. First, the British 
Union Jack was the national flag of Australia until 14 February 1954. Prior to this time, and 
somewhat unconventionally, both the red and blue Australian maritime ensigns were adopted 
for use on land. Alongside the Union Jack, the ensigns vied for and were given space and 
attention in the public sphere, as the photograph below demonstrates. This naturally resulted in 
practical, emotional confusion and conflict around flag usage. Which flag was appropriate for 
which occasion and what place?  
                                                 
76 Some of this work comes from my paper “Flagging Australia: Claims and Identity”, to be published as part of 




Figure 3:In 1938 and to celebrate 150 years of white ‘settlement’ Martin Place, Sydney was decorated with an 
array of British Union Jacks and Australian red and blue ensigns (Ziegler 1938: Chapter 11: 9). 
 
This conundrum lasted for decades. As recently as 1981 the Australian national flag was 
described in the First Schedule to the Flags Act 1953-1973 as, “the British blue ensign... 
differenced by a large white star... and five white stars, representing the Southern Cross” (Foley 
1996a: 1).  
As the Union Jack, the red and blue Australian ensigns competed for attention; views 
were polarised around allegiance to Britain and the desire for a distinctive national identity. 
Loyalties were tested and patriotic duty questioned. Russell Kennedy notes the uncertainty 
created by Australia’s flags, “[T]his clumsy sequence of events must be partly to blame for the 
stumbling development of our national identity” (1998: 17). Acknowledging the specificity of 
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the time gives credence to Kennedy’s argument. In Chapter Four I noted that Empire Day was 
established in 1905 to mark late Queen Victoria’s birthday. At this time, educational 
propaganda advocated that children who were “good Britishers” would become “good 
Australians” (Kwan 2006: 47). Within five years however, children were being fed the reverse 
message, they were told by that “by being ‘good Australians’ they would become ‘good 
Britishers’” (Kwan 2006: 47). By way of further example, Kwan notes that during the First 
World War there were struggles with identity as Australians entered the war with two flags to 
represent their ‘dual’ nationality, “[C]ould loyalty to Australia mean disloyalty to Britain?” 
could “an Australian flag … serve as the national flag without being a disloyal symbol” (2006: 
55).  
During the 1920s the Union Jack continued to preside over the Australian ensigns. By 
1924 the blue ensign could be used on public buildings, however, private businesses and 
individuals were expected to use the red ensign. Confusion and notions of individual flag 
superiority were propelled into World War II. Coffins of Australian servicemen, overseas and 
at home, were draped with the Union Jack in deference to tradition, yet if grieving families 
wished to incorporate the Australian flag as well, or instead of, this was permissible but only 
on request (Kwan 2006). Confusion as to who Australians ‘were’ was compounded by the fact 
that Australians were officially subjects of the British Crown until 1948. Confusion was also 
buttressed by the rhetoric of the then Prime Minister Robert Menzies who declared in his 1951 
commemoration of the first fifty years of federation that Australia was a “well-knit nation” 
claiming that, “[I]n our fifty years there has never been argument about whether we are British 
or not. We are British” (qtd. in Kwan 2006: 102). Menzies rhetoric was mirrored in the flags, 
“[S]ome thought they could fly whichever flag they pleased, merely selecting one to suit their 
mood or colour scheme” (Cayley 1966: 117). For many Australians the Union Jack remained 
their flag of choice. Menzies sought to remedy the confusion and had the Australian national 
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flag officially defined in the Flags Act 1953. In order to help Australians transition to the new 
official symbol, Menzies waited for a young Queen Elizabeth II to visit Australia and proclaim 
her assent. Royal approval was granted on 14 February 1954. Finally the Australian blue ensign 
took precedence over the Union Jack, but this was no panacea; on-going misunderstandings 
about which flag to fly did not abate. As recently as 1977 Australians were being reassured by 
the Government that they could still fly the Union Jack.  
In The Flag Book Arthur Smout (1976), cites numerous frustrations. On the one hand, 
he endorses Cook’s use of the Union Jack as “another example of the flag being used as the 
symbol of national authority” (1976: 7). Conversely he asserts that the continued use of the 
Union Jack by Australians equates to national disloyalty. Smout argues while every Australian 
citizen has the right to fly the Union Jack, it must be “in conjunction with” the Australian 
national flag, not “instead of” (1976: 14). He questions “why the Union Jack is flown above 
the State Government Houses? Since Elizabeth is Queen of Australia, why is not the Australian 
National Flag flown by her representatives?” (1976: 16). Smout blames the Commonwealth 
Government and calls on it to take steps to end the anachronism which sees Australian national 
authority symbolically usurped by the Union Jack. To highlight the ambiguity produced by 
flags, Smout draws attention to a Brisbane Australia Day naturalisation ceremony. At this event 
the Union Jack and Australian national flag were both present on the stage, which, Smout 
argues, transmits a message of confusion. In his quest to be free of the dominating force of the 
Union Jack, he demands an end to “this ancient custom of displaying the Union Jack and 
Australian National Flag on the platform – a relic of the bygone days of Empire” (1976: 60).  
The second “three flag crisis” is identified by Smout in a chapter titled: “Is it really 
necessary to have three flags?” (1976: 64). Smout notes the idiosyncratic situation in which 
Australia finds itself as it employs three ensigns on the water, “…why three flags? Could not 
one National Flag serve all purposes? The U.S.A. appears to get along very well with one 
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national flag, as do most other nations in the world” (Smout 1976: 64). Smout claims that the 
blue ensign is for use by customs and government vessels; the red specifies nationality but has 
no authority while the white ensign belongs specifically to the Royal Australian Navy; this is 
“a hang-over from the days of Empire dependency and that Australia has continued this 
anachronism, simply following U.K. tradition” (Smout 1976: 65).  
The Australian white ensign was not adopted until 1967. Prior to this the British white 
ensign was used by the Australian navy. The British white ensign, similar to its blue 
counterpart, worked in conjunction with the Union Jack. Agar states the British white ensign 
is a symbol of security that represents “Britain’s influence and good name [which] stood for 
everything that was fair, just and honourable”, Agar continues, when “our” colonies “asked” 
they “received the protection of the White Ensign afloat and the Union Jack on shore, in the 
days when their lands would otherwise have been in a state of tribal confusion” (1962: 27). 
The significance of the British white ensign and its adoption by Australia further deepens this 
investigation. The omnipresence of British symbolism is manifest at every stratum of 
Australian cultural life.   
The third “three flag crisis” I draw attention to through the flying of multiple flags, 
indicates that resultant issues of confusion and conflict which surround Australian identity have 
been propelled into the twenty first century. According to Eriksen multiple flag use infers that 
“the multivocality of a single flag cannot do justice to all the moral obligations and levels of 
belonging” (2007: 6). Australia fits well with Eriksen’s claim. Currently in Australia, the 
national flag and the Aboriginal flag and Torres Strait Islander flag are frequently flown in 





Figure 4: The Australian, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags flying in Brisbane (Image: ABC 2010).77 
 
The Australian flag, with its colonial iconography, colours, heritage and off-spring,78 serves as 
an ongoing reminder of the theft of Indigenous peoples’ sovereign ownership of the land and 
the violence, that continues to have real social and cultural effects on health and well-being.    
Some International Opinions 
Foley states it is “undeniably incongruous” that in 1981 the Australian national flag could 
still be officially described in terms of the British flag (1996a: 1). This form of reference lingers 
with somewhat extraordinary perceptions in popular culture. For example, American actor, 
Jerry Seinfeld said, “I love the Australian Flag; Britain at night” (qtd. in Scruby 2009: 46). In 
response, Harold Scruby, executive director of Ausflag (see below), argues that is “how the 
                                                 
77 When flags fly in unison strict rules of precedence apply and the national flag must reside in the position of 
honour. For example, with a line of flagpoles the Australian flag must be flown at the far left of the person who 
faces them. If the flagpoles vary in height then protocol dictates that the Australian flag must fly from tallest 
flagpole. 
78 Further examples include the Royal Australian Air Force ensign. Adopted in 1948, the Union Jack sits in the 
canton on a light blue field, a red kangaroo was added in 1982. The New South Wales Ambulance Service flag 
also has the Union Jack in the canton, the service badge is in the fly and it was adopted in 1984. See also the flags 




rest of the world sees us. Not as a proud, mature, fiercely independent, sovereign nation, but as 
a colony, still desperately clutching child-like at the bosom of a bygone empire” (2009: 46). 
The Australian flag, according to Scruby, represents genocide, invasion and oppression to 
Indigenous people and its symbols of exclusion fly in the face of ‘Reconciliation’ (2001). 
Reflecting Billig’s thesis of “banal nationalism”, Scruby claims the Australian flag, 
“subliminally proclaims that if you’re of British descent, you’re superior to all other citizens 
of this country” (2001).  
Returning to popular culture, for some British sports fans the Australian flag is a source of 
ridicule. The “English Barmy Army” was founded by three friends during cricket’s England 
1994 / 95 Ashes tour of Australia. The “Barmy Army” now has a membership of over 3,000 
and has produced a specialised songbook of taunts, tailor-made for the Australian ‘enemy’, a 
sample of which I cite here: 
The Aussies love the English 
The Aussies love the English, you might find it quite strange 
'Cos we sent them all down under, with only balls and chains 
And when they see the English, they always shout and scream 
But when they had the chance to vote they voted for the Queen! 
God save your gracious Queen 
Long live your noble Queen 
God save your Queen (you're a convict) 
Send her victorious 
Happy and glorious 
Long to reign over you 
God save your Queen  




Adam Collins notes that over the years this ‘song’ has been accompanied with a chant, a 
deliberate and patronising statement of British superiority that demands Australia to “[G]et 
your shit stars off our flag” (2014: 32). Collins, a member of the Australian Republican 
Movement, calls for the public to support the nation in the same way that they do the cricket, 
he argues that a republic will leave, “no confusion about where we stand as a nation” (2014: 
32). Collins finds the ridicule galling: the Barmy Army, he says “are laughing at us, and well 
may they snigger. The person who holds the highest office for our proud and vast land lives in 
a palace several thousand kilometres away” (2014: 32).  
In 1988 and 2015, Professor of American Studies and vexillologist Scot Guenter,79 
conducted two quantitative studies. The purpose of these studies was to extend understandings 
of flags by going beyond the taxonomies of history, design and usage. Guenter’s methodology 
focused on Sperber’s theoretical process of interpretation which employs two concepts, 
“focalisation” and “evocation”. This approach enabled Guenter to examine “recognition” of a 
flag, through focalisation that explores “meanings” of a flag through evocation. In both studies 
200 American college students were presented with a sample of ten national flags, including 
the Australian flag. Question #1 asked the student to identify the flag. Question #2 invited the 
respondent to think and to try and summarise how and where they had learnt the information 
used to answer question #1. From this stage of focalisation, the survey moves to evocation. 
Question #3 asked the student to think about their response to question #1 and to, “list the 
‘connection’ your mind makes from that flag to what images, thoughts, or concerns follow as 
you free associate. List the images and thoughts that come to mind” (Guenter 2015: 10). 
Guenter’s research spans 27 years and extends my thesis by providing an approach from which 
international interpretations of the Australian flag can be garnered. Guenter’s most recent 
findings indicate that Britain “remains a very powerful and dominant element within the 
                                                 
79 Guenter’s paper will be published as part of the Sydney ICV26 Proceedings 2015. See also (Guenter 1988). 
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integrated meaning conveyed by the national flag of Australia to American college students” 
(2015:13). A comparative analysis between the 1988 and 2015 studies reveals that the 2015 
data produced a “harsher interpretation” of British imperialism (2015: 13). Guenter’s findings 
also indicate that 21st century American responses to the Australian flag are entwined with 
“some possible uneasiness with race” (2015: 14).  
Flag Organisations of Australia 
Smout (1976) brings to light many of the problems and ambiguities which surrounded 
the flags of Australia and were in play during the 1970s. In the early 1980s the official status 
of the Australian flag was that of a defaced British blue ensign.80 At this time, and in the lead 
up to the 1988 bicentenary of British occupation, there were increasing calls for a new 
Australian flag. Against this backdrop, three flag groups formed. In 1981, Ausflag was 
established. Scruby, co-founder and executive director states, Ausflag’s purpose is to source 
and advocate for a “flag which clearly and unequivocally proclaims our identity to other nations 
… and  a flag which unites the Australian nation in all its diversity” (qtd. in Kwan 2006: 121). 
Ausflag calls for a distinct Australian national flag, however notions of ‘unity’ are somewhat 
problematic. Reflective of Anderson’s “imagined community” ‘unity’ is a utopian fantasy; 
notions of ‘inclusion’ for a national symbol, however, are more tangible, as White attests, 
the function of a national symbol lies not in its capacity to convey particular shared 
meanings, but in its power to spark recognition in a population in which shared 
understanding of what the nation stands for is impossible. Its role is thus to identify and 
map, to imagine the community without imagining it united (2005:130).  
 
Ausflag “describes itself as a voluntary, non-political, non-republican, non-anti-monarchist 
organisation that is not anti-British, but rather pro-Australian” (Foley 1996a: 91). Ausflag has 
                                                 
80 In vexillology ‘deface’ is a technical term used when a device, such as a badge or a constellation has been 
added to an existing flag.   
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launched several flag design competitions and maintains its presence in the debate for a new 
Australian flag. In contrast sits the Australian National Flag Association. 
In 1983 and in response to Ausflag and an increasing political push by Labor to change 
both the national flag and the national anthem, former President of the Returned and Services 
League81 (RSL), Sir Colin Hines, formed a steering committee and invited John Vaughn to join 
the association (Kwan 2006). The primary focus of the ANFA is to protect and promote the 
national flag, the Australian blue ensign, in its current form. As Ausflag sought to dispense 
with the Union Jack, the ANFA fought to retain it. According to Vaughn the symbols of the 
national flag represent, “‘a unique Australian history and national identity’. Once Australians 
understood those symbols, Vaughn argued, they would not want to change their flag. It was a 
matter of education” (Kwan 1994b: 304). The discursive framing which privileges the national 
flag is powerful and harks back to the era of the White Australia Policy where white supremacy, 
entitlement and privilege are understood as being the inherent and unquestionable facets of 
Australian identity. Or to put this another way, “[T]he invisibility of privilege strengthens the 
power it creates and maintains. The invisible cannot be combated, and as a result privilege is 
allowed to perpetuate, regenerate, and re-create itself” (Wildman and Davis 2002: 89).  
The current Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, was a Director of Ausflag for six years. 
However, in 2004, Turnbull accepted an invitation to join the ANFA. Turnbull announced “it 
is a long time since I canvassed the desirability of changing our flag and despite allegations to 
the contrary I am a convinced supporter of our national flag” (qtd. in Steketee 2004). Vaughn’s 
                                                 
81 The Returned & Services League of Australia was formed in 1916 as the ‘Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial 
League of Australia’. It was adapted in 1940 to incorporate the air force and became known the ‘Returned Services 
League of Australia’ in 1965. In 1990 it changed to its current name to include existing as well as former members 
of the Australian Defence Forces. The patron of the RSL is Queen Elizabeth II. The badge of the RSL bears the 




triumph was palpable. The “long term director and contributor of Ausflag”, Malcolm Turnbull, 
had defected, 
Dear Mr Scruby … [Turnbull’s] support for the traditional Australian National Flag of 
“Stars and Crosses” is most significant. Mr Turnbull is, I believe, well attuned to the 
views of the Australian community. The Australian flag, now 103 years old, is our 
permanent, chief national symbol by law, custom and tradition … I call upon you to 
acknowledge reality and immediately close-down the Ausflag website and end all other 
activities of Ausflag Limited. You may care to consider donating any surplus funds to 
the worthy, non-profit school educational undertakings of the Australian National Flag 
Association … Like Mr Turnbull, you may wish to become a member of ANFA … 
Yours sincerely John Vaughn. 
 
Scruby responded: 
Dear John (please call me Harold) It seems like the only exercise you’ve been getting 
lately is jumping to conclusions … do you really believe that when we become a 
Republic, we will be celebrating … under a Union Jack flag which screams out to the 
rest of the world that we remain subordinate to Great Britain? PS: And would you please 
stop referring to the Australian flag as the “flag of stars and crosses”. Its correct 
definition is the British Blue Ensign defaced by the southern cross and Federation star 
– or simply “Britain at Night”. Regards Harold. (Ausflag 2016). 
 
The different standpoints of Ausflag and the ANFA are countered by the neutrality of Flags 
Australia. Founded in 1983 Flags Australia has published the vexillological journal, Crux 
Australis, every quarter since 1984 and is the leading Australian authority on flag design, usage 
and history. Flags Australia is “an advisory and research association concerned with all aspects 
of flag design, symbolism and protocol” (Burton 2006a: 151). There is much to be learned from 
Australian vexillogical organisations. In light of this work, each has been considered according 
to its approach, analysis, standpoint and vested interest.  
Applications of the Australian National Flag  
Ideologically the national flag is the metaphor of nation. Yet in Australia, as Vaughn 
articulates, the flag represents a particular version of history and identity that is dispersed 
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through “education” and various applications. Therefore, as White claims the Australian 
national flag is a symbol which is partisan for some, yet for others, it represents a “naturalness 
through familiarity” (2005: 118). It is precisely this “naturalness” that impels examination and 
produces questions regarding the meanings, potential for meaning and prevailing colonial 
symbolism that are enshrined in the private and public display of the national flag. Gordon 
Maitland’s work, The Story of Australia’s Flags (2015) is a reference book that traces the 
origins of Australia’s flags. Maitland notes,   
… while the Royal Australian Navy has its ensign and the Royal Australian Air Force has 
its own flag, the Australian Army does not have a flag of its own; the Army’s flag is the 
Australian National Flag. The reason for this dates back to the 17th century formation of the 
British Army, and to the concept that the army and the people are one. In the Australian 
context … the Australian National Flag represents all Australians and is apolitical (2015: 
19).   
 
The claim that the national flag is “apolitical”, and that it represents all Australians is akin to 
arguing that the nation itself is not a political entity. Such claims well serve the discourse of 
nation-building; if the flag is not a political symbol, it is further rendered “banal” (drawing on 
Billig), and can be seamlessly ‘draped’ across bodies and inscribed onto cultural artefacts as a 
seemingly ‘innocent’ image. Paulo Kolstø draws attention to the need for national identity to 
be learnt, and argues “in the school of national identity construction … national symbols – 
flags, coats of arms, national anthems – play … a crucial role in nation-building and nation-
maintenance” (2006: 676 emphasis in the original). Not only are Australians invited to watch 
their flag from afar, they are invited to “carry it in their hands, participate in flag parades, and 
flag hoisting ceremonies” (Kolstø 2006: 676). Maitland concurs, stating that his attachment to 
the flag was inculcated as a child, “I am of that generation which, at school, recited: I honour 





In the early 1980s, as possibilities for new flag were mooted, the RSL became a strident 
protagonist in defence of the national flag. This was a battle which went to the core of their 
allegiance to both Great Britain and Australia, “…the RSL does not wish to see the flag under 
which Australian servicemen fought in two major wars … change to some new, and 
presumably less ‘loyal’ design” (Edwards 1985:3). At the time many RSL members held 
positions of authority in the nation’s public and private spheres. The RSL was, and remains a 
powerful voice concerning issues of nationalism and thus mobilised to distribute, “[K]eep this 
our flag forever” car stickers, gave backing to the ANFA, was forthright as it lobbied politicians 
and, “intense ‘consciousness-raising’ among the public – most of whom, if left alone, would 
probably remain fairly apathetic” (Edwards 1985: 3). Ex-serviceman Geoff Baker delivered a 
personal protest. Having lost his left eye he used his empty eye-socket as a billboard to display 
the national flag on a glass eye-ball, “I, and a lot of other blokes, fought under that flag and we 
are very proud of it” (Baker qtd. in Van Oudtshoorn 1984: 8).  
The emotions embroiled in flags and war run deep, and the emotional responses elicited 
by the RSL are frequently contextualised as a normative reaction to the horrors of war. Military 
forces wear national colours and keep the flag ‘alive’ through remembrances of loss. In war, 
as an emblem of the homeland, the flag acts as a reminder of the nationalist inculcations that 
indoctrinate the right and duty to defend the nation. Flags become a tangible link to ‘home’, to 
what it represents, and to the justification of military violence in all its manifestations. It is the 
national insignia that fortifies the resolve to ‘win’, to combat and defeat the Other, regardless 
of the cost, 
[T]he primordial rag dipped in the blood of a conquered enemy and lifted high on a 
stick – that wordless shout of victory and dominion – is a motif repeated millions of 




In victory, flags become the embodiment of conquest, tangible signals from which the authority 
of a nation and its associated principles are represented.  
Maitland cites Robin Northover’s poem “Our Flag”. Northover claims the Australian 
flag is the flag of “our laws and our language” and the Union Jack represents “[T]he rogues 
and schemers, the doers and dreamers” who “gave modern Australia birth” (qtd. in Maitland 
2015: 313). The cost of this birthing, by the “rogues” and the “dreamers” was and is at the 
perpetual expense of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, whose languages, laws, 
lives and lands were both disregarded and disrespected. The poem concludes: 
But there are thousands who’ve died for its honour, 
                        And shed of their blood for OUR FLAG 
                                                            (qtd. in Maitland 2015: 314 emphasis in the original). 
 
Smith (2003) states that it is the belief in the principles and meanings of a flag over which 
people fight, die and kill. The flag transubstantiates into an external force under which are 
carried, “the fears and hopes, the myths, and the magic of those who carry it” (Smith 1975: 37). 
Flags are endowed with values and emotion that work, sometimes overtly but often effortlessly, 
to connect the individual to their ‘imagined’ collective. For the RSL, the emotional leverage of 
the flag enables this organisation to mobilise a force of public visibly and vocality whose raison 
d’etre is to daily inscribe the nation through the remembrance of battles fought, won or lost. 
The RSL demonstrates how symbols can evoke “powerful psychological responses that, when 
occurring simultaneously in multiple individuals or entire groups, leave a strong imprint on a 






Political applications of the 1954 Australian national flag commenced with Menzies 
who was the first Prime Minister to authorise the flying of the flag, both day and night over 
Canberra (Cayley 1966). This tradition has been both maintained and fortified. The focal point 
of Australia’s new Parliament House is the flag and its flagpole. The flag is conceptualised as 
“the unifying symbol of the nation” (Joint House Department 1989: 7) and flies atop the flag 
mast, which at 81 metres tall, towers above the Parliament and is visible from most parts of the 
city, “establishing the Parliament’s presence and symbolically announcing the centre of 
Government in Australia” (Joint House Department 1989: 7). This imposing configuration is 
one of the largest stainless steel structures in the world and the statement it makes is completed 
by the flying of “a monster flag the size of a double decker bus” (Sydney Morning Herald 10 
April 2013: 5).  
In 2013, the Department of Parliamentary Services issued a tender for the manufacture 
and supply of a new batch of flags for Parliament House. Officials refused to reveal the 
expected costs although “in 1997 the cost was reported to be $2000 per flag” (Sydney Morning 
Herald 10 April 2013: 5). Each flag weighs around 25 kilograms. A set of ten flags are used 
on a rotational basis and changed on the first Wednesday of every month (Flag Fact Sheet: 
Parliament House, September 2015). The structure built to house the flag cost over $4.4 million 
and weighs 220 tonnes, when the flag was unfurled for the first time, Senator McClelland 
declared “the flag would become “Canberra’s trademark”. The flag, measuring 6.4 metres by 




Flagging the Flag  
According to Smith national flags typically symbolise the events from which a nation 
is founded, but they may well fly in the face of historical accuracy, 
[T]he flag thus expresses a “civil religion” that political groups in the country try to 
control. This encourages people to support their view of the past, the future, the 
government and economic system, and relations between different groups of people 
(2003: 5).  
 
Here Smith establishes that the national flag carries with it potent levels of power to which the 
eyes of the nation look in order to realise their imaginings of legitimacy, values and identity. 
In Australia during the 1990s both Prime Minister John Howard and One Nation82 leader, 
Pauline Hanson, made routine and effective use of the national flag for political gain. Avowed 
monarchist Prime Minister, John Howard was Australia’s 25th and second longest serving 
Prime Minister (1996-2007). Ian Ward (2012) credits Howard as being the first Prime Minister 
to adopt the routine ‘flagging’ of the national flag at his media conferences, as a result, “the 
flag’s fortunes have risen dramatically under the Prime Minister’s tutelage ... At once it is 
reassuring consistent and strong. And the flag has repaid Howard many times over” (Parker 
qtd. in Ward 2012: 75).  
In 1995 Howard aired his support for the current design of the national flag. He noted 
there was no community desire to change the flag and argued that there were “more substantive 
issues of greater practical importance to the Australian people” (qtd. in Foley 1996a: 111).83 In 
1996 Howard articulated that the focus of his Government was to form a cohesive national 
community, to re-enforce Australian values and to create trust between Government and the 
                                                 
82 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party represents a conservative form of nationalism that is grounded in 
Protectionism and the White Australia Policy.  
83 Foley concurs, “[T]his is, of course, undeniably true” and she hopes that Prime Minister Howard will not include 
the “matter of the national flag” at the next elections (1996a: 111).  
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people. An essential part of Howard’s vision was to protect and respect Australia’s national 
symbols and this included the introduction of a National Flag Day.84 Held on 3 September 
National Flag Day commemorates the 1901 first public flying of the flag. On that day, as the 
flag was being raised in Melbourne, schools throughout Australia were contacted via telegraph, 
and instructed to simultaneously raise their Australian flags during a special assembly (Kwan 
2006). Proclaiming 3 September as National Flag Day Howard claimed “[O]ur national flag is 
a unifying force. It is a familiar and powerful image, and a focus for national pride” (qtd. in 
ANFA 2012b).85  
On Anzac Day 1996 Howard stated that legislation would be introduced which would 
further protect the national flag. The Flags Amendment Bill 1996 decreed that the design of 
the flag could only be changed through a referendum or plebiscite. If a poll were to take place 
then the current national flag must be included with any alternative designs (which is what 
happened in New Zealand, see Chapter One). This legislation became law in 1998 and the 
Flags Act 1953 was amended accordingly. Howard stated, 
[T]his ensures that the people are consulted about their National Flag which is our 
oldest national symbol … All Australians can now be assured that the design of the 
National Flag – their Flag – is a matter for them and not for politicians or pressure 
groups (qtd. in ANFA 2012b).  
 
Howard’s argument is persuasive and reassuring in its intent. His rhetoric firmly places the 
responsibility of the national flag in the hands of the people as it simultaneously satisfies his 
colonial affections. Graeme Orr explains that the 1998 amendment of the Flags Act was both 
political and symbolic, yet it lacks legal efficacy as the amendment can be repealed by a future 
                                                 
84 This day has been celebrated by the ANFA since 1984. In 1996 the Governor-General of Australia, William 
Deane, officially proclaimed 3 September as Australian National Flag Day. At ICV26 Michel Lupant, President 
of the Federation Internationale des Associations Vexillologiques (FIAV), noted that Australia is one of the few 
countries to dedicate a day to its national flag (3 September 2015).   
85 See Appendix D for the Australian National Flag Prayer.  
151 
 
Parliament. Orr claims that Howard’s “was an act of political theatre, a dare to ‘stand up and 
be counted’ for the current flag’s design” (2012: 517). Anna Clark (2006) also draws attention 
to Howard’s relationship with the national flag and argues that the flag was explicit in the 
(re)engineering of Australian national identity. In 2004, a $31 billion federal education package 
was announced by Prime Minister Howard and the former Minister for Education, Brendan 
Nelson.86 The grant made funds available depending upon certain criteria being met which 
included the prominent display of the Government’s values framework and the installation of 
a functioning flag pole to fly the Australian flag. Funding was not allocated for additional 
flagpoles to fly the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander flags, the provision of which was 
deemed to be the responsibility of individual schools.  
School remains a potent site for the learning of nationalism, as Hanson comments, 
“[M]y pride and patriotism were instilled in me from an early age when I watched the 
Australian flag raised every morning at school and sang the national anthem” (qtd. in Martino, 
Hanrahan & Crossley 2016). When Hanson delivered her first parliamentary address in 1996, 
she demanded for equality for all Australians, criticised the preferential treatment given to 
Aboriginal people, and reignited in the public consciousness a discourse of white supremacy, 
[I]f politicians continue to promote separatism in Australia, they should not continue to 
hold their seats in this parliament. They are not truly representing all Australians, and I 
call on the people to throw them out. To survive in peace and harmony, united and 
strong, we must have one people, one nation, one flag87 (One Nation 2014).  
 
                                                 
86 Director of the AWM (2012 - ).   
87 This slogan has successfully navigated both time and space. Versions of the refrain, have been employed to 
perpetuate as well as facilitate the endorsement of white colonial ideals, allowing them to (re)surface and be 
(re)invented. In 1891, a decade before the 1901 Federation of Australia, politician Henry Parkes addressed a 
Sydney Federal Convention advocating for the six separate British colonies unite. Parkes states, “the time has 
come when Australian people shall be one, henceforth and forever … one people [to] inherit one destiny” (The 
Henry Parkes Foundation n.d). In 1898 the Australasian Federation League of New South Wales added the words 
“one flag” to Parkes’ slogan. Federation, a ubiquitous white, patriarchal vision, was thus framed by the slogan 
“one people, one destiny, one flag”. 
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Hanson officially launched her One Nation party in 1997. The Australian flag was omnipresent 
throughout. Orr (2010) argues that the Australian national flag was in fact fundamental to 
Hanson’s One Nation party. Numerous images can be found online of Hanson draped in the 
national flag. At the height of One Nation’s success, the party secured nearly 23 per cent of the 
Queensland 1998 state election and won 11 seats on National Party preferences (Law 2013: 
22). In the 2016 federal election One Nation under the leadership of Hanson secured four seats 
in the Senate. Hanson continues to endorse “the one flag”, 
[W]e as Australians have never been asked in a referendum whether we endorse or 
recognise the Aboriginal flag … But it is flown everywhere, especially above 
government buildings. Flying two Australian flags is extremely divisive … we should 
be united under the one flag, the Australian flag (Hanson qtd. in Davies 2016).   
 
Michael Anderson argues that flying the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags on 
government buildings signifies that Australia recognises Indigenous sovereignty. Therefore 
Hanson’s rejection of the Aboriginal flag is understood by Anderson as an “unease” which 
“stems from this recognition of our sovereignty” (Mandybur 2016). Fundamental to Hansonite 
ideology is the premise that social division results from the “special treatment” afforded to a 
particular group. This principle, as the above quote demonstrates, evidently extends to the 
public display of the Aboriginal flag.  
Perceived threats to Australia’s sovereignty are used to spruik political interests. 
Former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, took national flag usage to a new level. In November 
2104, leaders of the twenty most economically developed countries in the world, known as the 
G20, gathered in Brisbane. For this two-day event, 282 flags, 19 of which were Australian, 
were purchased and taxpayers were charged over $100,000 (Gartrell 2015: 11). Highlighting 
both the cost and importance of flags, Adam Gartrell (2015), draws attention to Australia’s 
Federal MPs and senators who, in the latter half of 2014, spent more than $500,000 on 
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Australian flags. Of interest is the ratio, which indicates both the pragmatic and ideological 
nature of flags and their value when used as a party political prop. The Liberal Government 
spent $330,000 compared to the Labor Party who spent $130,000. Abbott’s penchant for using 
Australian flags at press conferences was seen to reflect the discourse of ‘national security’ 
which he frequently touted. Tony Wright (2015) claims that Abbott’s national emergency alert 
system could be understood by the number of flags he employed. For example, when he 
delivered his national security statement he stood in front of six Australian flags. On another 
occasion, Charles Waterstreet remarks, Abbott “outflagged the enemy when he announced his 
national security speech … The killer surprise was to use 10 Australian flags … researchers 
have noticed that the more flags behind Abbott, the less he speaks” (2015: 34). When employed 
as ‘visual megaphones’, flags can ‘speak’ louder than words. 
So what is the purpose behind the multiplicity of flags? Is it an assertion of political 
credibility or just one of political fear-mongering? On one hand Eriksen argues the 
“[O]mnipresence of flags” demonstrates a need by the state, “to give material evidence for a 
postulated imagined community” (2007: 9). In this light, the flags employed by Abbott form a 
backdrop of discursive affirmation, a statement to demonstrate Australia’s legitimacy, power 
and authority. On the other hand, Billig notes that, for established nations, as the ‘imagined 
community’ becomes ‘inhabited’, as the poets are replaced by politicians and the epic ballads 
are replaced by government reports, the ‘community’ and its place in the world “are not so 
much imagined, but their absence becomes unimaginable” (2013: 77). What Billig alludes to 
is the potential for the ‘nation’ and all it stands for, to be rendered inconceivable. When the 
nation and the existence of its members is threatened, the public display of tangible national 
iconography provides redress for the nation’s fears, “[W]hen threats arise, national 
identification may increase, which may in turn lead to symbolic manifestations of heightened 
national identity” (Butz 2009: 783). From this standpoint, the rhetoric of ‘national emergency’, 
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so frequently used during Abbott’s term as Prime Minister, inscribes in the flag an emotional 
appeal to nationalism through threat of the loss of freedom and sovereignty.  
The current Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull asserts that the Australian flag will 
never change and furthermore he states that Australians, in particular younger Australians, 
“don’t deconstruct the Australian flag and … say, ‘well, there’s a Union Jack, that’s the flag of 
another country,’ they look at it as one Australian symbol” (Baxendale 2018). Turnbull thus 
‘flags’ the national flag as a signifier of Australian nationalism that is banally accepted by the 
populace. If he is correct, then borrowing from Vaughn, it is indeed a “matter of education”, 
for if, as Turnbull asserts, Australians “don’t deconstruct” their flag, then a deconstruction of 
the flag though education is in order. For example, how would Australians react if they knew 
that the British Union Jack is the official point of honour on their national flag? Guenter 
provides evidence that demonstrates students in America associate British colonialism with 
Australia’s flag. If a similar study was undertaken in Australia what would be revealed? 
Turnbull’s comments were a strategic attempt to deflect attention from the flag, but in reality 
they highlight the need for new debates which move away from banal acceptance and a lack of 
‘deconstruction’, towards a more focused and contemporary understanding of the nation’s flag 
and its symbolism.  
Social Applications  
Cronulla 2005 
Cronulla Beach is located in the Sutherland Shire. As mentioned in Chapter One it was 
here that Forby Sutherland was buried. The Sutherland Shire lays claim to being the ‘Birthplace 
of Modern Australia’:  
Australia’s most historic place, where the two great captains, Cook and Phillip, first 
landed, first encountered Aborigines, first raised the flag, first observed a bush 
landscape utterly strange to them, and first took steps to explore … It is beyond 
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comprehension that the ‘Birthplace of Modern Australia’ has been allowed to slip into 
relative obscurity … it has been ignored and mistreated throughout our nation’s entire 
history. In any country but Australia, Kurnell would be a shrine! (Salt 2000: 7-9). 
 
“Australia’s most historic place” is the site of the original onslaught of violence and injustices 
forced upon Aboriginal peoples. Suvendrini Perera identifies the Sutherland shire as a Christian 
enclave of Anglo-Celtic whiteness, “a white sanctuary” which is threatened and constricted by 
“the great Middle Eastern melting pots of Sydney” (Perera 2007: 4). The racialised socio-
spatial-ness of ‘the shire’ reflects the racial hierarchies which underpin every level, place and 
space of the white Australian nation. Perera argues “invisiblised ‘white sovereign violence’ 
continues to produce and patrol the limits of the nation in the form of the unquestioned and 
unquestionable law of the land” (2007: 5). Maria Giannacopoulos contends that Australian law 
has been forged out of violence yet “disguises its status as such by circulating a series of 
knowledges about itself which operate to deny its relation to violence” (2006). She asserts that 
white sovereignty has been established through the repudiation of colonial violence in all its 
formations. Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll claim that the threat of violence is inherent to 
patriarchal white sovereignty and is ‘legitimised’ through the “disavowal of white race 
privilege”, which they say, “works to negate its relationship to racial oppression and mask its 
possessiveness” (2006: 155). They assert that the actions of white males in 2005, which has 
entered the Australian lexicon as the “Cronulla Riots”, was in fact a protest in that it was a form 
of organised violence, driven by the inherent white patriarchal right of ‘possession’. The beach 
is territory to be defended, a site “where collective national ownership and identity are on public 
display: a place of pleasure, leisure and pride” (Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll 2006: 149).  
Against this backdrop outrage boiled over when it was reported that two surf lifesavers 
had been in an ‘unprovoked’ attack by a large group of men of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ 
(El-Khouri 2012). On 11 December 2005, under the apparent threat of a non-white bodied 
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invasion and roused by an SMS call to arms, a crowd some 5000 strong of mostly young, white, 
frequently shirtless, Anglo-Celtic Australian males gathered to reclaim their beach. The 
preferred weapon of choice was the Australian national flag which vicariously adorned the 
‘soldiers’ as they marched into battle. Defiantly armed with the Australian flag, fuelled by 
alcohol and racist chants, the ‘troops’ rallied, they “chased, attacked, beat and bashed any 
person in their sight of Middle Eastern appearance” (El-Khouri 2012: xiii). Giannacopoulos 
(2006) states that it is through the act of naming ‘others’ that the Australian nation is reproduced 
as a white possession. She cites a media report in which the riotous white youth are exempted 
from racial descriptors. The un-raced youth are positioned as if beyond identity, they are 
‘legitimate’ and ‘local’; in contrast are the men of “Middle Eastern appearance”. 
Giannacopoulos argues, the proper capitalisation of “Middle Eastern” effectively delegates 
“ethnicity to the non-belonging youths” (2006 emphasis in the original).88 This is a discursive 
endemic, a phenomenon which has shaped the formation of a white Australian identity since 
first contact, “as long as law-breakers are mainstream, that is white and from an English 
speaking background, their ethnic group is protected by the absence of reference to it” (Sykes 
1989:16). Racial referencing is thus a strategy which is both explicit and implicit in that it 
constructs a standpoint which enforces nationalistic ideals through the marked identification of 
minority groups. The metonymic image of the Cronulla Riots was the white, young male 
swathed in the Australian flag. The flag, “emerged as a rallying point and signal proclamation 
of a ‘genuine’ Australian ethos” (Burton 2006b: 9). 
As the battle for Cronulla went into the night Australian citizens, Hadi Khawaja and 
Ali Ammar sought revenge. They broke into the Brighton-le-Sands RSL club in South Sydney, 
stole the national flag and proceeded to burn it in front of a crowd of 150 people. In Australia 
it is not a criminal offence to burn the national flag, “burning or otherwise wilfully desecrating 
                                                 
88 See also Hage in Thornton (2017).  
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national flags as a form of protest against the established order is extraordinarily common, 
because symbolically a national flag is the nation-state” (Foley 1996a: 150 emphasis in the 
original). The flag burning protest was broadcast on television. For Giannacopoulos this media 
event conjured 
colonial images of violence supported by the flag of empire … It was the British flag 
that Cook had forced into the earth upon invasion and it was in such manoeuvres that 
white sovereignty began to be violently asserted (2006).  
 
Eighteenth century colonial violence committed under the colours of the Union Jack transcends 
time to re-emerge in Sutherland’s shire of the twenty first century. Giannacopoulos 
conceptualises the forceful impalement of the land by the “flag of empire” as the beginning 
point from which the potent assertion of white sovereignty continues through the on-going 
assailment of Indigenous people and theft of sovereign land. 
Khawaja was sentenced to three months jail for breaking into the RSL and burning the 
flag (Wallace 2006) and Ammar, 16 at the time, served seven months (Olding 2015). Both men 
publicly apologised and Ammar also walked the Kokoda Track89 as part of his ‘rehabilitation’. 
The magistrate, Paul Falzon argued that if a window had been broken, or a trophy stolen, the 
significance of the crime would have been less, “[T]he emotional injury in this case is 
somewhat amplified” and because of the context, Falzon deemed, “[I]t’s vandalism of a 
particular kind. It’s extreme vandalism” (qtd. in Wallace 2006). According to Butz (2009) 
people who possess deep psychological attachments to their flag may feel a heightened sense 
of threat by its desecration. This assertion goes some way to explain both Falzon’s comments 
and the punishment meted out to Khawaja and Ammar. At Cronulla the Australian flag was 
                                                 
89 In 1942 Australian soldiers fought their most significant battle of the Second World War. On a 96 kilometre 
narrow and rugged jungle pass in Papua New Guinea, known as the Kokoda track, Australian soldiers defended 
Port Moresby from Japanese soldiers who planned to capture and use it as a base from which to bomb and 
potentially invade Northern Queensland.  
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employed as a territorial signifier; a status symbol of segregation denoting who ‘grew here’ 
and who ‘flew here’. Australian ‘values’ were made incarnate through the flag which was, 
inscribed on bodies in, multiple forms: blazoned on bikinis and backpacks, tattooed on 
to arms and torsos, painted on faces like war paint, wrapped around shoulders like a 
trophy: a performance of native-ised territoriality (Perera 2006). 
 
In their analysis of the aftermath of the Cronulla Riots Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll 
state that ‘race-blind’ responses were delivered, “[T]aking race and racism out of the equation 
enabled patriarchal white sovereignty to produce a colour blind and power evasive discourse” 
(Moreton-Robinson and Nicoll 2006: 155). Giannacopoulos claims that white violence was 
discursively endorsed and thus ‘legitimated’ by Prime Minister Howard who said, “I do not 
accept that there is underlying racism in this country” (2006). Furthermore, in what can be read 
as a tacit approval of the flag’s use as a weapon, Howard refused to criticise the Australian 
flag-waving, flag-wearing whites of Cronulla, “I would never condemn people for being proud 
of the Australian flag” (qtd. in Ireland 2015: 37). There certainly was no thought of punishment 
for those who wielded the flag as an agent of terror,  
[A]fter all, if they chant racist slogans whilst carrying the Australian flag their violence 
comes to signify as something other than criminal ethnic violence. White violence at 
Cronulla beach is subtly sanctioned by creating a discursive distinction between 
legitimate violence and ethnic criminal violence (Giannacopoulos 2006 emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Twenty first century racial violence is thus symbolically dispensed through the Australian flag, 
a continuation of the veneration of the Union Jack and the forced impalement of white 





Six weeks after the Cronulla Riots, at the 2006 Australia Day “Big Day Out” music 
festival, the Australian flag once more became a prevalent symbol of white supremacy. As a 
result, the following year 2007 festival-goers were asked to refrain from wearing or carrying 
the flag. Festival organiser, Ken West,90 described the display of nationalism and use of the 
flag at the 2006 event, “as intolerable … The Australian flag was being used as gang colours. 
It was racism disguised as patriotism” (qtd. in Mulvey 2007). West was immediately vilified 
by Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd, the RSL and ANFA. Prime Minister John Howard was 
outraged, calling the suggestion to ‘ban’ the Australian flag, “offensive … to millions of 
Australians” before continuing, “[F]lags don’t have legs and arms, if anyone was breaking the 
law at Cronulla … they should be dealt with by the authorities” (Mulvey 2007). Flags however 
are mobilised through the “legs and arms” of the corporeal body, as the epigraph states, flags 
can signify group unity and purpose. When bodies are wrapped in the flag, they are 
metaphorically enveloped in the arms of the nation – the body transforms to become ‘the 
nation’ and all it represents.  
Foley was also critical about banning the flag. She argues that if “you’re intimidating 
people, it does not matter really whether you’re doing it by waving a flag, or a tea towel, or a 
photo of the Sydney Harbour Bridge” (qtd. in Huxley 2009). Foley’s comments effectively 
trivialise the flag’s transformative capacity and are somewhat surprising given that she 
previously acknowledges the national flag as being representative of the nation-state. To 
profess that there is no differentiation between using the flag and a tea towel or a photograph 
as a means of intimidation is extraordinary. By refusing to acknowledge the flag’s very real 
power and influence she relegates it to that of a “banal” and seemingly innocuous everyday 
                                                 
90 See also West in Thornton (2017).   
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object. In this instance, far from being a banal signifier of national identity the flag, as this 
photograph demonstrates, has the transformative capability to reconfigure and take on a ‘new’ 
life as an agent of racism, for which, unlike the discipline meted out against Khawaja and 
Ammar, there is no punishment.  
 
 
Figure 5: Australian protestors use the national flag to cover their faces (Image: Sydney Morning Herald 2009). 
 
The white body en-masse, wrapped in the Australian flag, becomes the embodiment of the 
White Australian Nation: a domestic body asserting sovereignty and ownership through the 
fabric of the flag and acts of terror. Scruby argues that it is the Union Jack which emboldens 
white Australians, the Union Jack “allowed our flag to be used as a racist symbol, allowing 
those of Anglo descent to say, ‘I’m more Australian than you’” (qtd. in Huxley 2009).  
National flags signal group membership as they simultaneously reflect the nation’s core 
values and belief systems, thus “national symbols often play prominent roles in protests of 
actions or events that are perceived as countering these beliefs” (Butz 2009: 787). Joanne Frare 
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(2009) argues that the levels of flag-display behaviour seen at both Cronulla 2005 and Big Day 
Out 2006, brought the issue of flag-usage into the public consciousness. With increasing levels 
of flag-waving Frare identified the need for research and conducted a study from which to 
better understand the social implications of Australian flag-display behaviour and large scale 
intergroup relations. Frare’s findings “suggests that flags are able to express powerful, and even 
sometimes hostile, expressions of national attachment and sentiment” (2009: 49). Butz asserts 
that events such as Cronulla “suggest that national symbols may play a role in collective 
nationalistic responses to outgroups” (2009: 788).  Chris Sibley, William Hoverd and John 
Duckitt note national flags “automatically activate normative values for ingroup members” 
(2011: 494). From these findings it can be established that aggressive acts of flag-waving 
behaviour, such as those seen at Cronulla, are synonymous with a form of nationalism that 
permits the forceful promotion of national values to be conveyed through expressions of 
hostility. As a result the flag may well impede notions of national inclusion for minority groups, 
which in turn may impact psychological health and well-being (Butz 2009, see also Butz et al. 
2007; Sibley et al. 2011). Since Cronulla, at every Australia Day there has been a mass 
mobilisation of a cheap red, white and blue army. A vast array of products, a “menacing 
display, in the everyday space” which possess a “two-faced ability simultaneously to 
camouflage and to stage racist violence” (Perera 2007:12). Currently Australian ‘reclaimers’ 
continue to use the Australian flag as their trademark statement, donning it in a multitude of 
fashions.   
‘Reclaiming’ Australia 
Like the knights of old sporting their coats of arms, the Australian flag draped around the 
body of the citizen becomes a twenty first-century-marker of the corpus of nation. This modern-
day coat-of-arms represents colonial beliefs and core values and is used to deflect perceived 
threats to nationalist discourse. For close to 250 years Australian national identity and 
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membership into the nation has been regulated by norms from which white citizens have 
benefited. National identity, values and symbols are closely aligned to concepts of whiteness 
and are protectively guarded. Reclaim Australia is a far-right nationalist group which protests 
against what it refers to as the “Islamisation of Australia” and is an example of another group 
which has been mobilised through the national flag’s symbolism of ‘White Australia’. At a 
Reclaim Australia rally an elderly white man, wearing a matching Australian flag cap and t-
shirt, holds a sign, adorned with Australian flags which states: “OUR COUNTRY OUR LAWS 
NOT YOURS” (Howden 2015b: 5). At a similar rally, Roxley Foley, Aboriginal Tent Embassy 
caretaker, stood close to a Reclaim Australia group and in a statement of Indigenous 
sovereignty and resistance, held a sign which read, “not yours to reclaim” (Gorrey 2015).  
 





“Symbols of that whiteness will always engender fear” (bell hooks 2009: 10). 
Flags are imbued with beliefs and values which are in a constant state of renewal, 
reinforcement and contestation. As noted it is in the political interest to take charge of the flag 
given its associated and very real power. To put this another way, jurisdiction of the flag “can 
control an important element in the battle over social relations within its territory” (Leib & 
Webster 2007: 31). The flag is thus a vessel of socialisation which carries with it the potential 
to signify dissent, dependent upon the individual / group’s subject position. In order to explore 
this further I discuss the racial conflict and divisions which have been elicited through the 
display and the endorsement of the Confederate battle flag of the American South.  
For many Southern whites, the Confederate battle flag represents the battles fought by their 
ancestors during the American Civil War. This flag proudly represents their heritage. For others 
the battle flag is “a symbolic container which condenses all that it means to be a (white) 
Southerner” (Leib & Webster 2007: 32). For some, both black and white, the flag is a broadly 
associated as being a symbol of rebellion or defiance. For the majority of Southerners of 
African-American descent, the flag is a symbol of racial discrimination, hatred and fear. bell 
hooks states that 
the face of terror will always be white. And symbols of that whiteness will always engender 
fear. The confederate flag, for example, will never stand for heritage for black folks. It still 
awakens fear in the minds and imaginations of elder black folks for whom it signaled [sic] 
the support of white racist assault on blackness. 
White folks who mask their denial of white supremacy by mouthing slogans like ‘heritage 
not hate’ to support their continued allegiance to this flag fail to see that their refusal to 
acknowledge what this ‘heritage’ means for black folks is itself an expression of white 
racist power and privilege. For the confederate flag is a symbol of both heritage and hate. 
The history of the confederacy will always evoke the memory of white oppression of black 





hooks draws attention to a multitude of traumas which are evoked by the Confederate flag. She 
identifies how white discourses work to position this symbol as an innocuous statement of 
“heritage”. Furthermore, hooks argues that support of the Confederate battle flag is tantamount 
to a refusal to engage with African-American perspectives, which in turn further cements the 
white agenda.  
The correlations that can be drawn to the Australian context are of interest. To claim that 
the Australian flag represents ‘our’ heritage and democratic way of life mutes Indigenous 
perspectives and experiences. The “continued allegiance” for the Australian flag, the “refusal 
to acknowledge” what it represents to Indigenous peoples is, as hooks states, “an expression of 
white racist power and privilege.” Echoing notions of the ‘haunted’ nation, hooks goes on to 
argue that ongoing allegiance to white superiority constrains and deforms the psyche of both 
blacks and whites. She contends that it is the responsibility of white people to unlearn and 
contest normative systems of practice and thought.  
The American Civil War was fought over the Southerners’ determination to defend its right 
to own slaves. In defeat, the Confederacy re-established itself with racial vitriol and enforced 
segregation, “[B]etween 1882 and 1968 almost 5000 lynchings took place with the express 
purpose of subjugating African Americans with terror” (O’Malley 2015a: 15). As the black 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s took hold, the Confederate flag took on a new 
life and became a symbol of opposition to the civil rights movement. On 17 June 2015, white 
supremacist Dylann Roof, aged 21, murdered 9 black church-goers during a bible-study 
meeting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal church in Charleston. Roof’s website sported 
a manifesto of white supremacy and photographs of him with a Confederate flag. 
The Confederate flag was first flown from the dome of the South Carolina state house in 
1962. The Reverend Clementa Pinckney, civil rights activist and state senator who was shot 
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dead by Roof, “was forced to walk by the living insult of that flag each day when he went to 
work for his Charleston constituents” (O’Malley 2015a: 15). As a result of Roof’s race hate 
crime, calls were made to remove the Confederate flag. The flag’s defenders however, evoked 
the argument that the flag is part of South Carolina’s heritage. The flag represents “the sacrifice 
of lives on the battlefield in the Confederate cause” and they claimed that if the flag came down 
then, “calls to change street and place names honouring Confederate leaders” might well be 
made (McLeod 2015: 15). In his tribute to Reverend Pinckney, Former President, Barack 
Obama eulogised, 
[F]or too long, we were blind to the pain that the Confederate flag stirred into many of our 
citizens … we all have to acknowledge, the flag has always represented more than just 
ancestral pride … Removing the flag from this state’s capital would not be an act of political 
correctness. It would not an insult to the valour of Confederate soldiers. It would simply be 
acknowledgment that the cause for which they fought, the cause of slavery, was wrong. It 
would be one step in an honest accounting of America’s history, a modest but meaningful 
balm for so many unhealed wounds (qtd. in O’Malley 2015b: 26).    
 
Obama’s address leaves little room for dissent as he dispels the myths which discursively 
connect the flag to battlefield valour and heritage. Obama argues that the Confederate flag, 
woven out of racist practices and rhetoric, has no place in the current public sphere. The 
Confederate flag was lowered on 10 July 2015, “and suddenly it seemed utterly preposterous 
that the ugly banner had been tolerated there for so long”, a crowd of several thousand which 
was as much “white as it was black” cheered and sang as the flag was finally lowered 
(O’Malley 2015a: 15).   
Conclusion 
The symbolic and pedagogical power of flags can be understood through knowledge which 
explores both their origins and applications. Work done in the field of vexillology that includes 
a careful analysis of the manifold ways flags are deployed, reveals how flags can generate and 
channel an array of social, political and emotional reactions. In Australia, flags elicit a range 
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of responses that accrue around various connections and disconnections with nationalist 
ideologies. In addition, as demonstrated, there is a long-standing confusion and ambivalence 
associated with the flags of Australia. What emerges from this study is the extent to which flags 
signify multifariously at this current juncture in the twenty first century. For some, they are 
symbols of allegiance, representing national fervour, identification, and a sense of belonging. 
For others, the national flag signifies exclusion. A sense of the depth and diversity of feelings 
generated by the national flag and its colonial insignia is at the heart of this research, and while 
much of this has been discussed above, a more thorough appraisal of the national flag will be 
gleaned through an analysis of the responses of some Indigenous people in Chapter Seven. But 
first, before Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander reactions to the national flag are considered, 
I focus on the long-standing resistance to colonial rule. Understanding the struggle, 
determination and resilience of Indigenous resistance underpins the final chapter as reactions 
















CHAPTER SIX: Acts of Resistance: Spanning Time and Distance   
Grass roots reality was always the prime focus of Kevin’s work. Through his art, words and 
actions, he sought to break through the code of silence that keeps the wider population ignorant 
of the daily reality of ‘living Black’ in this land … Kevin’s life is only one example of the 
thousands of Kooris, Murris, Yolgnu, Yapa, Palawar, Nungas, Nyoongahs and Gooris, earning 
life’s breath on a daily basis, who inspire each other by acts of courage, bravery and 
determination, resisting, persisting and surviving – hoping, eventually, for ‘the boat people to 
grow up proper way’ for this land.91  
                                                                                                (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 56-57). 
Introduction  
This chapter is about resistance. Since first contact Indigenous people in this country 
have resisted and actively opposed the colonial imposition of the British Empire. A range of 
responses to colonialism are discussed in this chapter which relate to the realities of “living 
Black” in a nation which has long been subjected to the dominant discourses of white 
supremacy through policy and practice. In order to understand how resistance by Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people has been, and continues to be expressed, I investigate a variety 
of events and reactions. I begin the chapter with an exploration of art, which as a multi-layered 
expression of Aboriginal Law, is both a primary mode of communication and an important site 
of resistance. I discuss this through the life of Kwat-Kwat artist, Yakaduna, also known as 
Tommy McCrae / McRae (c. 1835-1901). McCrae’s ink pen on paper drawing, Corroboree 
depicts a number of flags and presents the viewer with a variety of hypotheses in relation to 
how the work produces meaning. I will provide a reading of this work produced by the great 
grandfather of Burnum Burnum92 (Swain 1988), who planted the Aboriginal flag at Dover, 
England in 1988. Chapter Six takes a chronological path examining events and people who 
form links in a long and interconnected chain of resistance, and who, as the epigraph suggests, 
refuse to be silent. I conclude the chapter by discussing a significant act of colonial resistance. 
                                                 
91 Kevin Gilbert was an activist, poet, playwright and artist. His ashes were buried at the Aboriginal Tent 
Embassy in 1993 (Jopson 2012: 12). 
92 Burnum Burnum was an activist, author and educator.  
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Two hundred years after Cook made his land claim for the British Crown, Eddie Koiki Mabo, 
a member of the Torres Strait Meriam nation, pursued a lengthy High Court battle against the 
State of Queensland which resulted in a ruling that established the Meriam people as the 
sovereign owners of their land and extinguished the colonial doctrine of terra nullius.93 
Art as Communication 
Aboriginal art is a long-standing practice that has been grounded in over 60,000 years 
of knowledge and tradition (Boulter 1991). According to Wally Caruana “[A]rt is central to 
Aboriginal life. Whether it is made for political, social, utilitarian or didactic purposes – and 
these functions constantly overlap – art is inherently connected to the spiritual domain” (2012: 
7). Aboriginal art is an ancient mode of communication that centres on the spiritual life of 
Aboriginal people called “the Dreaming” by Europeans. The term “Dreaming” is derived from 
the Dreamtime, an expression coined by the anthropologist Baldwin Spencer. In 1926, Spencer 
claimed that the Arrernte word altyerre meant both ‘time of creation’ and ‘dream’ (Elkin 1966; 
Arthur and Morphy 2005). In this context “the Dreaming” refers to the creator ancestors and 
supernatural beings which traversed the continent and formulated laws regarding social and 
religious behaviour that constituted the foundational premise for Aboriginal Law. Caruana 
suggests that “the Dreaming” formulates “the ideological framework by which human society 
retains a harmonious equilibrium with the universe – a charter and mandate that has been 
sanctified over time” (2012:10). Before colonisation, Aboriginal Law was understood and 
expressed in a variety of ways such as song, dance, storytelling and art. Aboriginal Law 
constitutes,  
the highest law, no-one can ever sign it away … The law transcends all things … The 
law is who we are, we are also the law. We carry it in our lives. The law is everywhere, 
we breathe it, we eat it, we sing it, we live it (Watson qtd. in Gilbert & Williams 1996: 
43). 
                                                 
93 See the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) website www.nativetitle25.gov.au  
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Aboriginal Law, is thus a set of practices that regulates all facets of existence and finds 
expression in all manner of artistic expression. Unlike Western law Aboriginal Law is not an 
evolving entity; rather, it is an established foundation upon which life is understood. The Law 
is inclusive of all living and non-living things and sees these as interrelated. The Law is both a 
set of instructions and a mode of storytelling that finds a prominent place in art-works. 
Aboriginal people customarily attained status through the acquisition of knowledge. 
Art as a manifestation of knowledge asserts varying levels of authority dependent upon the 
cultural status of both artist and viewer. According to Kevin Gilbert, “art communicates more 
directly [and] has more significance to us than the written language. … We have presented our 
oral tradition and reinforced it with our artworks” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 28). Pre-
colonisation, Aboriginal artistic expression was based on protocol and was both personal and 
collaborative; art was the affirmation of a complex web of inter-relations (Mundine 2006). 
Aboriginal art is therefore a multi-layered, powerful and complex form of cultural expression 
that encompasses ethical responsibility and social organisation.  
Galarrwuy Yunupingu observes that, 
[W]hen we paint – whether it is on our bodies for ceremony or on bark or canvas for 
the market – we are not painting for fun or profit. We are painting as we have always 
done to demonstrate our continuing link with our country and the rights and 
responsibilities we have to it. Furthermore, we paint to show the rest of the world that 
we own this country, and that the land owns us (qtd. in Boulter 1991: 23).   
 
Aboriginal art is understood here to be a cultural responsibility, a conduit which links the land 
to its people and the people to their land. Yunupingu claims that many colonial artworks depict 
acts of possession authenticated by images which feature the Union Jack. Colonial artworks 
formulate a visual narrative of (dis)possession that continues to both inform and substantiate 
the discursive framing of whiteness in relation to official narratives of Australian history.  
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Traditional artistic expression includes motifs which encompass a range of meanings 
specific to individual groups and nations. Significance is reflected in the patterns that mark the 
bodies of individuals and the shields of the numerous clans. The importance of this cultural 
form of identification is explored by Dennis O’Brien. The Kaurna shield is a symbol of his 
clan, the Kaurna Miyurna people of South Australia,  
[T]he shield is Kaurna, it’s our identity. The shield is important and the markings are 
significant for us. It is one of the symbols that represent us, who we are and what we’re 
about, where we’re from. Nations around the world have different flags and banners 
that represent who they are. The shield is our flag (O’Brien qtd. in Osborne & Simpkin 
2015: 89). 
 
Caruana is interested in how religious images and designs make meaning. He notes that when 
motifs are applied to a shield or a body, for example, they are capable of producing a significant 
change in perception and can “transform the nature of the thing from a mundane state to an 
extraordinary one, from the profane to the sacred” (2012: 14). The Kaurna shield thus 
represents an ancient cycle of continuity that is both practical and spiritual and encompasses a 
complex belief system which unambiguously connects people to place and to one another.  
The Gweagal shield was taken during Cook’s first encounter with Aboriginal people at 
Kurnell in 1770 and was subsequently ‘gifted’ to the British Museum, London where it has 
been held since. In 2015 the shield was ‘reloaned’ to Australia and was a central part of the 
Encounters exhibition. The Gweagal shield holds special significance for Shayne Williams, a 
Dharawal Elder. The shield symbolises Aboriginal resistance both past and present (Osbourne 
and Simpkin 2015) and forms a tangible link with the past that signifies the resilience and 
ongoing survival the oldest continuing living culture on earth. Elizabeth Coleman states that 
Aboriginal art forms should be considered as forms of insignia and their status comparable to 
the European coat of arms system (2005). While Coleman’s focus is concerned with protecting 
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Aboriginal artwork from appropriation her analogy draws attention to the many Aboriginal 
nations and the symbols which established group or clan membership and associated cultural 
pride. Designs are encoded with meaning and thus, cultural symbols directly connect clans to 
their land and provide a link for the maintenance of customs and ways of life. Cultural symbols, 
such as those found on the Kaurna and Gweagal shields, also convey specific messages relating 
to ownership, knowledge and identity which in turn uphold and strengthen social structures. 
Yakaduna, also known as Tommy McCrae, was a talented artist whose work captured 
the exact markings of his south-eastern Murray River tribe, and according to Khadija von 
Zinnenburg Carroll are, “seductively detailed for those who are now attempting to reconstruct 
the significance of these individual designs” (2014: 68). McCrae’s importance is noted by 
Caruana who identifies him as a nineteenth century forerunner to the urban and rural artists of 
today, who use art to 
offer a variety of perspectives on a world with which much of its audience has generally 
been unfamiliar. At the same time, by implicitly questioning and challenging 
contemporary attitudes, they articulate the concerns and aspirations of Aboriginal 
people in modern society (2012: 222). 
 
The education of white Australia through Aboriginal art has been a long-standing practice. 
McCrae’s illustrations attest to this. Through his artwork McCrae keeps his culture alive and 
communicates the richness of his world, which had existed for millennia prior to colonisation.  
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Tommy McCrae (c.1835-1901) and his artwork Corroboree. 94   
Background  
Tommy McCrae was a member of the Kwat-Kwat people who lived on the central 
Murray River border between New South Wales and Victoria. McCrae illustrated both the 
traditional and the contemporary through his use of paper and ink. Hetti Perkins describes 
McCrae’s drawings as “incredibly lively”: “I feel that if I were to give the paper a jolt the 
figures would all start up and continue what they were doing” (2010: 176). The significance of 
McCrae’s work is noted elsewhere, “McCrae tells his stories as an ancient animator might, 
compiling frame after frame of illustrations; chapters of Aboriginal daily life and the impacts 
of colonisation in simple and uncoloured truth” (Koori Mail 18 November 2015: 57). Prior to 
providing a reading of McCrae’s ink sketch Corroboree (c. 1890), I discuss events that 
occurred during the early part of the nineteenth century which became a sustained focus of 
McCrae’s artwork.  
In 1835, at approximately the time of Tommy McCrae’s birth, Australian born colonist 
John Batman secured vast tracts of land from the local Aboriginal people of Port Phillip.95 
Agnes Bell notes, Batman, William Buckley,96 and a small party of “Batman’s aborigines” 
bargained for some six hundred thousand acres of land, “…the Batman aborigines danced and 
sang to show the local groups that they came as friends. To signify that they understood, the 
local aborigines replied with a short corroboree” (1965: 5-6). Although a corroboree had been 
                                                 
94 The word corroboree refers to Aboriginal cultural ceremonies which use music, dance and song to depict 
everyday life and events both traditional and contemporary. Corroboree themes “include the ways of birds, 
animals and fish; the movements of the storm, the flood and the sea … and the Aborigines’ experience of, and 
interest in, European and other non-native objects and pursuits …” (Elkin 1966: 289). 
95 The Wathaurong people, who McCrae refers to as the “Melbourne tribe” (Carroll 2014: 248).  
96 Buckley was a convict who was transported to Australia for life. He left England on the HMS Calcutta in 1803, 
one of 307 convicts assigned with establishing a settlement at Port Phillip (Levell 2008). The settlement failed 
and Buckley absconded. He was eventually found and adopted by the local Wathaurong people, ‘the Melbourne 
tribe’. Buckley lived with them from 1803-1835 and was known as Murrangurk. He learnt and participated in the 
local Aboriginal life and he had a wife (Morgan 1967; Sayers 1994; Maynard & Haskins 2016). In 1835 Buckley 
re-entered white society as it sought to establish a settlement on the Yarra River. Buckley was then paid by the 
British authorities to act as an interpreter and he accompanied John Wedge and Batman, the ‘pioneers’ of 
Melbourne, to secure land from the Wathaurong tribe, for Batman’s new settlement. (Carroll 2014).  
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performed in the spirit of friendship, this event, referred to as Batman’s treaty, was the 
beginning of an era of betrayal. Batman’s treaty was deemed invalid by the British authorities 
and had no legal substance, it was however “an important first step in this process [of white 
settlement … and] is symbolic of European relations with the Kulin, in that self-interest and 
deceit were central to colonisation” (Yarra City Council 2016).  
Following Batman’s treaty the landscape was systematically alienated. Convicts were 
recruited from Hobart and Sydney to build roads for the settlement and the first land sale 
attracted over 200 hundred people. Land sales were marked by a bell-man, “a colourful figure 
mounted on his old grey horse and carrying a red ‘Auction’ flag” (Bell 1965: 29). Demand for 
land in and around Melbourne led to further sales. Williamstown97 became Melbourne’s first 
suburb, and a flag was employed as a signpost, “[Y]ou enter the bush at a place marked with a 
red flag which indicates where the track to Melbourne commences” (Bell 1965: 20). In the 
early years of the settlement, Melbournians also gleaned important information from the high 
ground of ‘Flagstaff Hill’. Here flags of different colours and shapes were hoisted up a tall mast 
to identify the origins of visiting ships: “a flag shape denoted a ship from overseas while a 
pennant was the signal for an interstate vessel” (Royal Historical Society of Victoria n.d.). 
By the end of 1844 Melbourne had a population of over twenty thousand and was the 
second largest town in “The Land of Promise” (Bell 1965: 41). Land possession enabled 
manufacturers and pastoralists to further drive Aboriginal people off their country. In the 1850s 
gold was discovered. Tens of thousands of people from around the world came to Victoria, via 
Melbourne. As a result, trade, industry, and the population burgeoned, 
 
 
                                                 
97 Williamstown was named, “to honour the ruling King” (Bell 1965: 16), King William IV (1765-1837).     
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over one hundred thousand people came from England, tens of thousands from Ireland, 
Scotland and China; thousands from Wales, France, Germany and the United States of 
America; hundreds from Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Bell 
1965: 67).  
 
The influx of people from other nations brought with it a plethora of flags proclaiming 
distinction, ownership and affiliation. At the gold diggings, flags were used to signpost 
government offices and stores. For example, in Ballarat, the doctor’s flag was yellow and 
embellished with a mortar and pestle. Coffee shops, lemonade stalls and the barber all had their 
own flags. The undertaker’s flag was black. Alongside these, and scattered over the landscape, 
were the flags and banners of the international miners (Kieza 2014; see also Fox 1973). Flags 
signified distinction from ‘others’, emblems of difference that heralded the new age and erased 
the old. McCrae skilfully navigated this environment of rapid change which sought to relegate 
Aboriginal people to the margins.  
In the early 1860s, McCrae established himself and his extended family on an eight 
acre unsupervised reservation at Lake Moodemere. The family generated an income by selling 
Murray River cod, local produce, and decorative artefacts (Sayers 1994; Carroll 2014). It was 
at Lake Moodemere that McCrae made most of his drawings. McCrae was commissioned to 
draw by white settlers and he produced prolific amounts of work. By white standards, McCrae 
was a symbol of assimilatory success; he was a hard worker and a teetotaller who owned a 
horse and cart (Sayers 1994; Carroll 2014). Despite achieving a level of economic 
independence, McCrae could not escape the exigencies of official race policies. In 1885 the 
Victorian Board for the Protection of Aborigines refused a request from McCrae and two other 
men who asked for tents or a house that could be used as shelter from the cold winter (Sayers 
1994), and in subsequent years regulations stipulated the forced removal of Aboriginal children 
from parents who were deemed unable to care for them. Over a period of six years, all four of 
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McCrae’s children98 were forcibly taken and sent to various reserves in Victoria. This had a 
devastating effect on McCrae and his final years were deeply troubled as he strove, yet failed 
to reunite his family and reclaim his independence from colonial forces (Cooper and Urry 
1981). It was during this time in his life that McCrae drew Corroboree. 
 
 
     Figure 7: Tommy McCrae (c1890) Corroboree, ink on paper (University of Melbourne Archives [UMA] 2016). 
 
  
                                                 
98 Alexander McCrae was Burnum Burnum’s maternal grandfather (Norst 1999). 
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A Reading of McCrae’s Corroboree 
Carroll argues that “McCrae’s artwork must be read within the contemporaneous 
context of the racialized laws that were changing Aboriginal ways of life” (2014: 218). Caruana 
asserts that the interpretation of Aboriginal images is “not a one-to-one equivalence. Rather, 
like poetry with all its inherent complexities, multiple references and intended ambiguities, 
each symbol or icon within a work may encapsulate a variety of meanings” (2012: 14). 
Therefore, as with any textual reading, the symbolic infusion of Corroboree offers various 
meanings to its audience, past and present, and will be understood according to their levels of 
knowledge pertaining to Aboriginal culture and Australia’s colonial history. Following this, 
my reading of Corroboree, which features the three quintessential symbols of colonisation – 
the ship, the white man and the flag – is therefore influenced by the date of its production, the 
historical backdrop and McCrae’s lived experience.  
Adolphus Elkin states that the performance of European themed corroborees can be 
understood as “a protest against, or an attitude of casualness towards, the people who usurped 
their country” (1966: 289). During McCrae’s lifetime traditional dances and ceremonies such 
as the corroboree were forbidden by white authorities.99 McCrae resisted, or following Elkin, 
“protested against” this attack on his culture through his artwork and the corroboree became a 
significant and recurring theme. Using ink and paper McCrae was able to record the cultural 
rituals of his people, and in doing so, he captured many of the old customs, including the 
patterns on the bodies of his corroboree dancers. He portrayed groups of corroboree dancers in 
different ways. For example, the ‘Echuca tribe’ dancers carry either playing-sticks or short 
                                                 
99 The extinguishment of Aboriginal traditions and cultural practices were played out at on both the local and 
continental scale. Daisy Bates provides details of two dances “the Wanji-Wanji and the Molong-go” which “took 
one or two generations to traverse the continent … these great traditional dances demand a large number of 
performers and audience, and for lack of them, petered out” (1944: 125). Dispossession, genocide and enforced 
re-location, when combined with the Christian principles of white governance are directly attributable to the 
demise of these ancient, traditional ceremonies. 
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spears, whereas the Lachlan area dancers are featured with small feathered head-dresses. Of 
particular interest McCrae always portrays the ‘Melbourne tribe’ carrying “small flag-like 
decorated sticks” (Sayers 1994: 33; see also Morphy 2004; Carroll 2014). In Corroboree the 
dancers carry flags atop sticks, which indicates that they are members of the ‘Melbourne tribe’ 
or the Wathaurong people, who had previously adopted William Buckley, and from whom 
Batman, using Buckley as interpreter, stole vast tracts of land. This leads me to hypothesise 
that the duplicity of Batman’s treaty was in fact heightened by the realisation that a corroboree 
had been performed in the spirit of ‘friendship’, to which Buckley was privy.  
Buckley is the white man featured in McCrae’s illustration, and like the corroboree, he 
presents as a recurring subject for McCrae. The symbolic importance of Buckley can be 
understood as multi-faceted. Buckley represents three seismic events which impacted McCrae 
and his people. First, in 1803 Buckley was one of the first white men to land at Port Philip. 
Second, through his rejection of white society Buckley became assimilated and welcomed into 
the local Aboriginal clan.100 Third, in 1835 Buckley re-entered white society and acting as an 
interpreter, played an active role and was present at the 1835 signing of Batman’s treaty. 
Buckley is portrayed in McCrae’s image with little facial hair; his face and expression are 
clearly visible. McCrae’s depiction of Buckley stands in sharp contrast to European accounts 
which mythologised Buckley as the ‘wild white man’ who on his re-entry into British 
civilisation, “was dressed in animal skins, his hair and beard spread ‘as large as a bushel’” 
(Levell 2008: 227). McCrae also depicts Buckley as part of the clan, initiated and assimilated 
into the rites and cultural practices of those who have adopted him, “a body fully painted with 
                                                 
100 On one occasion during his time with the Wathaurong people, Buckley states “I saw some natives coming 
along, one of them carrying a flag over his shoulders” (qtd. in Morgan 1967: 79). Buckley recalls how the local 
people had encountered an unmanned vessel in the bay and were attracted to the flag because of its colours. They 
hauled it down and also took several other things which “would prove serviceable”, when the crew returned to 
find their flag and other items missing, “they fired off their pieces, but they were at too great a distance to do any 
injury to the natives” (qtd. in Morgan 1967: 79).  
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clan designs and otherwise adorned in the manner appropriate for an Aboriginal corroboree, 
the European hat heightens the dignity of Buckley and the ceremony” (Carroll 2014: 239). At 
first glance the image suggests that flag-waving and friendship are a mutually satisfying 
cultural experience. However, on closer scrutiny, while McCrae locates Buckley as part of the 
dancers, there is clearly a disconnection. Buckley, the white man, is set apart from the main 
group of dancers, whose legs converge in unison. McCrae’s perspective is powerful, he resists 
colonial authority by reversing assimilation practices and ascribes power to Aboriginal people 
and their cultural traditions, thereby nominating white ‘visitors’ as guests to be included, or 
not, at the behest of local clans.  
I cannot ascertain if the Corroboree ship is the Calcutta or the Rebecca. However, both 
vessels are significant. The former transported Buckley to Port Phillip in 1803, and the latter 
carried Batman to Port Phillip in 1835. There can be little doubt that the boat, as both the 
transporter and supplier of white people to Aboriginal land is a symbol of irrevocable change. 
Boats are a recurring and prominent feature of McCrae’s work. Carroll notes a century later 
that it is the image of the boat which has warped the paper, “[H]e crosshatched them so heavily 
that the ink soaked through and tore the paper” (Carroll 2014: 250). The significance of the 
boat for McCrae is profound. Comparable, Carroll asserts “to the emphasis of a totemic animal 
or place. The totemic animal in Aboriginal society was one with which each person was 
associated … their whole life” (2014: 250). Seen in this light the boat in Corroboree can be 
read as an on-going site of tension, a symbol which signifies life-long and cataclysmic change 
for McCrae and his people.  
Traditionally the corroboree dancers would have carried leek-leek or lyrebird feathers 
(Carroll 2014), yet in Corroboree McCrae depicts the dancers holding flags that replicate the 
flags seen on the ship. Carroll notes that here McCrae “is seen to camouflage the symbols of 
national ceremony to suit both societies in which he operated” (2014: 240). In other words, 
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while this image might satisfy a colonial audience, it may also transmit a less discernible 
cypher. Elkin argues that in “songs of contact” (European themed corroborees) Aboriginal 
people use “the contact situation and European articles for their own personal and social ends, 
almost as though white men as such did not exist” (1966: 290). Following this I note how the 
Corroboree flags are seamlessly absorbed into the text as if their integration diffuses their 
representational force. Viewed in this way, Corroboree can be seen as a re-imagining of the 
cultural scene where white Australia, through the re-appropriation of its insignia, is 
‘assimilated’ into McCrae’s tribal world, just as Buckley had been for so many years.  
However, if we consider Corroboree in the context of its production date, it becomes 
evident that for McCrae c.1890, there could have been little doubt as to the violent and self-
interested objectives of the ‘boat people’ who stridently marked the landscape with a 
performative insignia which ‘announced’, ‘claimed’ and ‘declared’ their intentions which were 
underpinned by “sanctions such as legal frameworks and normative values” (Coleman 2005: 
71). While the depiction can be read in multifarious ways it seems reasonable to assume that 
the arrival of sailing ships and the insignia of pieces of cloth, – flags – which came to represent 
the myth of terra nullius and the sovereign claim to Aboriginal land, played a significant role 
in how McCrae told his stories through his artwork.    
Corroboree: An Enduring Legacy 
For the descendants of McCrae’s “Melbourne tribe”, the Wathaurong people, the 
repercussions of past colonial practices resulted in an extensive, but not a total loss of language. 
Certain words have survived; the Wathaurong language lives on,  
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[P]re-school children can sing basic rhymes, adults wear the words on their chest and 
walk down Moorabool Street with the pride that they alone of all the thousands who 
walk it know what Moorabool means101 (Pascoe 2007: 191). 
 
Likewise, Corroboree has survived. Since the 1960s Corroboree has been stored in the UMA. 
Described as a living cultural memory, the artwork Corroboree “connects many lives, past and 
present and by tracing objects through provenance new perspectives can be found and complex 
narratives reinterpreted” (UMA 2016). Corroboree has been transformed, it has been fused 
into the exterior of the University of Melbourne’s new Arts West building.102 From an “archival 
object” Corroboree has become, “a monumental work of public art” inscribing “a powerful 
indigenous perspective on Australian history into the building’s skin” (UMA 2016). 
Corroboree is replete with contemporary relevance. Corroboree provokes questions which 
speak of place and identity, of nation and belonging, of land and acquisition, and, in the twenty 
first century, of the flags which continue to speak for, and represent the Australian nation.  
Twentieth Century Resistance103 
McCrae died in 1901, the year of federation, when the ‘modern’ Australian nation was 
born and the Australian red and blue ensigns were officially endorsed. As noted, preparations 
leading up to federation had taken ten years and were racially motivated as Aboriginal people 
were systemically excluded from this nation-building project. During the early years of the 
twentieth century African-American political activism gained momentum and Marcus Garvey 
became a source of influence for many, including Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. Garvey 
                                                 
101 In Wathaurong language, “Moorabool” means mussel, for this and further examples, see Pascoe (2007: 259-
260). 
102 See Arts West façade Reveal Video @ https://arts-west.arts.unimelb.edu.au/arts-west-exterior/arts-west-
facade-competition (University of Melbourne 2016). 
103 Some of this work comes from my paper, “Flagging Australia: Claims and Identity”, to be published as part of 




was also an important figure for Aboriginal political activism during the twentieth century 
(Maynard 2007) and he clearly understood the potency of national flags, 
[T]hat we suffer so much today under whatsoever flag we live is proof positive that 
constitutions and laws, when framed by the early advocates of human liberty, never 
included and were never intended for us as a people (Garvey qtd. in AfricaTown/CD 
2014).  
 
In 1917 Garvey founded the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). By the 
mid-1920s the UNIA had established chapters in 41 countries, including Australia. In 1920 the 
UNIA held its first international convention in New York’s Maddison Square Garden. Over 
25,000 members attended, including a contingent from Australia (Maynard 2007; see also 
Crampton 1989b). It was at this convention, 13 August 1920 that the Pan-African flag, a tri-
colour consisting of three equal horizontal bands of red, black and green was formally 
adopted.104 The flag was created in response to an American popular song of ridicule written 
in 1900 called, “Every Race has a Flag but the Coon” 105 (UNIA-ACL 2015). While this was 
not the only racist song of its kind, it drew attention to an absence to which Garvey responded, 
[S]how me the race or the nation without a flag, and I will show you a race of people 
without any pride. Aye! In song and mimicry they have said, “Every race has a flag but 
the coon” How true! Aye! But that was said of us four years ago. They can’t say it now 
(qtd. in UNIA-ACL 2015). 
 
The colours of the Pan African flag denote: red for the blood that unites all people of Black 
African ancestry and is shed for liberation, black for the people whose existence as a nation, 
though not a nation-state, is affirmed by the existence of the flag, and green for the abundant 
natural wealth of Africa (UNIA-ACL 2015).  
                                                 
104 The Pan-African Flag is also known as the UNIA Flag, the Marcus Garvey Flag, the Universal African Flag, 
the International African Flag, the Black Liberation Flag, the Black Nationalist, African Nationalist, or the New 
Afrikan Liberation Flag (UNIA-ACL 2015). 
105 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiMTYG4woUk (Roseborough 2011). 
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In Australia Fred Maynard became increasingly aware of international Black 
organisations and philosophies while working on the Sydney waterfront. In 1924, as Aboriginal 
political activism intensified, Maynard and fellow activist Tom Lacy founded the Australian 
Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA). Faith Bandler and Len Fox note, “[N]ow they 
began to fight in a new way, using the white man’s weapons of organisation, of protest, of 
pressure, of politics” (1983: 48). John Maynard states that many people consider the 1960s as 
marking the beginnings of Black political consciousness in Australia. However, he argues, the 
AAPA is, “rightfully recognised as the precursor of the Aboriginal political movement” (2007: 
2; see also Plater 1994). The AAPA ceased in 1928, but was re-established by 26 January 1938 
with Jack Patten as spokesperson. The AAPA formed a coalition with the Australian Aboriginal 
League (AAL), under William Cooper and the Aboriginal Progressive Association (APA), led 
by William Ferguson and Pearl Gibbs, to protest about the white sesquicentenary celebrations 
and organise a Day of Mourning which read in part, 
this being the 150th Anniversary of the whiteman’s seizure of our country [we] hereby 
make protest against the callous treatment of our people by the whiteman during the 
past 150 years, and we appeal to the Australian Nation of today to make new laws for 
the education and care of Aborigines, and we ask for a new policy which will raise our 
people to full Citizenship status and equality within the community (qtd. in Hocking 
2007: 189).106  
 
As the 1938 calls for equality and citizenship rights were officially ignored, Aboriginal people 
were being discursively marked as a “dying race” (Ziegler 1938: Chapter 1:1). Ziegler writes,  
[T]he present-day situation of this ancient race is forlorn indeed. According to the 
observations of an eminent authority, it is on the highroad to extinction and is gradually 
dying out from physical and psychological maladjustment to the changes brought about 
by contact with us (1938: Chapter 1:16). 
                                                 
106 In contrast to this the Minister-in-Charge of Celebrations, John Dunningham declared the 150th Anniversary to 
be a source of pride and achievement from which the “discoveries” of James Cook and, “the colonising genius of 




In 1938, the Australian nation was underpinned by harsh assimilatory policies and practices, 
yet momentum was gathering that would be felt in Aboriginal communities across the land, 
“[W]hat Bill Ferguson and Bill Cooper and their comrades had started was something that 
cannot be stopped” (Bandler and Fox 1983: 60).  
As the American Black Panther movement ascended in the 1960s both Malcolm X and 
Martin Luther King were assassinated. In Australia, Aboriginal activists made their call for 
“Black Power”. This was “a policy of self-assertion, of self-identity… which is trying to 
encourage black culture – the re-learning, the re-instating of black culture wherever it is 
possible” (Coe 1975: 105). Black Power, “is where our people come together united, fighting 
for survival” (Anderson 1975:19). Resistance to colonial rule during the 1960s was made 
public through various protests. Precursors to the Black Power movement of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s include the 1965 Freedom Ride and the 1966 Wave Hill walk-off. These events 
laid the foundations for the emergence of more strident forms of political activism.  
The Freedom Ride 
In New South Wales a civil rights protest led by Charles Perkins highlighted racial 
discrimination in the state’s western country towns. Perkins was born in the era of the 
‘protection’ and subjected to the assimilatory practices of colonial rule. He challenged these 
systems of power and through his responses became an influential voice of resistance, “[T]he 
more the whites criticized Aborigines, the more I was determined to learn, and so fight them 
and answer their irrational criticism” (Perkins 1975: 70). In 1966 he became the first 
Indigenous male to graduate from university. Perkins entered bureaucratic life in 1969 and 
worked for the Commonwealth Office of Aboriginal Affairs. In 1981 he became the first 
Indigenous person to head the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. He went on to chair of 
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Arremte Council of Central Australia and was elected deputy chair of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 1993.  
In 1965 Perkins led a group of Sydney University students on a political protest known 
as the Freedom Ride. The Freedom Riders demanded equality for Aboriginal people and they 
protested about the utility of public space by drawing attention to the systemic nature of racism 
in regional New South Wales. The Freedom Riders travelled to Walgett, a town where racial 
discrimination was endemic. For example, in 1964 two young Aboriginal boys, aged nine, were 
incarcerated in a prison cell for two days and nights as punishment for taking two table tennis 
bats, balls and some crayons from the Anglican Church. The Anglican minister showed no 
compassion and laid all blame with members of the Aboriginal community (Curthoys 2011). 
Others however were outraged, including several unions. The result was widespread publicity 
and a written report which,  
went far beyond the gaoling incident. It described the tin shanties, and reported first-
hand accounts of the brutality and sadism of one particular policeman … the delegation 
learnt of the exclusion from the RSL Club of returned Aboriginal Diggers (except 
sometimes on Anzac Day) and the sign ‘Aboriginals by invertation [sic] only’ at the 
Oasis Hotel-Motel (Curthoys 2011: 14).   
 
Interviews and surveys conducted by the Freedom Riders found that Aboriginal people could 
not purchase blocks of land, had to wait for the doctor to treat white patients before being seen, 
and were excluded from the clothes shop, the cinema, and the Oasis lounge and RSL. Ann 
Curthoys explains “wherever we went, the story of racial discrimination was the same” (2011: 
17). The activists protested outside the Walgett RSL for seven hours, the ensuing 
confrontations and debates had an indelible effect, not only on the township, but also upon 
many of the young people present, Michael Anderson for example, witnessed the student 
protest first-hand (see Perkins 1975: Chapter 8). The Freedom Riders went on to protest in 
Moree as Aboriginal people were not allowed to enter Council chambers or use the toilets. 
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Adults were refused entry into local swimming pool and Aboriginal children’s access was 
strictly regulated (Perkins 1975). The Freedom Riders’ demonstration against racism in the 
country towns of NSW was an effective strategy of resistance that attracted national and 
international media attention. The publicity “shocked and embarrassed white Australia, 
especially in the cities, and contributed to the overwhelming YES vote in the 1967 referendum” 
(Parbury 2005: 117 emphasis in the original). 
The Wave Hill Walk-Off 
On 23 August 1966 Vincent Lingiari, a stockman and traditional owner, led 200 
Gurindji stockmen, domestic workers and their families off the Wave Hill pastoral station. 
According to Nici Cumpston this was, “an unprecedented act of resistance and self-
determination”, a precursor which “marked the beginning of the national land rights 
movement” (2017: 46). The Gurindji protest was a land claim that demanded better pay, 
treatment, and working conditions from the owner of the pastoral station, an English aristocrat, 
Lord Vestey. The strike lasted nine years. Initially the workers camped in the bed of the 
Victoria River before moving on to their traditional lands at Daguragu or Wattie Creek in April 
1967. Minoru Hokari argues that the Gurindji walk-off was an act of decolonisation that sought 
to “physically leave European authority, to regain autonomy and sovereignty over their 
country, to establish their own community, and to run the cattle station by and for themselves” 
(2000: 113).   
In 1967 the Governor-General, another British aristocrat, Lord Casey, refused to grant 
a lease of 1300 square kilometres around Daguragu to the Gurindji. The Gurindji argued,  
[O]ur people have lived here from time immemorial and our culture, myths, dreaming 
and sacred places have evolved in this land. Many of our forefathers were killed in the 
early days while trying to retain it. Therefore we feel that morally the land is ours and 




In 1972 the Whitlam Labor government (1972-1975) came into power pledging to legislate for 
Aboriginal land rights. The original Wave Hill lease was relinquished and two new leases were 
issued, one to the Vesteys and one to the Gurindji. The Gurindji lease encompassed some 3300 
square kilometres (NMA 2014). On 16 August 1975 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam went to 
Daguragu and in a powerful and now renowned gesture, poured a handful of soil into Vincent 
Lingiari's hand 107 stating,  
Vincent Lingiari, I solemnly hand to you these deeds as proof in Australian law that 
these lands belong to the Gurindji people, and I put into your hands part of the earth as 




Figure 8: Prime Minister Gough Whitlam ‘returns’ traditional lands to Vincent Lingiari (Image: Bishop 1975). 
                                                 
107 Nigel Parbury claims that “[T]his symbolic action was in imitation of the gesture by the Dutigalla [one of many 





This occasion marked the first time that the Commonwealth Government had recognised 
Aboriginal Law or ceded land to the sovereign owners.  
Concerted campaigns of protest and public awareness driven by Aboriginal activists 
during the 1960s highlighted the need for change at every level of Australian society. On 27 
May 1967 the Australian people were asked to accept a referendum, “to repeal the 
discriminatory provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution by counting Aboriginal people 
in the census and allowing the Commonwealth to pass laws for Aboriginal people” (Parbury 
1999: 121). The referendum was supported by ninety-one per cent of the population and the 
two discriminatory clauses which had adversely affected Aboriginal people since 1901 were 
removed. Gordon Briscoe expected the referendum,  
would wipe away the injustices of the past 200 years of coercion, suppression and 
humiliation and establish a way of life for Aborigines that would bring the peace we 
are entitled to as human beings (2014a: 172). 
 
Despite the positive result of the referendum little change occurred. Behrendt claims that this 
was due to the systemic failure of official structures and institutions to implement change or 
any form of equality which would ease the harmful impacts of colonial policies and practice. 
Behrendt also observes that the refusal to implement structural change is fortified by those 
“who embrace the Australian identity only in its colonial manifestation” (2003: 4). The 
rejection of an ‘exclusive’ colonial-Australian-identity by Indigenous people is an enduring 
assertion of resistance which has been etched into the landscape since first contact. Tanya 
Hosch states “[T]hese fearless leaders and dear friends … remind us we are all part of a 




Symbols of Identity and Resistance  
Since first contact, each stage of opposition and political agitation came with demands 
for change, recognition and social equity which bolstered and propelled the next, culminating 
in two of the most significant Aboriginal symbols of identity and resistance. The first, discussed 
in detail below, was the Aboriginal flag created in 1971whose colours of black, yellow and red 
have since become central to Aboriginal identity.108 To show or wear the Aboriginal colours is 
a performative act of resistance which is daily replicated through “the public display of the 
Aboriginal flag and colours on Indigenous bodies and on buildings in cities, country towns and 
remote communities” (Moreton-Robinson 2008b: 127). Flying the flag or wearing its colours 
is an effective way of conveying solidarity, belonging, and pride. Jim Everett writes, 
Red, black and yellow are the colours of our band, 
Black is for the people of this Southern land. 
Yellow is for the mighty sun life giver in the sky, 
And red is for our people’s blood so onward we survive  
(1988: 105). 
 
The second symbol to assert Aboriginal sovereignty, land rights, culture and identity was the 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy which was founded in 1972,  
[W]ith its flags fluttering proudly in the breeze, the Aboriginal Embassy on the lawns 
opposite the Federal Parliament has been one of the most successful press and 
parliamentary lobbies in Australian political history (Newfong 2014: 139). 
 
  
                                                 
108 Archie Moore argues, “[T]he current Aboriginal Flag is a pan-Aboriginal flag. Aboriginal people may not feel 
represented by this flag – given that it is a united Aboriginal nations flag” (2015: 122). This is a valid point but 
the intention here is far from seeking to homogenise. My critique involves an exploration into the history of the 
Aboriginal flag and its applications as a symbol of resistance, pride and identity.  
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The Aboriginal Tent Embassy 
The Aboriginal Embassy began life as a beach umbrella, and has since become the 
longest running protest site in Australia (Gilbert 2000). The Aboriginal Embassy was 
established on the lawns opposite Parliament House, Canberra in 1972 in response to William 
McMahon’s Prime Ministerial Australia Day address. McMahon stated that his Coalition 
government would neither give, nor recognise land rights for Aboriginal people. He argued 
that land rights would “threaten the security of tenure of every Australian” (qtd. in Parbury 
2005: 119). McMahon’s comments spoke to the anxiety of the wider population and implied 
that white Australians might lose ‘their’ land to Aboriginal people. The historical and ongoing 
theft and control of Indigenous lands underpins the affluence of white Australia. Land is the 
fundamental source of inherited wealth from which white Australians have reaped the benefits. 
In a direct protest to McMahon’s address, a group of young Black Power activists109 
left Sydney on 25 January 1972. They drove through the night and arrived in Canberra in the 
early morning where they planted a beach umbrella on the lawns facing Parliament House. 
Kathy Lothian argues that “the rejection of ‘whiteness’ as ‘rightness’ was the foundational 
politics for many Black Power activists” (2007: 23). In an explicit rejection of McMahon’s 
stance the activists put up a sign which identified the area as the “Aboriginal Embassy”. Scott 
Robinson (1994) states that the Embassy was a multi-faceted display of symbolism. Canberra 
is home to many embassies that exude wealth, privilege and diplomatic immunity. In contrast, 
the Aboriginal Embassy signified the status of Aboriginal people as sovereign owners of the 
land to whom wealth and legal recognition is denied, “[T]o some it represented traditional 
Aboriginal life and to others the degraded town and station camps, and it directly expressed 
                                                 
109 Michael Anderson, Billie Craigie, Bert Williams and Tony Coorey. 
190 
 
solidarity with the Gurindji people camped at Wattie Creek”110 (Garner 2013: 250). The beach 
umbrella Embassy soon transformed into a community of tents and was a site which also served 
to reunite Aboriginal people. Colonial rule ensured the movements and daily practices of 
Aboriginal people had been strictly regulated, “[U]nder the old pass-laws we didn’t have 
opportunities to be visiting people in other reserves and other states. We really didn’t know 
each other” (Sykes 1989: 94). The Aboriginal Tent Embassy became a physical site of 
reconnection and unity, where political activism was expressed and enacted, “the camp 
provided a unifying focus. A camp with a flag … was a challenge to white sovereignty” (Garner 
2013: 248). 
 
Figure 9: The Aboriginal Tent Embassy flying the Pan-African colours and the Tjuringa flag (Image: Foley n.d). 
                                                 
110 And vice versa. On 22 February 1972, two representatives of the Gurindji, who had been campaigning for land 
rights for six years, were invited to speak at a rally held at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy (Foley 2014b: 36).  
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Initially two flags were raised at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy,  
[T]he first flag that flew on the tents was a black, green and red pennant which was the 
flag developed fifty years earlier by Marcus Garvey as the symbol of his international 
black consciousness movement (Foley 2014b: 30).  
 
This flag was hand stitched by Michael Anderson.111 In a show of international unity Anderson 
replicated the colours of the Pan-African flag. The colours were inverted as “Anderson had 
never seen the actual flag but was only remembering what … had [been] described to him” 
(Maynard 2014b: 94). The first flag flown at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy was a strategic 
signal that explicitly connected the Aboriginal struggle for justice to the broader international 
civil rights movement. In April a second flag, known as the Tjuringa flag joined the first, 
“comprising a spear laid across a red [ochre] and black background with four crescents looking 
inward to symbolize the black rights struggle from the four corners of Australia” (Foley 2014b: 
30). 
Several months of peaceful protest passed as support for the Embassy grew both 
throughout Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. In July 1972, the situation changed 
for two reasons. First, it was sometime during this month that the Aboriginal flag made its 
arrival at the Embassy.  
                                                 





Figure 10: The Black Power salute and the Aboriginal flag [inverted] at the Aboriginal Embassy (goori2 2011). 
 
Second, on 20 July, following the introduction of the Trespass on Commonwealth Lands 
Ordinance (1972) 150 police entered the camp and tore down the Embassy tents. Violent 
clashes ensued and eight protestors were arrested. On 23 July, 200 activists tried to re-establish 
the Embassy. They were confronted by 360 police in what Foley describes as “one of the most 
violent confrontations in the history of Canberra” (qtd. in Robinson 1994: 58). Finally, on 30 
July, as busloads of supporters from across the continent arrived, the Tent Embassy was re-
assembled. 2000 people marched to Parliament House and in a remarkable show of resistance 
and solidarity the peaceful protestors handed a note to police giving them permission to 
dismantle the tent (Robinson 1994; Dow 2000). This was a strategic strike at colonial authority. 
By granting permission for the tent’s removal, Aboriginal people reclaimed authority over a 
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site that had been, according to the newly instituted ordinance, illegally occupied. Sykes recalls 
this event,  
[W]e stood back and watched while they removed the pegs and uprights, rolled the 
canvas up and walked away. Quite a few of us were still there, and we whipped out 
another sheet of canvas and held it aloft with our hands. The tent, we felt, was not what 
was important, it was the symbolism of what it represented. A piece of ragged canvas 
held high by many hands still has the power to evoke that symbol of our destitution and 
living conditions, even today (1998: 192). 
 
The presence of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy had been a constant source of 
embarrassment for the McMahon government and even though authorities had physically 
removed it, the spirit of resistance that the Embassy produced endured (Gilbert 2014). On its 
twentieth anniversary, 26 January 1992, the Aboriginal Tent Embassy was permanently re-
established on the lawns opposite the now ‘old’ Parliament House. In 1995, the site was 
registered by the Australian Heritage Commission (Dow 2000). Briscoe claims the Aboriginal 
Tent Embassy became the “human face” of Aboriginal political consciousness which 
“transformed any previous symbol into a national one that a series of flags personified. In my 
view”, Briscoe asserts, “the flag was an emergent property that presented the lasting elements 




The Aboriginal Flag 
 
Figure 11: The Aboriginal Flag (Flags Australia 2016). 
 
In 1971, Harold Thomas, a Luritja man from central Australia created the Aboriginal 
flag. The flag is sometimes referred to as the Thomas flag, the Adelaide flag, (as it was designed 
and first presented in Adelaide), or the Third flag, as it was the third flag to be flown at the 
Embassy (Burton 2007). I can identify three events from 1970, which, when combined, resulted 
in the production of the Aboriginal flag. In 1970 Thomas wrote to the then Prime Minister, 
John Gorton, and enquired why no Aboriginal people were employed at the South Australian 
Art Gallery or Museum. Shortly afterwards Thomas was offered a job as a survey artist at the 
Museum. In 1970, Thomas also met with Gary Foley and together they discussed how to 
“encourage their fellow Aboriginals to ‘join the cause’” (Thomas qtd. in ATSIC 1991: 8). 
Furthermore, in 1970 at a Land Rights protest march in Adelaide, Thomas made a significant 
discovery. He noted that, “white sympathisers at the back marched with their assorted flags 
and banners while there was none of equal impact – indeed, none at all – to lead the Aboriginal 
people in front” (Burton 2007: 39). Thomas asserts that “twenty people with a flag could seem 
to outnumber a larger group of people without a flag” (qtd. in Kelly 2009: 37). Thomas and 
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Foley decided that a flag would effectively express Aboriginal people’s demands for land rights 
(ATSIC 1991).  
Thomas worked to reduce several colours on the original design to just three: “black, 
symbolising Aboriginal people; red, the mother earth, as well as ochre, which is used in 
ceremonies; and the yellow sun, the constant giver and renewer of life” (ATSIC 1991: 8). In 
order to represent Aboriginal people the colour black had to be used because, Thomas states, 
“we were talking in terms of … black consciousness, black awareness, black power, be proud 
of your blackness” (Harold Joseph Thomas v David George Brown & James Morrison Vallely 
Tennant 1997: 8; see also Kwan 2006). In this post-referendum era, as a result of assimilatory 
practices many people did not freely identify as Aboriginal. Thomas argued that a flag would 
help unite Aboriginal people and provide as a symbol for cultural identity. Thomas stresses 
that black was always intended to be on top of his flag, “the blacks under the red ground would 
have symbolised their death. The black was on top to react against the common view, it had 
shock value, it creates a tension” (Thomas qtd. in Kelly 2009: 44). Thomas regarded red and 
black as colours of aggression that contrasted with the blue of the Australian flag. Thomas 
created his flag to provide a unifying national symbol of identity for Aboriginal people (ATSIC 
1991). The Aboriginal flag and its colours evolved to become a multi-faceted symbol of 
political resistance, of survival, pride and the affirmation of cultural identity, “[T]he flag was 
not a racist flag for Aborigines, but a flag for the Aboriginal people of Australia” (Thomas qtd. 
in Kelly 2009: 37).   
The Aboriginal flag was first flown at Victoria Square, Adelaide on National Aboriginal 
Day 12 July 1971. A year later, Foley introduced the flag to the Tent Embassy in Canberra 
where it was adopted on a national scale. The fate of the original Aboriginal flag remains 
unknown. Described as, “one of our most powerful national symbols, the whereabouts of the 
original – a national treasure if it still exists – remains a mystery” (Williams 2013). Thomas 
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seeks to locate it and see it housed in the National Museum of Australia. During my research, 
I came across a black and white photograph of an Aboriginal flag.  
 
Figure 12: This photograph in The Advertiser, 14 July 1972, shows a square Aboriginal flag with a large central 
disk and Colin MacDonald (Image: Gale and Brookman 1975: 112). 
 
 
Figure 13: Photograph detail. 
 
From the above photograph it is evident that this Aboriginal flag differs considerably from its 
present version. Square in shape, it contrasts with European rectangular-shaped flags, which 
became dominant as a result of colonialism (Neumann 2007; Knowlton 2017). The upper third 
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of the flag is dark and the lower two thirds lighter. This is different to the flag of today which 
is divided horizontally in two equal halves. The flag in the photograph carries a large central 
disk. I note that on the tree there is an “ABORIGINAL EMBASSY” poster with an image of a 
flag that appears also to feature similar proportions to that of the material flag. Shortly after 
viewing the photograph I read an article by Tony Burton (2007) in the Journal of Flags 
Australia, Crux Australis, titled: ‘Tjuringa Dreaming: Revolutionary Flags of the Australian 
Aboriginals-Heralds of Change 1971-1997’. One section of the article is called: ‘An Adelaide 
Mystery’.  
Burton states that a piece of the Thomas flag had been deposited at the Museum of 
South Australia in 1991. Prior to his visit to the museum to investigate the offcut in 1995, 
Burton notes, vexillologists had presumed that the original Adelaide flag looked as it does 
today: a flag equally divided into black and red halves with a central yellow disk. Burton claims 
that the offcut, photographed below, is indicative of how the original flag actually looked. 
 




When I compared the 1972 black and white photograph of the ‘square’ Aboriginal flag with 
the photographs of the circular black and red offcut in Crux Australis I noted a striking 
similarity. I forwarded a copy of the photograph to Burton (FSA) and he agreed that “the pattern 
of the flag in North Adelaide seems to match the offcuts in the SA Museum” (2012 pers. 
comm., 17 September). Burton furthered the investigation and contacted Thomas, who 
identified the man in the photograph as Colin MacDonald and “confirmed that the flag near the 
tents with its large disk was a second generation (that is, a copy) of the original that had been 
displayed in Victoria Square the year before” (2012 pers. comm., 17 September). Burton then 
provided a number of hypotheses relating to the offcut in South Australia’s Museum. 
1. The Museum offcuts are from one of the replicas, not the original; 
2. They are from the original which itself had the anomaly of unequal 
segments of the circle; 
3. That this was the original design and that replicas copied this anomaly 
exactly (2012 pers. comm., 17 September emphasis in the original). 
In January 2017 I met with Kristin Phillips, Principal Conservator of Textiles, Artlab Australia, 
working for the South Australian Museum and I viewed the offcut. Phillips, who worked on 
the Eureka flag restoration project, was interested in the 1972 photograph which she stated 
gave her an idea as to why the proportions of the museum offcut were asymmetric. Phillips 
noted a correlation between the photograph and the museum’s offcut and she commented that 
the Tjuringa flag is also square, suggesting that perhaps its shape might have been influenced 
by the shape of the square Aboriginal flag. (2017 pers. comm., 15 June). 
Coral Dow’s chronology of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, formatted under three headings: 




 Milestones: 13 July 
 Details: An embassy established in Adelaide (following a consulate in Perth). The 
Adelaide embassy flew the red, black and yellow Aboriginal flag designed by Harold 
Thomas and first flown in Adelaide in 1971 
 Source Documents: Adelaide Advertiser, 14 July 1972 (Dow 2000: 9).  
Finally I note that mention was also made of this flag during a 1997 court case which was 
triggered by the Aboriginal flag’s gazettal (see below). In 1995 the Aboriginal flag was 
assimilated into Australia’s flag hierarchy through its gazettal, and it became an official flag of 
the Australian nation. Following the proclamation Thomas sought to assert his ownership of 
copyright as the flag’s designer. He was angry with the Commonwealth which, among other 
things, he claimed sought to reproduce the flag without his permission in the 1995 
Commonwealth of Australia book, Australian Flags (Thomas v Brown 1997: 3). During the 
court hearing Justice Sheppard examined the offcut held by the South Australian Museum. He 
noted “that the circle was divided between the black and the red sections of the material 
unevenly. There was more red material than black material” (qtd. in Thomas v Brown 1997: 6). 
Sheppard also drew attention to a photograph taken at a protest rally in March 1972, 
I looked at the photograph said to be of the group taken after the Brutality March in 
which Mr [Colin] MacDonald is holding the flag, I observed that the flag he was 
holding seemed to have more material that was red than material which was black (qtd. 
in Thomas v Brown 1997: 45).  
 
Sheppard noted the similarities between the offcut and March 1972 photograph but did not 





1. It be declared that:  
(a) Harold Joseph Thomas is the author of the artistic work being the design for the flag 
described in Schedule 1 to the proclamation dated 27 June 1995 under s.5 of the Flags 
Act 1953 and published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S259 of 14 July 
1995, such flag being known as “the Aboriginal flag” (“the artistic work”); and  
(b) Harold Joseph Thomas is the owner of the copyright subsisting in the said artistic 
work (Thomas v Brown 1997: 2).  
The Aboriginal flag remains protected under the Copyright Act 1968 and can only be 
reproduced with Thomas’ permission. The Adelaide “mystery” is not solved. Perhaps filmed 
or photographic evidence in private collections may be in existence, which, if found, could 
substantially enrich our understandings of the Aboriginal flag during the early stages of its life. 
Further research indicates that the original flag was indeed different to the present flag, 
in both shape and proportion. Thomas states that his original flag was “squared up” and that 
“present day flags were too long” (qtd. in Burton 2007: 45; see also Thomas v Brown 1997: 8). 
The exclusive manufacturers of the Aboriginal flag, Carroll and Richardson, were unable to 
produce the flag in its original, shorter proportions and convinced Thomas that his flag would 
look out of place if its specifications differed from those of the national flag (Kelly 2009). 
Thomas and vexillologist Ralph Kelly agree that the original proportions of the Aboriginal flag, 
“were more balanced and stronger than the current stretched proportions and the central disk 
was better in its original larger size” (Kelly 2009: 40). Following this, it could be argued that 
through its standardisation, the Aboriginal flag has been successfully regulated in that it now 
defers to colonial specifications. Furthermore through its gazettal, the Aboriginal flag has also 
been forced into compliance, yet in this instance colonial authority was imposed without 
Thomas’ consent.  
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On 14 July 1995 both the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags were gazetted by 
the Federal Government as official flags of Australia. Thomas was critical of this. His flag was 
meant to serve his people and was not intended to be, as he put it, “a flag of significance to the 
Australian nation generally … [and] was not a reflection of white people’s flags” (Thomas qtd. 
in Kelly 2009: 37). Thomas’s complaint was compounded by a lack of governmental 
consultation,  
[T]he Gazettal had no respect for the designer. It didn’t appreciate the integrity of the 
flag. The Government didn’t understand the facts of the flag and its symbolism. The 
Government wanted a symbol to show acceptance. It dismissed the struggle of the 
people for whom the flag is still important (Thomas qtd. in Kelly 2009: 38). 
 
Thomas argued that the representational force of his flag would be diffused if it became an 
Australian flag (Kwan 2006). Not only was the symbolism of Thomas’ flag under siege but so 
too was its status. According to the Flags Act 1953 proclaimed flags are subservient to the pre-
eminence of the Australian flag.  
Opposition Leader, John Howard, was opposed to giving the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander flags official recognition. He claimed the move “would rightly be seen by many 
in the community not as an act of reconciliation but as a divisive gesture” and he feared it 
would “diminish the status of the Australian flag” (qtd. in Kwan 2006: 134). Clark argues that 
Howard’s vision for the nation, “rests on a construction of unified national identity premised 
on division” (2006: 55). The status of the “unified” nation’s flag was being compromised and 
the Opposition was anxious “that the red, black and yellow Aboriginal flag could be flown in 
place of the Australian flag at official events” (Cole-Adams 1995). Labor Prime Minister at 
that time, Paul Keating, argued that the official inclusion of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander flags was an “inclusive act” which meant, “[I]t will no longer be a breach of protocol 
for a young athlete like Cathy Freeman [see below] to carry the Aboriginal flag with pride” 
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(qtd. in Cole-Adams 1995). Through the premise of “inclusion”, or what Administrative 
Services Minister, Frank Walker calls “a gesture of reconciliation to Australia’s indigenous 
peoples” (Cole-Adams 1995), the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags were proclaimed 
as official flags of Australia. The formal recognition of the Aboriginal flag was granted by the 
Queen’s representative, Governor General, William Hayden. The Flags Act 1953 Proclamation 
states that the flag is, “recognised as the flag of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia and a flag 
of significance to the Australian nation generally” and is, “to be known as the Australian 
Aboriginal flag” (Commonwealth of Australia 1995: 152). Thomas “bitterly resented the flag 
being proclaimed in this way … the proclamation represented a usurpation of something which 
properly belonged to the Aboriginal people” (Sheppard qtd. in Thomas v Brown 1997: 11). 
Despite the flag’s forced assimilation into the Australian nation, the Aboriginal flag spans time 
and distance and endures as a strident symbol of identity, pride and resistance. The following 
section explores some of the ways the Aboriginal flag has been employed to reinforce and 
reinstate Aboriginal identity. 
Flagging Pride and Resistance  
1988  
On 26 January 1988, white Australia marked 200 years of ‘settlement’ and was in the 
grip of a national celebration (Norst 1999). Andrew Lattas notes that national celebrations are 
contrived by the state in order to produce nationalism which he defines as “one of the major 
currencies the state trades upon for its existence” (1997: 223). In New South Wales alone more 
than 32,000 Bicentennial events were planned (Jarman 1987). The Australian Bicentennial 
Authority (ABA), formed by the federal government in 1980, and headed by the serving Prime 
Minister of the day, was tasked to prepare a programme for the year-long 1988 celebration. 
The ABA’s objectives were: 
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 To strengthen national pride.  
 Involve all Australians.  
 Provide useful and lasting souvenirs for future generations.  
 Offer educational and cultural programmes into Australia’s past, present and 
future.   
 To have international involvement (White 2004: 31).  
The original theme chosen by the ABA for the Bicentennial was ‘Living Together’ (Parbury 
2005). The Bicentennial logo was designed by Don Goodwin in 1981. He originally used the 
Commonwealth colours of blue and golden yellow, however in 1984, the colours were altered 
to green and deep yellow to reflect the formal adoption of Australia’s national colours (Bartlett 
2010).  
 
Figure 15: The Australian Bicentennial Logo (Flags Australia 2014). 
 
The “Australian Bicentennial symbol is a ribbon broadly representing the Australian land-
mass, and the differing stripes, harmoniously combined, visually express the Bicentennial 
theme of ‘Living Together’” (Jarman 1987:12), although according to Flags Australia, 
[T]he logo for the Bicentennial celebrations was a stylised map of Australia, consisting 
of a ribbon with stripes of different widths. The ribbon alluded to the diagonal stripes 




Lattas states that the production of symbolic capital such as flags allows the state to 
profit “from its investment in the creation and circulation of a culture of nationalism” (1997: 
223). ABA Chair, John Armstrong questioned the “Living Together” theme noting the 
structural inequality of Australian society and the Bicentennial theme was subsequently 
changed to: ‘Celebration of a Nation’ (Parbury 2005). Two hundred years of white Australia 
was heralded as a year-long national celebration in the minds of its citizenry. The politics of 
cultural investment work hard to connect the people to their mythologised version of history. 
Through this investment “the fiction of a national identity and the mythic space of the nation” 
is created and so “the state renews and establishes its authority as sovereign” (Lattas 1997: 
223-224). The Bicentennial project was an intense campaign in which the story of white 
Australia was authenticated through ephemera and events underpinned by the narrative of a 
‘national celebration’. This narrative was represented by a logo into which the Union Jack, as 
ever-present overseer, was surreptitiously woven.  
Kevin Gilbert & Eleanor Williams state that 1987 was designated as a “Year of 
Mourning” for Aboriginal people (1996: 59). Resistance to the official Bicentennial 
celebrations commenced with a demonstration at the War Memorial, Canberra. It was here that 
the Aboriginal flag, also known as the land rights flag, was laid, as if draping a coffin at the 
base of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier which displays the sacrosanct words: “Lest We 
Forget” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 59 and 82). In Chapter Four I argued that the Australian 
War Memorial has been eulogised as ‘the soul of the nation’ and I drew attention to the fact 
that it is a space where Aboriginal people have long been kept on the periphery. The act of 
draping the Aboriginal land rights flag at the base of the Unknown Soldier could be interpreted 
as a symbolic gesture of mourning that marks the Unknown Solider as Aboriginal and also 
draws attention to the battles fought on Aboriginal land during two hundred years of 
dispossession, and to the on-going reality of exclusion. Smith notes that for military funerals 
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the national flag becomes a ‘pall’ flag used to drape the casket (1975). In Australia the national 
flag “may be used to cover the coffin of any deceased Australian citizen … The canton should 
be draped over the ‘left shoulder’ of the coffin, representing the heart” (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2010: 21). Even in death the body remains symbolically ‘British’ at heart. Draping 
the Unknown Soldier with the Aboriginal flag can also be understood as a powerful act of 
symbolic inversion that challenges the dominance of colonial discourse with a public 
declaration of Aboriginal sovereignty. 
Australian writer Patrick White was disenchanted with the 1988 celebrations. He 
articulated his disdain by the flying both the Aboriginal and Eureka112 flags (Norst1999). These 
flags are potent, grass-roots symbols of resistance, as a result, they have gained popularity in 
their own right, “… they were people’s flags. In Australia this has been rare. Flags represent 
official power” (Kennedy 1998: 20). Kennedy draws attention to the way in which the 
Australian national flag, and its associates, state flags for example, have been authorised and 
manipulated as symbols of colonial authority.  
Burnum Burnum 
In a personal statement of resistance to the Bicentenary, Tommy McCrae’s great 
grandson, Burnum Burnum made a famous anti-colonial declaration. On 26 January 1988, he 
planted the Aboriginal flag at Dover and took possession of England. Burnum Burnum was 
proud to discover who his great-grandfather was “…for Tommy McRae was respected as a 
notable Aboriginal artist in his own day and is valued even more today” (Norst 1999: 68). Like 
                                                 
112 The Eureka flag, is also known as the flag of the Southern Cross. It was first flown over the Ballarat Eureka 
goldfield on 29 November 1854. In response to increasing angst against the government and the exorbitant costs 
associated with the monthly gold licence fee the diggers gathered around a pole some 24 metres tall from which 
the giant, four by two and a half metres Eureka flag flew and the diggers swore their allegiance to a flag that was 
not British. “We swear by the Southern Cross to stand truly by each other and fight to defend our rights and 
liberties” (Kieza 2014: 136). The Eureka flag has a dark blue field and a white symmetric cross in the centre which 
features five white, eight-pointed stars. Today the Eureka flag has been endorsed and appropriated to suit an array 
of purposes. For some the Eureka flag is an icon which speaks of unity and popular struggle; for others it is a 
symbol of right-wing patriotism and division.         
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his predecessor Burnum Burnum wanted to send a message about the colonial history of 
Australia. His protest was “[A] bit of theatre-of-the-absurd to show the absurdity of people on 
the other side of the world claiming a whole continent for themselves” (Norst 1999: 131-132). 
Burnum Burnum’s was “the Bicentennial event that was to crown them all” (Norst 1999: 130).  
 
 
Figure 16: On 26 January 1988 Burnum Burnum used the Aboriginal flag to take possession of England (Image: 
Kulture Consulting n.d). 
 
Burnum Burnum chose the white cliffs of Dover to make his land claim because it evoked in 
him a sense of terra nullius; the landscape here presented as ‘empty land’ and lay waiting to 
be claimed. This was a moment captured in time, as noted by Norst “[T]he image of the 
Aboriginal hero laying claim to English soil with the Aboriginal flag held proudly aloft 
expressed ‘more than a thousand words’” (1999: 135). Burnum Burnum ‘invaded’ and took 
‘possession’ of England with the Aboriginal flag. His was a “symbolic gesture of defiance 
[which] played against the pomp and ceremony of the bicentennial celebrations” (Farnsworth 
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1997). Burnum Burnum’s claim conveyed Aboriginal peoples’ convictions regarding the 
unlawful occupation of their land. His “‘invasion’ was a publicity triumph. He appeared on 
television all over the world” (Norst 1999: 132). As Burnum Burnum laid claim to England he 
delivered an address (see Appendix E). Burnum Burnum’s Declaration and use of the 
Aboriginal flag questioned the legitimacy of Australia’s claims. Burnum Burnum conveyed to 
“white Australians and British people the realisation that this occupied land, Australia, was 
claimed arbitrarily by an alien people without any consultation, let alone treaty or 
compensation” (Coulter qtd. in Norst 1999: 136). Burnum Burnum’s was a strategic message 
of resistance to the world. I now turn to some notable athletes who have also employed their 
flags to send a powerful message of resistance.  
Flags of Culture and Identity 
Cathy Freeman  
Cathy Freeman is an athlete of international renown. She was born in 1973 and became 
an Olympian sprinter. Freeman is described by Leanne White as “an iconic sporting and 
cultural ambassador for her country, [who] has helped influence the way Australians and the 
rest of the world think about this country and its people” (2008:1). Freeman was shaped by 
assimilationist policies which deeply affected her family and community. She states that “[A]ll 
this pain inspires me. I want to be a freedom fighter. I want to break down the stereotype of 
Aboriginal people as alcoholics and criminals” (Freeman 2003: 79). At the 1994 
Commonwealth Games in Canada, Freeman aged 21, won her first gold medal. She ran a 
victory lap draped in the Aboriginal flag, an image which was broadcast worldwide. Freeman 
notes she  
took the flag and draped it over my shoulders like a cape and trotted off. I wanted to 
shout, ‘Look at me, look at my skin. I’m black and I’m the best!’ There was no more 




This was an act of agency and pride that resonated globally. Arthur Tunstall, Australian 
Commonwealth Games chef de mission113 criticised Freeman’s use of the Aboriginal flag. He 
stated the management “did not want any athlete acknowledging flags other than the Australian 
flag” (McGregor 2000: 169). In 2012, Tunstall re-stated his case, “[W]e compete under one 
flag, the Australian flag … They were the rules … I didn’t even know what the Aboriginal flag 
bloody looked like!” (qtd. in Sygall 2012: 2). In 1994 the Aboriginal flag was 23 years old.  
Freeman’s decision to carry the Aboriginal flag generated 5000 letters and faxes of 
support. A 94 year old Aboriginal woman stated,  
I’ve seen all these things happen with stolen children, being moved from our homes, 
seen cruelty and sadness and when I saw you run around with that flag, for the first time 
in my life I felt it was worth it all to be an Aborigine (qtd. in Freeman 2003: 87).   
 
Thomas credits Freeman with altering the Aboriginal flag’s capacity for meaning-making, 
“until Freeman’s triumphant laps in Canada, the flag had rarely been seen as a symbol of 
victory. Freeman changed its image forever” (Thomas qtd. in Stephens 1994: 1). Six years 
later, at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, Freeman won Australia’s 100th Olympic gold medal 
which was the first individual gold medal won by an Indigenous athlete (White 2008). In a 
similar symbolic gesture that would again generate significant local and global support 
Freeman ran her victory lap sporting both the Aboriginal and Australian flags. 
                                                 




Figure 17: The Aboriginal and Australian flags being carried by Cathy Freeman at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Image: 
SBS 2015). 
 
It was always a dream of mine to not only win an Olympic gold medal but to do the 
victory lap with both flags ... I hold the Aboriginal community in such a high place in 
my heart so I’m very proud of my Indigenous roots (Freeman qtd. in Marlow 2015). 
 
Damien Hooper  
Damien Hooper is a professional boxer who competed at the London 2012 Olympic 
Games. Prior to his first match, Hooper sparked contention by wearing a T-Shirt which had the 




Figure 18: Damien Hooper wearing an Aboriginal flag t-shirt at the London 2012 Olympic Games (Image: Barrett 2012). 
 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) Rule 50 forbids the use of any paraphernalia which 
may detract from the sporting focus of the Games. The Olympic charter also states athletes 
who breach IOC Rule 50 should face disqualification. Following the charter, Hooper had 
breached IOC rules and he was duly reprimanded. Australia’s chef de mission, Nick Green, 
stated that Hooper was “very remorseful” and “extremely apologetic”, Green asserts Hooper 
has “learnt his lesson and he won’t do that again” (Lane & Barrett 2012: 4). The infantilising 
of Hooper as a ‘naughty child’ who has “learnt his lesson” is a well-worn colonial strategy used 
to bring into line recalcitrant ‘others’. Hooper, clearly aware of the discursivities of national 
sporting bodies, responds to the admonition by stating,  
I am an Aboriginal, representing my culture and all my people, and I am very proud ... 
I was thinking about my family and all that. It made my whole performance better (qtd. 




In his response, Hooper undermines Green’s affirmations of his penitence for wrong doing by 
foregrounding his people as the primary focus of his performance. There are no quotes of 
remorse from Hooper himself. Hooper remained,  
unfazed about a possible sanction from the IOC or the Australian Olympic Committee 
(AOC). “I’m not saying that I don’t care,” Hooper said “I’m just saying that I’m very 
proud of what I did” (qtd. in Barrett 2012)  
 
Following Hooper’s treatment by the IOC debate was reignited which saw Indigenous leaders 
from across the nation demand a new Australian flag. Gracelyn Smallwood asks, 
when will all this madness end of the white man’s fear of Aboriginal elite athletes 
wearing the colours with pride? … After 224 years of oppressing our people the white 
man still wants to control what we can and cannot be proud of … We’ve got news for 
the government and that is Aboriginal Australians, including our elite athletes, will 
never disrespect our culture and the flag that we identify with no matter the occasion 
(qtd. in Hagan 2102: 1).  
 
Hooper questions both the validity and appropriateness of the Union Jack, “[W]e are two 
cultures living in one nation … we’re not Pommies,114 why should our flag be another flag?” 
(qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 22). Activist Phil Cleary called on the AOC to lobby for the Aboriginal 
flag to be recognised at the Olympics, “out of respect and because [in contrast to the Australian 
flag] it is not a symbol of conquest” (qtd. in Lane & Barrett 2012: 4). While recognition for the 
Aboriginal flag remains an aspirational goal, changes in May 2015 to the AOC’s constitution 
have been warmly received by many Indigenous Olympic athletes. The amended constitution 
now reads: “To recognise the heritage, culture and contribution of our nation’s first people, and 
to give practical support to indigenous reconciliation through sport” (AOC 2016). While the 
amendment to the AOC’s constitution is a positive step forward, the Australian flag remains 
the only one permitted to be flown at the Olympic Games. As the AOC notes, “International 
                                                 
114 A British immigrant / national.  
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Olympic Committee mandate[s] that the only flag that can be flown is the flag of the territory 
(in our case, Australia). Only one flag is approved per country” (2016: pers. Comm., 16 Nov). 
Following this discussion two things are evident. First, for some Aboriginal people the 
Australian national flag remains a colonial symbol of sovereignty which defies any imaginings 
of ‘unity’. The national flag’s representational capability is thus ‘deficient’ and warrants 
supplementation with the Aboriginal flag, as Freeman and Hooper both demonstrate. Second, 
official reactions to the public display of the Aboriginal flag are, in some cases, as Smallwood 
attests, indicative of a perceived threat; of “the white man’s fear”. Geoff Hocking states, “the 
flag, as a symbol, has always been recognized as one of the most important tools for bringing 
together peoples of like minds, or peoples of common experience” (2002: 44). Understanding 
the flag in these terms we can see how the current Australian national flag has the capacity to 
fail those whose collective experience stands in sharp contrast to the “common experience” of 
white Australians.   
Patty Mills 
Patrick “Patty” Mills is an elite basketball player. His father is from Thursday Island in 
the Torres Strait and his mother is a member of the Stolen Generations. Mills competed at the 
2012 London Olympic Games where he and his teammates held a ‘semi-serious’ “flag raising, 
with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island flags ceremoniously unpacked and then draped 




Figure 19: Patrick Mills with the Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal flags (Image: Mills 2017). 
 
As noted the IOC is stringent with its rules, including the use of political statements and non-
approved flags. In this instance Green resolved the issues which emerged from the display of 
the unauthorised flags and they stayed up.  
Mills states, “I have an Indigenous background and feel there’s a part of me that has to 
represent and show where I’m from, and part of the culture, just like everyone else on the team” 
(qtd. in Wright 2013: 32). From this comment Mills infers that while white Australians are 
represented by the cultural symbolism of the Australian national flag, his Indigenous heritage 
is overlooked. This assertion of a different mode of meaning-making from flags centralises the 
notion that signification is culturally understood. Guenter explains, “[F]lags are visual symbols, 
with both aesthetic and emotional draws based on the cultural stance of the person viewing 
them” (2016: 3). Through Mills’ Indigenous lens the Australian flag is seen and understood as 
an exclusive symbol of cultural identity. I now draw attention the Torres Strait Islands and their 
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flag, which Mills acknowledges has deep significance, “[M]y heritage and my culture and 
where I’m from mean the most to me, more than anything” (Mills qtd. in Witz 2014).  
Torres Strait Islands, Mabo and the Torres Strait Islander Flag 
The Torres Strait Islands consist of some 250 small islands situated in the waters of the 
Torres Strait, between Cape York Peninsula and Papua New Guinea and are a designated part 
of the State of Queensland. Among these islands is Bedanug, which in 1770 Cook both 
‘claimed’ and ‘re-named’. Cook’s territorial acts linger, they signify a blatant disregard for 
Indigenous people which continues to haunt the nation,  
[O]ur people have been living here for thousands of years, hunting dugongs, fishing 
and trading. We are a seafaring people. When we saw the foreign ship approaching, we 
used smoke signals to warn each other. Our people did not agree to Cook’s declaration 
of possession of our land. There was no treaty. There was no consent. … This is the 
original grievance which Australia must now make right (Bourne & Bedford 2017: 25).  
 
From the mid-1800s and on several fronts life for Torres Strait Islander people was irrevocably 
altered by colonial forces. These included missionaries who repressed traditional beliefs and 
sought to inculcate Islanders with Christianity. The pearling and bêche-de-mer (sea cucumber) 
industries also exploited local people as cheap labour. Furthermore in 1898, the Cambridge 
Anthropological Expedition accelerated cultural denigration by the collection and removal of 
over twelve hundred culturally significant objects (Nakata 2001). Underpinning these 
intrusions were the assimilationist government administrators. For example, during the first 
half of the twentieth century, and under the guise of protection, the Queensland government 
kept the Islanders segregated from mainland Australia controlling where and when they could 
work and travel (Langton & Loos 2008).  
Eddie “Koiki” Mabo of the Meriam nation, was born on one of the smallest and most 
remote islands known as Mer, or Murray Island. At aged 15 Mabo was disciplined and sent to 
215 
 
Thursday Island for twelve months. Pat Killoran, Protector of the Torres Strait Islands, forbade 
Mabo from travelling south and ordered him to work on the local trochus (sea snail) luggers. 
By the late 1950s Islanders were permitted to work on the Australian mainland where they 
performed menial tasks. At Hughenden, in western Queensland, Mabo worked on the railways. 
When in town, Mabo, his wife and small children were refused accommodation, so they slept 
at the railway station. These practices were replicated for many Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people who lived in Queensland during the 1960s, as the State “intensified its 
draconian racialist grip on their lives” (Langton & Loos 2008: 339). 
In the 1970s Mabo was made aware that his home, Murray Island, was classified as 
Crown land. Mabo refused to accept that the Crown owned all rights in relation to his land and 
became determined to prove otherwise. (Reynolds 2000; Langton & Loos 2008). In June 1992, 
after a protracted legal battle, and in the same year that the Torres Strait Islander flag was 
created, the High Court’s Mabo decision was finally realised,  
[H]is flaring imagination, intellect and courage finally enabled him to persist through 
the ten years of the Meriam High Court challenge that acknowledged the native title 
that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had to their land ‘since time 
immemorial’. He died of cancer on 21 January 1992, four months before the High Court 
decision swept away the concept of terra nullius. This is now referred to as the Mabo 
decision, or sometimes simply Mabo (Langton & Loos 2008: 333). 
 
On the proviso that there was a demonstrable and continuous link with land and traditions, the 
Mabo decision facilitated opportunities and possibilities for Aboriginal people on mainland 
Australia. In reality though colonial law ensures that native title is difficult to prove. Given the 
relationship between colonial power and land, it follows that the displacement of Aboriginal 
people from their land was an essential weapon of colonisation. The result of this disruption 
makes it often impossible to establish an unbroken link to country and culture. In other words, 
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the very nature of colonial dispossession complicates and thwarts Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples’ claims for native title.  
In the aftermath of Mabo and the disclosure of the myth of terra nullius, questions were 
raised that challenged official narratives of Australian history and perceived threats 
surrounding notions of legitimacy provoked an outburst,   
[T]he reaction of the vested interests ranged against the Indigenous inheritors of native 
title was hysterical and vindictive. While the Murray islanders celebrated, pastoralists 
and miners expressed more and more wild theories and fears for the future of the 
Australian land tenure system and whether Aborigines would demand compensation 
(Langton & Loos 2008: 371). 
 
Attwood states that this anxiety promotes ideas “that symbols of the British Australian past 
will be abandoned or severely eroded, for instance, that the Union Jack will be replaced by a 
symbol of the Aboriginal presence” (1996b: 105-6). The Union Jack is the signifier of white 
possession and for many the Union Jack on the Australian flag is the tangible marker of what 
it means to be ‘Australian’. For those whose vested interests lie in maintaining the mythology 
surrounding a legitimate and peaceful settlement, the national flag is extolled as a symbol of 
shared values, identity and heritage.115 The national flag however, as Mills attests, could not 
‘speak’ to or for, Torres Strait Islanders. 
                                                 
115 See http://www.jamesmcgrath.com.au/australians_urged_to_unite_under_our_iconic_national_flag for a 
recent example of Australian national flag reverie spoken by James McGrath, Assistant Minister to the Prime 




Figure 20: The Torres Strait Islander Flag (Flags Australia 2016). 
 
The Torres Strait Islander flag was designed by the late Bernard Namok of Thursday 
Island. It was created in 1992 as a result of a cultural revival workshop. The Torres Strait 
Islander flag symbolises the unity and identity of all Torres Strait Islander peoples. The flag’s 
colours: green, blue, black and white represent the land, the sea, the people, and peace, 
respectively. The flag’s central symbols are the dhari and a five-pointed star. The former 
represents a dancer’s head-dress and the latter represents the five major island groups. The star 
is also a reminder of the importance of navigation to the seafaring people (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2010: 28).  
The Torres Strait Islander flag is now over twenty years old. Despite this, it is evident 
that for some Australians knowledge about this flag is limited. For example in Melbourne’s 
North West, the Australian, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags are flown at the 
Malahang Reserve in Heidelberg West Park. However, over a period of two years the Torres 
Strait Islander flag was stolen five times due to misconceptions about its origins. Banyule 
Mayor Craig Langdon told the Heidelberg Leader that he believed the flag was being stolen 




He said the caller asked whether he was proud of the flags flying at the reserve. 
“I said of course I was proud of the flags, and she said ‘we don’t like the Arabic flag’,” 
Cr Langdon said. 
“I said no it’s not, they’re the three official flags of Australia.” 
Cr Langdon said the caller remained staunch that she and others in the community 
believed the flag was Arabic (qtd. in Thorpe 2016).  
 
In order to counter both the confusion and the expense of replacing the Torres Strait Islander 
flag, the council decided to invest in educational signage to clarify the flags’ status and history. 
Mayor Langton confirms that the signs, combined with the publicity attracted, have worked – 
the Torres Strait Islander flag has not been stolen since March 2016 (pers. comm., 15 November 
2016). Bernard Namok Jnr, from Badu and Darnley Islands, airs his frustration at the lack of 
public education regarding his father’s flag, “twenty years on, there is still more education 
needed about Australia’s Indigenous cultures and in particular the Torres Strait Islander flag, 
colours, symbols and designer” (qtd. in Koori Mail 9 March 2016: 23). His response has been 
to create a documentary which not only keeps his father’s legacy alive, but also informs and 
educates the wider population (Thorpe 2016).116  
Conclusion   
Indigenous resistance to colonial rule is a long-standing practice which, since first 
contact, has been expressed in a multitude of ways. In this chapter I have discussed a range of 
these expressions. Grounded in culture, expressions of resistance by Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people stridently reject the imposition of an exclusive Australian identity that 
has been forged out of colonial ideology and symbolism. This is made evident by McCrae, who 
despite the ‘protection’ and assimilation policies which actively sought to extinguish age old 
customs and traditions, has kept his culture alive through his artwork. Long-standing protests 
                                                 
116 “Carry the Flag” (Namok 2017).  
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also elucidate the resistance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The protracted 
fight for land rights as demonstrated by the Gurindji and Eddie Mabo was fortified by their 
refusal to acquiesce. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy endures as a permanent visual protest site 
of resistance, a place where ongoing activism to the colonial project is daily performed. 
Through various acts which foreground the Aboriginal flag, Burnum Burnum and most 
recently, elite athletes such as Freeman and Hooper demonstrate how the Aboriginal flag 
signifies as both a statement of resistance, as well as a powerful marker of cultural identity. 
The athletes’ responses cited in this chapter highlight how the Australian national flag fails to 
be fully representative. In order to further understand this, Chapter Seven is devoted to various 




CHAPTER SEVEN: Seeing Red … White and Blue 
We want to be proud of a flag that we fly and the current Australian flag just doesn’t sit well 
because of its dark history … How can we be proud as Aboriginal Australians and see the sight 
of the Union Jack and what that flag has done in the past, the genocide the rape and the murder 
and the stolen children? I can’t stand for that. That’s why I never fly that flag at my fights. I 
want a flag that represents all of us.  
                                                                               (Anthony Mundine qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 22). 
 
Introduction 
Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues that for Indigenous people the effects of white 
possession are palpable. She states “white possession is not unmarked, unnamed, or invisible; 
it is hypervisible … signs of white possession are embedded everywhere in the landscape” 
(Moreton-Robinson 2015: xiii). In order to discover what the national symbol might represent 
to some Indigenous people, this chapter channels Moreton-Robinson’s theory of 
‘hypervisibility’ directly onto the Australian flag. Currently, hegemonic ways of seeing or 
understanding the national flag effectively seal and steal the discussions which frame it; 
knowledge outside of dominant discourses is often silenced, or rendered invisible. Much of 
today’s rhetoric about the flag is couched in comfortable terms of reference which speak to 
tradition, sentiment and history. What is frequently ignored in this discourse, until it becomes 
conspicuous through the manifestation of overt forms of nationalism, is the political component 
of the flag. The Australian national flag is typically imagined as an everyday emblem and is 
neither seen nor understood as an object which privileges white Australia.  
In Chapter Five I note bell hooks’ comment that flags, when employed as symbols of 
whiteness, have the capacity to transmit racialised messages of trauma, exclusion and 
oppression. hooks’ understanding of the ways that flags function can be transposed to the 
Australian context where we see that attachment to the national flag is also based on concepts 
of white supremacy. For white Australia understandings of ownership, entitlement and 
legitimacy have been inherited and are deployed under the flag to justify white autonomy over 
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Indigenous dispossession. It is precisely this enduring act of dispossession, which is 
symbolised in the flag that ensures the continuity of trauma referred to by hooks. The on-going 
act of dispossession is accompanied by national narratives that ratify claims to sovereignty. 
These stories formulate the nation’s understanding of itself and are derived from privileged 
ways of ‘knowing’ that have generally avoided both intellectual analysis and public scrutiny 
(see Stanner 1974; White 1981; Billig 2013; Moreton-Robinson 2015). If the racialised 
properties of the national flag seldom receive considered attention in the public sphere,117 it 
follows that the manufacture of a nationalism deeply embedded in a white supremacist colonial 
history remains tightly woven into the fabric of Australia’s national flag. With this in mind, the 
task at hand, for this chapter, is to consider, through various forms of evidence, Indigenous 
peoples’ understandings of the national flag. Dovetailed throughout this discussion are the 
standpoints of Indigenous leaders who spoke out in support of Damien Hooper in the aftermath 
of the 2012 London Olympic Games. They demand a new flag.118  
“Welcome to my nightmare” (Kevin Buzzacott qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 8). 
I begin with a narrative that tells of Uncle Kevin Buzzacott, a South Australian 
Arabunna Elder, who spent several years traversing his country while taking stock of its 
destruction. Armed with an Australian national flag Buzzacott tracked the damage done to his 
country back to its source at Parliament House, Canberra, 
  
                                                 
117 There are exceptions. Roz Ward, an academic from La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, was suspended 
over a private Facebook post in which she quipped the Australian flag was “racist” (Graham 2016; see also Ward 
in Thornton 2017).  
118 These interviews were conducted by then National Indigenous Times reporter, Geoff Bagnall, and arguably 




… from Lake Eyre, where the largest uranium mine in the world, Western Mining’s 
Roxby Olympic Mine, is depleting the underground waters of the Artesian Basin at the 
rate of 42 million litres a day to wash yellowcake. Radioactive tailings have already 
polluted the underground waters and the sacred mound springs are drying up. He has 
tracked the trail of evil to the burrow [Parliament House] in the sacred mountain 
[Capital Hill, Canberra] where the laws originate to permit the destruction to proceed 
(Gilbert 2000: 8).   
 
When Buzzacott arrived at the Tent Embassy, the Australian flag that had ‘accompanied’ him 
and was referred to as ‘The Predator’ or ‘The White Flag of Genocide’, was buried in the ashes 
of the Tent Embassy fire (Gilbert 2000). This sacred fire had been established on 26 January 
1998 as part of a ‘Fire Ceremony for Peace’ (Dow 2000). Buzzacott states, “[W]e will keep 
this fire burning until the law makers come and talk to us about recognising our sovereignty” 
(Dow 2000: 20). In order to express a heightened sense of disdain and frustration with the white 
Australian nation, Buzzacott periodically exhumed the national flag.  
For example in July 1998, Supreme Court Judge Justice Crispin visited the Tent 
Embassy to investigate acts of genocide committed against Aboriginal people. In a powerful 
statement Buzzacott removed the flag from the ashes, laid it before Crispin and declared 
“[W]elcome to my nightmare” (Gilbert 2000: 8). Here the national flag is conceptualised as a 
terrifying dream from which Buzzacott cannot escape. The Australian flag symbolises the on-
going destruction of his country and kin. The Union Jack, the ‘honoured’ component of the 
Australian national flag acts as a tangible reminder of colonial malevolence.119 As stated the 
disparities experienced by many Indigenous people in areas of health, incarceration rates and 
life expectancy are far greater than those of non-Indigenous people. Sherry Saggers and Dennis 
Gray state that the “narratives of ill-health” experienced by Indigenous people, “are 
inextricably linked to narratives of dispossession and exclusion … and from full participation 
                                                 
119 On 18 December 1998 Crispin found, “that no offence of genocide is known to the domestic law of Australia” 
(Gilbert 2000: 10). At this time Australia had been a signatory to the Genocide Convention for fifty years. Kevin 
Gilbert’s son, Euroka, notes the hypocrisy, “Australia will still punish and penalise others for their atrocities but 
will not own up to atrocities against the Aboriginals of this land” (qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 10 emphasis in the original).  
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in the social, political and economic life of post-invasion Australia” (2007: 17). The “narratives 
of dispossession and exclusion” are made visually apparent through the symbolism of the 
Australian national flag, which does little to reverse Buzzacott’s sense of malaise.   
In February 1999 then Prime Minister John Howard refused to engage with delegates 
at the Tent Embassy. Howard also rejected an invitation to attend a Fire Ceremony and discuss 
the Declaration for Peace, which demanded recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty, and called 
for an apology, as well as the termination of the ongoing policies and practices of genocide. 
Howard’s negative responses prompted the Tent Embassy delegates to take “peace-talk making 
fires” to Parliament House (Gilbert 2000: 10). On each occasion the Fire for Peace was 
desecrated by officials.120 Two days after the desecration of the third fire, Buzzacott once more 
removed the flag from the ashes of the Embassy fire and in a public ceremony he speared “the 
ash-covered Australian flag, The Predator, to kill the evil power over this land” (Gilbert 2000: 
8). The ‘evil’ referred to recalls the first days of white invasion which over time became a full-
scale assault of the continent and its people. This offensive, Buzzacott argues, has been 
authorised under the colours of red, white and blue,“[T]he Ceremony is our way of dealing 
with the evil that is being committed under the banner of the blue, white and red” (Buzzacott 
qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 8; see also Dow 2000). The Australian flag is thus marked by Buzzacott 
as a hypervisible signifier: a blatant marker of evil and oppression that represents the continuity 
of colonial violence.  
Sam Watson adds a further dimension, 
Aboriginal people have had no part in the selection of the Union Jack as part of the 
Australian flag and as an Aboriginal person I totally reject that and as always I pay my 
absolute respect for Uncle Harold Thomas and I thank him again for his contribution to 
the struggle of our people by designing our flag.  
                                                 
120 On the 8th, 10th and 15th of February (Dow 2000; Gilbert 2000).  
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There is no history represented by the Union Jack, just a terrible litany of human rights 
abuses. The Union Jack, if anything, should be elevated up there with the Swastika. It 
really does not represent Aboriginal people, it represents the really worst aspects of 
history since 1788 (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 27). 
 
Watson draws attention to the fact that Aboriginal people have not been consulted about the 
Union Jack’s inclusion on the national flag and that it symbolises the brutality and perpetuation 
of the colonial project. In order to destroy the colours of ‘evil’: the red, white and blue, Michael 
Anderson, of the Euahlayi Nation and Convenor of the Sovereign Union (see Chapter Three) 
completed the journey which Uncle Kevin began, “The Predator is going back to the Queen in 
London ... If we don’t destroy the evil before it destroys us, our spirituality and connectedness 
to land is doomed” (Buzzacott qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 8).  
1999: ‘The Australian Flag of Genocide’ aka ‘the Predator Flag’  
On Commonwealth Day,121 8 March 1999, Anderson flung the well-travelled, ash-
covered flag, “the Australian flag of genocide to the British Crown at Buckingham Palace” 
(Gilbert 2000: 15). This was a foundational act which ensured the correct establishment of the 
Sovereign Union:  
Ghillar, Michael Anderson, was tasked with returning the evil in the Australian/British 
‘Predator’ flag – the Union Jack – through a sacred ceremony, which he carried from 
Euahlayi and other Nations, to the Gates of Buckingham Palace, where after conducting 
the Ceremony and Song placed the flag on a ceremonial spear and hurled it over the 
gates of Buckingham Palace and into its forecourt. This action permitted the rightway 
to build the momentum for the current Sovereignty Movement (Sovereign Union 2016). 
 
In this instance the Union Jack and by association the Australian national flag, are described 
as the “Predator” flag. The flag is understood as being representative of a corporeal body, a 
                                                 
121 Commonwealth Day is held on the second Monday in March every year. It celebrates the diversity of the 




living predator that has preyed upon, plundered from, destroyed and exploited Aboriginal 
peoples and their lands since first contact.  
 
 
Figure 21: Michael Anderson returns the Australian national flag back to the British Crown -1999 (Image: Sovereign Union 
2016). 
Anderson explains, 
[T]he genocide tracks back to the British Crown … Successive British monarchs signed 
papers legalising the killing of Aborigines and approving the forced adoption program 
of the Stolen Generations. By killing the evil and returning the flag to where it belongs, 
our people are being released from the evils of colonialism. We can at last have a chance 
to heal our wounds (qtd. in Gilbert 2000: 15). 
 
Anderson states that the Australian flag is returned to “where it belongs” and with its 
extradition there is a cathartic sense of liberation. This leads me to hypothesise about the 
ubiquitous nature of the Australian flag, and how at each encounter, this symbol of colonial 
rule makes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people ‘feel’; in other words, what emotional, 
physical and psychological responses are produced in the presence of the national flag and what 
impact this has on the health and wellbeing of Indigenous peoples in the everyday? The 
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Australian flag is however, more than just a colonial symbol, it cannot simply be relegated to 
the symbolic domain. The flag’s ubiquity as an officially sanctioned material object, I would 
argue, has a reach beyond symbolism that has the potential to generate fear and a distaste that 
might produce real, psycho-physical effects. As this research has progressed, it has become 
apparent that for many, the national flag is in fact a hypervisible manifestation of white 
sovereignty. The national flag’s associated spectrum of uses and applications; its presence in 
all public spheres of human activity constitutes a material documentation of white supremacy 
and violence. The national flag’s importance to the colonial, and nation-building project are 
best understood when we expose the rules and regulations that seek to protect the nation’s most 
‘sacred’ and indeed ‘valuable’ emblem. 
The Burning Issue 
The national flag is saturated with bureaucratic regulations. These include protocols 
which dictate the flag’s correct use, its flying, handling and disposal. According to the 
Commonwealth of Australia the flag is also imbued with “dignity” (2010: 5). To preserve the 
flag’s “dignity”: 
 The flag should not be allowed to fall or lie on the ground. 
 The flag should not be used to cover a statue, monument or plaque for an 
unveiling ceremony; to cover a table or seat; or to mask boxes, barriers or the 
space between the floor and the ground level on a dais or platform. 
 The flag should never be flown when in damaged, faded or dilapidated 
condition (Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 5). 
To dispose of a flag: 
 When a flag becomes dilapidated and no longer suitable for use, it should be 
destroyed privately and in a dignified way. For example, it may be cut into small 
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unrecognisable pieces then disposed of with the normal rubbish collection 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2010: 5).  
 The most dignified way to dispose of a flag when it is no longer serviceable is 
to burn it (Smith 1975: 92-93).  
 The flag should be destroyed in such a way that it is no longer recognisable as 
a flag, such as cutting up or shredding into small pieces of fabric. Disposal by 
burning is only appropriate for a flag made of wool or cotton, as synthetic 
materials are toxic when burned. When the flag has been destroyed, the remains 
should be wrapped tightly or sealed in a bag or box before disposal (Kelly 2017: 
134). 
Archie Moore comments on the rigor of flag-flying rules and regulations. He argues that “the 
very existence of National Flag Protocols – begs the question of who these protocols are for 
and why we might need them” (Moore 2015: 120). Foucault explains that the discursive 
formation of an object is facilitated by a “complex group of relations” which, “are established 
between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, 
techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization” (1997: 45). Following Foucault, 
the above-mentioned protocols constitute a prescriptive set of regulations which discursify the 
flag according to established “systems of norms”. That is to say, the regulations set out above 
are comprehensible (and deemed reasonable) precisely because they are formed through the 
“complex group of relations” whose very complexity has been normalised. So, we do not see 
how these protocols operate to “dignify” the flag; we just know that they do. According to these 
protocols, the flag must represent newness, purity, and modernity. As a carefully preserved 
icon, the flag must be revered and reflect the nation’s aspirations for self-preservation and 
national unity, never to be tattered, frayed or disrespected in any way, but always emblematic 
of a wholesome entirety that is upright, undivided, and knows its place in the world. The 
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metaphorical resonances of these rules are significant: the flag must always be intact. Any 
‘unrecognisable’ pieces, or a flag “no longer serviceable” (presumed aged or damaged) must 
be discarded, unseen, or burnt in the interests of projecting an untarnished whole flag as the 
symbol of a unified, coherent nation. Through the performative act of ‘flag- disposal’, (or 
sacrifice), the nation is re-born, “…national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive 
process” (Bhabha 1994: 209). What is aged or damaged, deemed unwholesome or unseemly, 
must be removed from sight. Any ‘scraps’ must be discarded. The flag must not ‘fall or lie on 
the ground’; it must conform to the illusion of social cohesiveness by demonstrating its upright-
ness.  
In addition to what the flag can and cannot represent in nationalist discourse, its utility 
is also decreed: it cannot be used to cover other cultural artefacts but should stand alone, its 
authority undeterred and unchallenged. The flag, this most prominent symbol of national 
culture, must at all costs reflect the conformity and uniformity of the nation. If or when it ceases 
to do so, it must be expunged from the nation. Forged from of a complex network of power, 
the flag is thus shaped and protected by an intricate web of relations, “… these relations are 
not present in the object; it is not they that are deployed when the object is being analysed 
(Foucault 1997: 45). The national flag therefore, presents as a seemingly innocuous signifier 
of nation that is normalised through various systems of ‘knowing’ and strengthened by the 
ubiquity of its presence as the primary cultural object of nation. Any failure to critically analyse 




1996: The White Flag  
In response to the 1996 Federal budget cut of $400 million from a wide range of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander services,122 hundreds of protesters rallied in Canberra, 
“… as a strong statement of unity by more than two thousand blackfellas: It’s our day today. 
We’ll do this our way … dances, songs and stories are performed” (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 
70 emphasis in the original). Eleanor Williams argues that it was the pain associated with the 
stories, which compelled the group to act and burn the Australian flag. She recounts, 
[A]s the TV cameras film, the white flag, ‘symbol of genocide’ burns to the drone of 
didgeridoo: 
  Anyone, everyone, come stamp on the ashes 
  like they stamped on the ashes of our Peoples. 
A gentle lady rises to speak: 
  I’ve waited fifty years to see this.  
How many watching the news tonight will know ‘the ashes’ refer to the ‘boong123 fires’ 
lit to destroy the evidence of massacres?124 (Gilbert & Williams 1996: 70 emphasis in 
the original).   
 
From Williams’ account a correlation is made between the massacres committed and the 
stamping on the ashes of the flag which highlights a new and traumatic facet to the national 
symbol.  
                                                 
122 These included cuts to legal services, domestic violence centres, youth training, artists’ cooperatives, child care 
and health centres (Gilbert & Williams 1996). Northern Land Council Chairman, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, was 
reported as saying “the cuts were ‘a spear in our heart’ for self-determination. Aboriginal people would die at the 
hands of the Federal Government because of the cuts” (qtd. in AIATSIS 2016). 
123 A derogatory term used to describe Aboriginal people (Wilkes 1985). 
124 In Western Australia, for example, Aboriginal bodies were burnt to destroy evidence of massacres. This 
practice “continued into the 1920s and 1930s at least and was aided and abetted by the pervasive conspiracy of 
silence that … remained stronger than any belief in the rule of law” (Owen 2016: 391; see also Charola & Meakins 
2016: Chapter 3).  
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As this work progresses it becomes evident that the Australian flag, a symbol which is 
hegemonically endorsed via the projection of religious, political and regional affiliations to the 
colonising nation, is guaranteed to be divisive,  
… in new, insecure nations the flags and other national symbols … often bring to the 
fore strong divisions within the putative nation … They [national symbols] must not 
only keep alive, but create a national identity and an allegiance to a state that did not 
exist before (Kolstø 2006: 679 emphasis in the original). 
 
While Kolstø’s claims are not directed at the Australian nation, his argument can be 
extrapolated. From evidence provided national inclusion is symbolically denied to Indigenous 
people through the symbols which were designed to foster the creation of a white “national 
identity” and an “allegiance to a state that did not exist before”. The creation of Australian 
symbols typically function to lend legitimacy to the historically “new” claims of Australia as a 
white possession. In addition to this, “… white subjects are disciplined … to invest in the nation 
as a white possession that imbues them with a sense of belonging and ownership” (Moreton-
Robinson 2015: 52). While white perceptions of the Australian flag combine with an inherent 
sense of ownership and entitlement, they are at odds with Indigenous understandings which as 
the epigraph states, perceive the flag as an unrepresentative symbol of exclusion and division,  
[T]he Australian flag is the white people’s flag. The things that have been done to 
Aboriginal people, including dispossession, disempowerment, the Northern Territory 
Intervention, the denial of the rights of Aboriginal people and even the taking away of 
all of our children, were done under the colour of that rotten, stinking white flag 
(Michael Mansell qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).   
 
Mansell’s associations with the “white people’s flag” are explicit: the flag connotes 
disempowerment, dispossession and destruction. Seen in this way, through its unambiguous 
colonial associations, the Australian flag represents the exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people from the body politic. As it flies the current Australian flag is incapable 
of facilitating mutual feelings of national belonging and inclusion for many Indigenous people:  
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[T]he white flag doesn’t represent us. It represents our destruction, our enslavement. 
Why would be (sic) bloody well wan (sic) to be represented by that flag.   
… at some time in the future, at the stage where Aboriginal people are recognised as 
human beings in this country, at the point where our sovereignty was recognised, the 
flag would have to change (Les Coe qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24). 
 
2006: The Flag of Oppression  
On 26 January 2006, Wayne Wharton burnt the Australian flag in Brisbane. As it burnt 
he expressed his disdain to the media. Wharton argues that the flag represents “the continued 
oppression of Indigenous Australians and represents all that is ugly about a Coalition 
Government committed to minimising expenditure on Indigenous specific programs” (qtd. in 
Hagan 2010: 32). Wharton’s act triggered a public outcry that caused Bill Mason, Queensland 
President of the RSL to assert that burning the national flag should be made a criminal offence 
(Hagan 2010). Prime Minister Howard responded, “[T]he Australian flag is more closely held 
and held more dearly by Australians than at any time that I can remember” (qtd. in The Age 
2006).125 He stated that while the desecration of the flag was “offensive, I don’t think it 
represents mainstream Aboriginal opinion … Much as I despise what they did I do not believe 
it should be a criminal offence” (qtd. in The Age 2006). He gave two reasons for his stance. 
Firstly, he argued that burning the flag was a form of political protest. Furthermore, he claimed, 
criminalising the act would “only turn yahoo behaviour into martyrdom” (qtd. in The Age 
2006). 
Howard’s response conveys a potent level of anxiety regarding democratic rights and 
their potential for political dissension, or violence. This can be seen in fact, as a sleight of hand 
where democratic freedom of speech is being sanctioned as an authorised right for all, while 
being simultaneously disparaged as a potential call to dissent that could result in martyrdom, 
the sacrificial elevation of a cause seen to transgress social unity. Actions such as flag burning 
                                                 
125 Note: Under Howard’s watch the 1996 National Flag Day and the Flags Amendment Bill were introduced.  
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rarely happen in isolation and while the public might be ‘outraged’, the event needs to be 
contextualised and understood as a deep-seated response. Robert Van Krieken et al. explain, 
“[S]uch behaviours … are rooted in social processes that are highly complex and that cannot 
be reduced to the dull weight of external social forces” (2000: 14). Wharton’s activism 
exemplifies this claim; his burning of the flag is a direct response to the inter-generational 
experiences of colonialism “[R]acism was at my doorstep for as long as I can remember. We 
grew up in a camp … because blackfellas weren’t allowed to live in towns” (Wharton qtd. in 
Hagan 2013:15).  
The ensuing debate drew attention to the complexity of social processes that generates 
Indigenous political activism and also, to the ways in which Indigenous activism can be excised 
from Howard’s ideas about “yahoo behaviour” and re-scripted into a prolonged history of 
Indigenous resistance, 
[W]hen a street warrior goes out and burns the flag or challenges the system, the whole 
world stops. They put our agenda back on the front page of the newspapers. Without 
these people, we’d still be sitting in the concentration camps (Wharton qtd. in Hagan 
2013:15).  
 
Wharton’s cousin, Stephen Hagan, refuses to condemn the 2006 Invasion Day burning of the 
national flag stating: “I understand the passion of his ways and its effect in bringing attention 
to the plight of our people” (Hagan 2010: 35). Hagan further claims that “the Union Jack on 
the national flag is a constant reminder of the British Empire that was characterised by greed, 
arrogance and hypocrisy” (2010: 35).  
2012: The Flag of Invasion and Division 
26 January 2012 marked the 40th anniversary of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy as it 
simultaneously commemorated the 224th anniversary of the First Fleet’s landing. From around 
the continent Indigenous people gathered at the Embassy to celebrate an iconic 40 year protest. 
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The event was marred by then Liberal-National Opposition leader, Tony Abbott who stated, “I 
think the indigenous people of Australia can be very proud of the respect in which they are 
held by every Australian” (ABC 2012a). Abbott argued “a lot has changed since [the Embassy 
was established], and I think it probably is time to move on from that” (ABC 2012a). Abbott’s 
comments quickly transformed, “[L]ike a game of Chinese whispers, media then embellished 
it further until finally it was reported Abbott wanted the Embassy ‘torn down’” (Graham 2012: 
19). As news of Abbott’s ‘tearing down the Embassy’ comments took hold Abbott, and then 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, were attending an awards ceremony at a 5 star, glass enclosed 
restaurant which was in close proximity to the Tent Embassy.  
A group of protesters surrounded the restaurant, banged on the glass and chanted. In 
the melee the Prime Minister’s bodyguards “dragged a stumbling Julia Gillard … missing a 
shoe and clinging to one of her four federal police close personal protection officers” to ‘safety’ 
(Welch 2012: 4). Images of the ‘riot’ made headlines around the world. According to a New 
York Times blog the riot was “a combustible mixture of race, social status and the juxtaposition 
of a leader dining in a glass-walled restaurant only steps from a decades-old protest 
encampment” (Welch 2012: 4). On 27 January, in the aftermath of the previous day’s 
disturbance and with the intention of making white Australians take notice, protesters from the 
Tent Embassy marched to Parliament House to burn the national flag, 
[A] protester, Wayne “Coco” Wharton, announced that the Australian flag flying on the 
building “had allowed white people to rape, murder and destroy our people for 224 
years, and we’re going to burn it.” An Australian flag was then set alight as the crowd 







Figure 22: The Australian flag burns outside Parliament House (Image: Porritt 2012). 
 
From the photographs (above and below) another dimension to this investigation is 
considered. Could the Australian national flag have the capacity to transmit trans-generational 
trauma? Christine Choo states, 
[T]he health and welfare of contemporary Aboriginal people must be considered in the 
context of the intergenerational impacts of their social, cultural and historical 
backgrounds. This is especially true in our study of the health of children (2016:102). 
 
The protesters here are young, some are children. Indicative of their vitriol they spit on and 
participate in the ritualistic burning of the national flag. Neil Jarman notes that “destroying the 
flag allows both for a real expression of anger and is also a symbolic act of revenge or 
aggression against the particular enemy nation” (2007: 91). The questions raised here are 
whether or not the Union Jack on the nation’s flag, alongside its colours of red, white and blue, 
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place an additional psychological and emotional burden on the upcoming generations? Is it 
possible that the flag can be internalised by children as a marker of their exclusion in the body 
politic? Do they understand the flag as a symbol which signifies their disinheritance? Do they 
carry with them the knowledge that the Australian flag is a symbol which has failed to serve 
generations of their ancestors? Perhaps a closer look at the photographs may shed light on this. 
Each photograph can be read as a manifestation of rage and outrage, and also sadness: 
there is sadness on the faces of the children. There is also a sense of determination and resolve, 
and in both images, a methodical intensity that resembles ritual whereby the flag is destroyed 
and spat upon with a focused degree of intent. This is a solemn event staged near Parliament 
House. The flag is reduced to ashes while its destroyers parade their sovereignty through a 
display of Aboriginal colours, draped flags, t shirts, ochre and other cultural signifiers that 
coalesce in a rite that erases both the symbolic and tangible power of the national flag. 
 
Figure 23: The vitriol of Indigenous youth is directed onto the Australian national flag at Parliament House 
(Image: Meares 2012). 
 
Acts of resistance that seek to subvert the status quo inevitably attract attention. 
Following this event, Chris Graham notes “Australians were outraged” (2012: 19). Then 
Northern Territory Labor Minister for Young Territorians, Rob Knight claims, 
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[F]or some little pricks to get there and stomp on our flag and set fire to it - there should 
be laws against it … I think it’s absolutely disgusting, and they’ve lost my support, and 
I think they’ve lost the majority support of Australians (qtd. in ABC News 2012b). 
 
Knight’s condemnation in this instance whitewashes the lived realities of colonial domination 
and perpetuates the disturbing pattern of bureaucratic complacency. Knight’s criticism is also 
an exercise of power, “[T]he objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a 
population of degenerate types … in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of 
administration and instruction” (Bhabha 1994: 101). To further emphasise his moral outrage 
Knight invoked an argument which continues to successfully ‘armour’ the flag. He claimed the 
flag, under which Australians have gone into battle, had been defaced by the protestors. While 
the effectiveness of this rhetoric has been discussed in Chapter Five, it is worth remembering 
that for many Australians, this claim is as appealing as it is powerful. Mythologising the flag 
by invoking “past sacrifices … in the name of the present” (Billig 2013: 77) effectively 
obstructs the circulation of other perspectives.  
In response to the criticism Dodson asserts that open condemnation is far too simplistic, 
“[Y]ou have got to look to why people are frustrated and why people feel that aggressive 
behaviour like that is required” (qtd. in ABC News 2012b). Jenny Munroe adds further context,  
[T]he Union Jack has no relevance to our people. It is a symbol of our oppression, it is 
a symbol of invasion, it’s a symbol of us being the beggars instead of the billionaires in 
our own land … I think the Union Jack should be got rid of and we should find some 
other symbol that unifies us rather than divides us, which is what that current flag 
actually does – it divides us (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).  
 
Munroe argues that the national flag does not serve her people; rather it is perceived as a symbol 
of disinheritance, of poverty and division. In contrast for white Australians the interplay 
between national flag, national values and national identity is compelling. Flag, ideals and 
identity sustain each other as the embodiment of national belonging. For minority groups 
however, the “flag may heighten the salience of national outgroup membership … potentially 
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lowering collective self-esteem or heightening social exclusion” (Butz, Plant, & Doerr 2007: 
406). Maurie Japarta Ryan states, 
[T]he flag of Australia represents the British government and it’s a symbol for that … 
When Cook landed this country was 100 per cent Aboriginal. In 2012 it is 2 per cent 
Aboriginal. Get rid of the English flag… (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).  
 
2014: “It’s really depressing … to continue to have such a flag” (Marianne Mackay qtd. in 
Bagnall 2012: 25). 
In 2014, leaders from the world’s 20 major economies including Australia, gathered in 
Brisbane for the G20 Summit. Indigenous peoples from across the continent also gathered for 
a week of cultural and political meetings at the Aboriginal Sovereign Tent Embassy in 
Brisbane. Peaceful protest marches were held over four days which drew attention to the 
unacceptable levels of Indigenous incarceration rates, suicide, deaths in custody, and child 
removal. Then Prime Minister Tony Abbott once again ignited the wrath of many Indigenous 
people at this time when he declared to the national and international media, 
[I]t’s hard to think that back in 1788 (Australia) was nothing but bush and the marines 
and the convicts and the sailors that straggled off those 12 ships just a few hundred 
yards from where we are now must have thought they’d come almost to the moon (qtd. 
in Waters 2014: 15). 
 
Abbott’s comments impelled Wharton and others to act, “we have to resort to symbolism to 
show our disgust in your colonial leadership” (Wharton qtd. in Piotrowski & Thackery 2014). 
On the final day of the G20 Summit, six Australian flags were defaced with words and symbols. 
The flags were paraded before a crowd of approximately 300 people by a group of about 50 
who were outraged by Abbott’s comments. They were then set alight, one after the other, each 
burning flag enflaming the next, as the protesters chanted “resist, revise, decolonise” 




Figure 24: Images of skulls and words stating “Invasion Dogs” were drawn on Australian national flags before they were 
publicly set on fire. (Image: Daily Mail Australia 2014). 
 
Reactions to the flag burning were mixed within the Indigenous community as the protest once 
again sent a signal to an international audience, “[I]mages of the Australian flag burning went 
around the world and … let the world know relations between Aboriginal Australia and non-
Aboriginal Australia are not ideal” (Waters 2014: 15). The unyielding nature of race politics 
underpins Wharton’s struggle. Anger and frustrations are vented on a flag which symbolises 
the seismic failure of a nation to represent and include Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people. Wharton explains, 
I still believe we haven’t got our rightful place in this country. But I don’t enjoy it, I 
don’t get any pleasure out of it. I find it frustrating and I find it very disheartening that 
we’ve still got to do this sort of stuff. I get really disillusioned at what the invaders have 
done to my people … (qtd. in Hagan 2013:15). 
 
Marianne Mackay’s struggle is similar and her words about the Australian national flag are 




[T]he Australian flag is not allowed anywhere inside my house. To have a flag with the 
Union Jack that represents everything that this country represents in regards to 
dispossession of land and culture, I think it’s really depressing for the Australian 
government to continue have such a flag that doesn’t truly represent the nation on a 
national level. 
To totally ignore everything our people have gone through since the invasion and to 
celebrate the flag the way they do is just a total disregard for our feelings and what our 
people have been through, but it’s also a total disregard for what Australia stands for. 
They call Australia the lucky country, but it’s not lucky for us, and if they’re going to 
have a flag that represents us today they just need to scrap it and get a whole new one 
(qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25).   
 
Mackay’s words express justifiable anger and contempt but they also draw attention to what 
she believes Australia ‘should’ stand for. She identifies the national flag as a symbol that white 
Australians celebrate which she argues is incongruous, given the history of invasion and the 
on-going realities of colonial oppression. Any ideological notions of Australia as the “lucky 
country”, as inclusive and egalitarian are dispelled at the sight of the Union Jack and Mackay 
mocks the hypocrisy by drawing attention to the “unlucky” and unrepresented. From Mackay’s 
perspective official, or indeed civil endorsement of the national flag is representative of a 
disdain, a ‘lack of care’ for her people. In other words, the national flag is a material artefact 
that symbolises white peoples’ disregard for Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander people and 
thus it presents as a hypervisible symbol which has the potential to exacerbate psychological 
stress. To protect herself Mackay refuses to allow Australia’s national symbol into her home.  
Arte-factual Responses: Re-painting the Flag 
In order to present another dimension to this discussion, I now turn to some selected 
works of art which explore the effects elicited by the British-Australian flag. As noted in the 
previous chapter, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander artists can challenge white ways of 
knowing and contest negative stereotypes through their creative output. Indigenous artistic 
expression is a forum where conversations are generated and audiences educated. As a site of 
contemporary resistance this art is invariably political, 
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[A]rt is political, as every action of Aboriginal People is political, and it must be 
political and must always remain political and reflect the political feeling until we can 
grow together, until people do not need to make very hard separate statement in their 
art … (Gilbert qtd. in Gilbert & Williams 1996: 24 & 30). 
 
As a potent site of activism the artworks provided make a powerful contribution to this 
discussion. Understandings of the flag are re-defined and re-told through art; these competing 
worldviews unsettle the commonplace understandings the British-Australian-symbol-of-
nation.  
1985: O.H.M.S. (Darren Kemp). 
In 1985, Darren Kemp, a visual arts student from Eora Centre, Redfern, New South 
Wales, made a line drawing, titled: ‘OHMS’.126  
 
Figure 25: Darren Kemp (1985) ‘OHMS’, line drawing (Craven 1999: 101). 
 
                                                 
126 O.H.M.S: On His / Her Majesty's Service, dependent upon who is on the British throne.  
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Kemp’s sketch details the early onslaught of colonial violence that was delivered in the name 
of the British king. In the background of this work there is a sailing ship. To my mind this 
vessel of invasion is slipping away from the shore. In its wake lies a trail of destruction. 
Aboriginal bodies are scattered; their tools and weapons lie dormant. A small fire gently 
smoulders, indicating that the assault was as unexpected as it was brutal. The most confronting 
image however lies in the foreground. Kemp has drawn an Aboriginal man impaled by the 
Union Jack. The man lies on the ground, and while it is not possible to say if he is alive or 
dead, his left hand is firmly grasped around the base of the colonial spear. This leads me to 
hypothesise that perhaps those who committed the crime artfully placed the British flag in his 
hand: a symbolic statement of what was to come. Conversely the depiction can be construed 
as a final act of resistance in which the victim endeavours to excise the coloniser’s weapon, 
and all it represents, from his body.  
The size of the colonial weapon is designed to make an impact. The flag pole is a similar 
length to the man lying on the ground, and the flag is as long as his shield. In a visual statement 
of resistance it appears as if the flag has speared the man to his country; they are as one in 
death, as they are in life. While the British flag might symbolise the indomitable reach and 
power of the colonisers,127 its force pales in comparison with the relationship that Indigenous 
people had, and continue to have, with their land: 
Rock stays, 
earth stays. 
I die and put my bones in cave or earth. 
Soon my bones become earth…. 
all the same. 
My spirit has gone back to my country…. 
my mother. 
 
                                                 
127 The explorer, John Stuart (see Chapter Four), provides an example of the power and reach exerted by the flag. 
In 1860, Stuart went to extraordinary lengths to place the Union Jack on top of a mountain which he believed to 
be the centre of the continent: Central Mount Stuart, “[W]e then gave three hearty cheers for the flag, the emblem 
of civil and religious liberty, and may it be a sign to the natives that the dawn of liberty, civilization, and 
Christianity is about to break upon them” (Stuart qtd. in Headon 1991:20). 
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This story is important. 
It won’t change, 
it is law. 
It is like this earth, 
it won’t move. (Neidjie 1985: 62-63). 
 
Kemp presents us with a visual counter-narrative in which the Union Jack, the primary 
symbol of dispossession, takes centre stage. In this work Kemp forcefully links the British flag 
to brutal acts of violence and thus disturbs hegemonic understandings of the flag. Through 
Kemp’s lens, the legacy of the performative act of British sovereignty, the implantation of the 
flag, is a brutal one. Authorised and executed in the name of ‘His Majesty’ the flag is a 
territorial signifier which relegates the status of Aboriginal people and their lands to that of 
colonial ‘possession’ and gives weight to the assertion that “the theft of Indigenous lands and 
the death of Indigenous people are inextricably tied to the assumption of patriarchal white 
sovereignty in Australia” (Morton-Robinson 2015: 138).  
From my analysis of Kemp’s work, a disconcerting reality presents itself. ‘OHMS’ was 
sketched over 30 years ago. Reflecting on this it becomes evident that since first contact, 
generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have had no respite from the 
significations of the British Empire inscribed in the red, white and blue. Following this, it is 
not implausible to suggest that the impacts associated with the current flag’s exclusive 
symbolism have not been given considered attention. Michael Woodley asserts,  
[T]he Australian flag is a symbol of colonial Australia and that says it all. It doesn’t 
represent Aboriginal people, or Indigenous people of this country, Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander … The Australian flag needs to represent the first Australians of this 
country. We are not a symbol of colonial possession. We are the first Australians … 
and we should be somewhere, somehow included in the flag that represents Australia 
as a nation (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 26).  
 
For Kemp and Woodley, the Union Jack, and by association the Australian flag, are colonial 
symbols of (dis)possession, encoded with associations of violence and exclusion.  
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2006: We Call Them Pirates Out Here (Daniel Boyd). 
Daniel Boyd’s work, We Call Them Pirates Out Here (2006) contains his response to 
the Anglo-centric visual narratives of ‘official’ history. In his re-working of one of the nation’s 
most iconic works, E. Phillips Fox’s, The Landing of Captain Cook at Botany Bay 1770 
(1902),128 Boyd presents us with his painting of this scene. Deploying artistic techniques that 
appropriate and satirise the original, Boyd de-romanticises first contact. Cook is portrayed, not 
as an explorer, but as a pirate, complete with eye-patch and parrot. Through the amalgamation 
of the Union Jack and Jolly Roger,129 Boyd transforms Fox’s billowing red ensign and it 
becomes the “Jolly Jack” (Museum of Contemporary Art [MCA] 2015) The Jolly Jack 
symbolically interweaves piracy and land theft to signify the merciless act of dispossession.  
                                                 
128 Fox’s The Landing of Captain Cook at Botany Bay 1770, was commissioned to celebrate Federation (1901), 
and was produced at a time of heightened nationalism. This painting appeased the new nation with its symbolism. 
It portrayed Cook as a “charitable conqueror” (Nugent 2009: 33). Cook is ‘imagined’ and subsequently portrayed 
in a paternalistic, somewhat heroic manner, his outstretched arm, in a command of authority, prevents his men 
from shooting two approaching Aboriginal warriors. Commanding the scene is a huge British red ensign. It billows 
behind Cook in readiness.  
129 It is presumed that the original pirate flags were red as ‘Jolly Roger’ is thought to be derived from the French 
term: jolie rouge. Certain Barbary corsairs, (pirates operating from North Africa) carried red flags adorned with 
symbols of violence. At the turn of the eighteenth century, however, pirates used black flags which signified “no 
quarter” (take no prisoners / show no mercy) or “fight to the death” (Crampton 1989a: 10). Each captain had his 




Figure 26: Daniel Boyd (2006) We Call Them Pirates Out Here, acrylic on canvas: 226 x 275 cm. Collection: 
Museum of Contemporary Art.  
 
The design of Boyd’s work is strategic. His painting looks like a postcard and this is 
significant as Boyd first encountered Fox’s painting as a postcard. In their heyday postcards 
were formidable messengers. Until recently, they were mass produced, widely used, and could 
be circulated to a far-reaching audience. Holiday-makers would often send postcards to family 
and friends, the picture postcard was often accompanied by a few lines of news and the slogan 
“wish you were here”. Boyd strategically replaces this commonplace postcard slogan with, “we 
call them pirates out here”. His message, perhaps a direct reply to Fox, leaves his audience with 
little doubt that for Boyd, Cook’s act, under the auspices of the Union Jack, was one of piracy, 
“it’s very important that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people continue to create 
dialogue from their own perspective to challenge the subjective history that has been created” 
(Boyd qtd. in Nugent 2009: 136). Robbie Thorpe says, 
[W]hen I think about the Union Jack, I think about the Skull and Cross Bones too, they 
go together those two. It’s the flag of the British Crown Pirate Corporation. They ruled 




Boyd would like to send his ‘postcard’ to England and inform the British about what happened 
to his people in the name of the Empire (MCA 2015 video). A decade earlier I note, a group of 
Indigenous artists were invited to present their responses to a British audience.  
1994: “The colours of death are red, white and blue” (Lin Onus qtd. in Chambers 
1994: 26). 
In 1994 an exhibition, curated by Hetti Perkins and Brenda Croft: True Colours: 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Artists Raise the Flag, visited London, Liverpool and 
Leicester. The tour was organised in response to a 1993 curation by Eddie Chambers: Black 
people and the British Flag. Chambers argues that for British artists “the British flag has 
increasingly come to symbolise little more than British bigotry, racism, intolerance, and the 
remaining vestiges of the Rule Britannia Empire mentality” (1994: ii emphasis in the original). 
Likewise the Boomalli Aboriginal Artists Co-operative state, “[A]s True Colours: Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Artists Raise the Flag demonstrates, this maxim is also true for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people” (qtd. in Chambers 1994: ii emphasis in the 
original). Perkins and Croft co-authored the introductory essay of the exhibition catalogue 
where they claim that Australia’s flag is the embodiment of allegiance and subservience to 
Britain. Furthermore they note,  
[I]f read from an aerial perspective, the continent of Australia is represented by the 
Union Jack floating on a sea of blue under the Southern Cross. It fails to represent the 
indigenous people who belong to this land or even the notion of multiculturalism which 
is so often touted as indicating the enlightened state of the Australian consciousness 
(Perkins and Croft 1994: 5).  
 
The authority of British imperialism lingers in the Australian flag. The Union Jack remains a 
visual signifier that tells the world the Australian continent was once a British ‘possession’,  
[A]s a portrait of a ‘British’ continent in the Southern Hemisphere, the ‘Australian’ flag 
well illustrates the driving force behind the implementation of the White Australia 
policy… (Perkins and Croft 1994: 5).  
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This point is well made, the White Australia Policy, the White Australian Flag and the White 
Australian Nation were all ‘born’ in the same year and are inextricably linked as markers of 
whiteness. 
Richard Bell states, “[T]he white man’s flag is seen for what it is – a piece of rag 
symbolising dispossession and oppression of our people. FUCK THE BRITISH FLAG (and its 
derivatives)” (qtd. in Chambers 1994: 17 emphasis in the original). Lin Onus writes, “[T]he 
presence of the Union Jack is a constant reminder of horrific times and despair. The colours of 
death are red, white and blue” (qtd. in Chambers 1994: 26). These samples provide a range of 
responses that are indicative of the flag’s capacity to act as an on-going reminder of the 
devastating effects of colonisation. In fact the scale and scope of reactions I have encountered 
during my research are far greater and more profound than I could have ever realised. I began 
this work with a sense of disquiet and anticipated that findings would, in general, be negative. 
As my research has progressed it has become evident that I had underestimated the intensity of 
reactions and responses. I have been taken aback by the pain, trauma and disdain which are 
evoked and provoked by the Australian national flag.   
2014: Cloth on a stick 
 





Colina Wymarra’s work, Eyes of Innocence (2014) was inspired by a story told by her father. 
The Gudang are seafaring people who regularly visit Bedanug (“Possession Island”, where 
Cook planted the British flag in 1770, as he sailed through the Torres Strait). On the beach one 
day the Gudang saw a ‘cloth on a stick’, 
[I]n their innocence, my people’s innocence, they grabbed that and used it as a blanket 
and covering. ‘Flag’ was not a concept they knew of. I painted the traditional Gudang 
woman as she covered herself and her baby in that cloth because they didn’t know what 
that cloth was or what it meant or [has] come to mean centuries later (Wymarra qtd. in 
Osborne & Simpkin 2015: 174). 
 
In this work, the flag, a multi-coloured piece of calico, becomes a serviceable object that is 
used to provide comfort and warmth. Feelings of safety are evoked as the coloniser’s artefact 
is transformed into a blanket which seemingly nurtures as it provides shelter and protection. 
Colonial meanings of “flag” however, as Wymarra notes were, for her people, the very 
antithesis of comfort and warmth. The British land-claim-flag is anathema to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people in that it signifies oppression, dispossession and violence. Under 
the auspices of this ‘blanket’ women were raped, babies and children murdered (Perkins and 
Croft 1994; Trudgen 2000: Chapter 1; Charola & Meakins 2016; Owen 2016). Wymarra 
demonstrates how inconceivable it is that the flag, which her people had innocently used as a 
blanket, could presume sovereignty over Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lands. Through 
Wymarra we also see the everyday implications of this cloth on a stick’s design. Nearly 250 
years after the event, the flag of Australia represents a brutal yet living past that remains tightly 
interwoven with the political present. Graeme Gardner asserts, 
[T]he Australian flag represents a takeover of another people. It’s a flag that represents 
part of Australia. It’s a flag that was brought over by another country to impose on 
people who lived here for 60,000 or more years before their involvement … [the 
Australian flag] represents the butcher’s apron. Why should we be proud with that 
hanging over our head … I think the current flag should be put away … (qtd. in Bagnall 




2013: Flag of Grief: Karla Dickens. 
In 2013 Karla Dickens won the New South Wales Parliament Aboriginal Art Prize with 
her entry: Jan 26, Day of Mourning. “Dickens’ art is a valuable invitation to better understand 
personal and national histories” (Brodie 2015: 69). Dickens sees Australia Day, the national 
day of celebration, as a day of profound grief,  
[T]he majority of Australia celebrates January 26 by wrapping themselves in the red, 
white and blue flag, having barbecues and feeling proud to be young and free …  
I cringe, stay close to dear friends, do all I can not to leave the house and respectfully 
hold my grief – the grief for the old, grief for the continuous denial, grief for the 
disrespect, grief for the lack of acknowledgment and the poor choice of the day to 
celebrate (Dickens qtd. in Taylor 2013: 16). 
 
In an expression of her grief and as a way to draw attention to Australia’s ongoing race 
relations, Dickens transformed an old Australian flag which she had found at her local tip. She 
hand-stitched her grief onto the flag embellishing Australia’s most sacred national symbol with 
black crosses. 
 
Figure 28: Karla Dickens (2016) Flag of Grief. Vintage australia flag, thread, embroidered applique 280 x 124 cm. 
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Dickens states that her reactions to 26 January are intensely personal and that she draws 
strength from her peers, 
[C]ontemporary artists who work to spotlight issues and humanity give me the 
confidence and pride to keep speaking up in non-violent protest. Standing shoulder to 
shoulder allows me the space for a safe connection, where growth and support open 
doors for change if possible, or acceptance in the lack thereof (Dickens qtd. in Martin-
Chew 2015: 74).  
 
Jan 26, Day of Mourning “pays homage to all the lives that have been lost and respect for all 
the people who are lost” (Dickens qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15). I can count 82 black crosses, 
representing 82 lives lost, stitched onto the Federation star alone. Dickens notes that the 
defacement of the flag will be interpreted by some as provocative and she recognises that her 
message may be difficult for others to comprehend, 
I think it’s going to be hard for people to separate the icon of the Australian flag from 
the message about Australia Day and what that means for most of Indigenous Australia 
(Dickens qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15). 
 
Australia Day and national flag are synonymous. As a result, those who get caught up in the 
red, white and blue celebration may fail to understand exactly what 26 January means for most 
Indigenous people.130 The amalgamation of national flag and national day is further 
conceptualised by Ali Gumillya Baker, 
I remember the flag waving of Invasion Day and the young faces of invading white 
primitives drunkenly swaying, wrapped in the colonising flag. It is a frightening space 
for Aboriginal people. It is collective amnesia on a mass scale that is violent and 
possessive. It causes us Nungas131 to be invisible and visible all at once and without 
recognition of our sovereignty (qtd. in Wurm 2012: 6) 
 
The concept of being both visible and invisible is powerful and well describes the violent 
effects of the sight of inebriated flag-waving white people. To be both seen and unseen on 
Australia Day marks both the hypervisibility of the flag, but also, as Baker notes, it is a stark 
                                                 
130 A.B.Original’s song January 26 was written to educate white Australians about Australia Day. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZ9qeX4gUeo (A.B. Original 2016). 
131 A term of self-identification used by some South Australian Aboriginal people. 
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reminder of the “collective amnesia” that obliterates over two hundred years of massacres, 
policies, and enduring practices of enforced assimilation. Warren Mundine states,  
Indigenous people overwhelmingly feel anger, sadness and grief about the chain of 
events beginning on January 26, 1788. That was when our ancestors began losing their 
lands and their ability to speak their languages, practice ceremony and live under their 
kinship systems. And we, their descendants, lost our birthright (2017: 24). 
 
For Dickens, Baker and Mundine 26 January is a day of grief and pain. Each year this day is 
framed as a national celebration, yet for Indigenous people in this country 26 January signifies 
genocide: it recalls white violence and dispossession and is augmented by a flag which reigns 
as a perpetual, hypervisible signal that invokes the brutality of colonial dispossession and its 
associated trauma. Similar to the flag, the ongoing maintenance of 26 January effectively 
upholds both the symbolic and real exclusion of Indigenous people.132 As Mundine explains, 
[M]ost Indigenous people will never celebrate January 26. That doesn’t mean we won’t 
celebrate Australia. Quite the opposite … I want Australia Day moved – not because I 
don’t want to celebrate Australia, but because I do (2017: 24).  
 
Accepting first prize, Dickens states,  
[I]f my work was truly honouring the loss of lives, there would be no red, white and 
blue visible, the colour would have disappeared. All that would be seen would be black, 
a mass of hand-sewn black crosses (qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15).  
 
Here Dickens suggests that her embroidered black crosses fail to represent the scale of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander loss and also implies there can be no real justice until the 
red, the white and the blue have been expunged from the national symbol. As a final point 
Dickens draws attention to the flag-wavers who are imbued with double standards. She notes, 
                                                 
132 Since the time of writing several local councils have pushed for a new date to celebrate Australia Day. On 28 
January 2017 Freemantle City Council in Western Australia held a culturally inclusive “Not Australia Day” event. 
Most recently, in Victoria, Melbourne’s Yarra and Darebin councils have also opted to ‘change the date’. The 
Commonwealth Government’s rebuke was swift, it decried the action of the councils and revoked their authority 
to hold Citizenship ceremonies.  
251 
 
… [I]t’s interesting that it’s all right for patriotic Aussies to take ownership of that flag 
and wrap themselves in it during riots and aggression, but when it comes to a blackfella 
having a voice about that same flag, it comes as a shock … (qtd. in Maxwell 2013: 15). 
 
As noted throughout, for the colonising culture, flag, ownership and entitlement are 
synonymous. White people ‘rapt’ in their flag claim it as the sacrosanct symbol of nation; its 
status as everyday ‘banal’ object belies attention. White cultural ‘understandings’ of the flag 
emanate from complex relationships of power which have been constructed through the 
generations, ‘legitimised’ and endorsed by narratives, policy and practice that both privilege 
and normalise whiteness. The Australian flag is thus an investment, the incarnation of values 
and ideals that are central to hegemonic understandings of national identity. To protect the flag 
from dissent, Indigenous voices are kept silent. This is not an oversight, but a deliberate 
strategy of nation building and maintenance (Billig 2013). Through the medium of art 
Indigenous artists stridently re-script Australia’s hegemonic narratives, “[W]e are cultural 
activists and we state our cultural beliefs and position as indivisible from our political beliefs 
and position – always have, always will” (Perkins and Croft 1994: 15). This affirmation of 
resistance persists, and moving through the twenty first century Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander artists: 
will continue to look to the past, to their ancestral or cultural teachings or histories, to 
inform their present thoughts. Whether inspirational, informative or heartbreaking, their 
works open up and encourage conversations that are essential to dispel myths, 





Dis-Mantling the Symbol of Invasion and Oppression 
The final section of this chapter discusses some Indigenous perspectives which relate 
to a new flag built on the premise of inclusion. As noted in Chapter Two, a 1994 survey found 
that Aboriginal people were united in their calls for the removal of the Union Jack (Foley 
1996a). These demands remain strident,  
[W]ith the British Union Jack as part of the current flag it represents the European 
invasion of the land as far as Indigenous Australians are concerned. Indigenous leaders 
almost universally believe if there is ever to be true acceptance of the history and 
heritage of Indigenous Australia there has to be a new flag that features the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Island cultures (Stephen Hagan qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 22). 
 
Hagan states that a new national flag which incorporates Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
cultures would indicate that the nation finally accepts and recognises Indigenous history and 
cultures. Justin Mohamed asserts, 
I think the change needs to come … We need to have something there that represents 
all of us. I think Australia needs to recognise and have things that recognise Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24).  
 
The Mayor of Palm Island,133 Alf Lacy, notes the longstanding nature of the Australian flag 
debate and argues that it’s time to foreground a discussion about a new Australian flag that 
includes Indigenous perspectives. Lacy supports embedding the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander symbols into a new Australian flag however his primary concern is that of inclusion, 
“we need to make sure we get recognised somewhere in the flag debate in this country” (qtd. 
in Bagnall 2012: 22). Elverina Johnson contends, 
I think the flag should include whatever they need to include, whether it be the colours 
of the Indigenous people, the Aboriginal flag, but anything that will represent and speak 
out loud about the Indigenous people of Australia and make it inclusive of who we are 
here and that we exist (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23). 
                                                 
133 Palm Island is one of a group of sixteen islands located 65kms north of Townsville, Queensland. In 1914 Palm 
Island was gazetted as an Aboriginal reserve. From 1918, and for the next fifty years Aboriginal people from 
around Queensland who were deemed ‘uncompliant’ according to the draconian laws of the colonial state were 
incarcerated on Palm Island (Langton & Loos 2008). 
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Torres Strait Island Regional Mayor, Fred Gela states Australia’s flag ought not to be 
monocultural,  
we need something that can truly reflect the various cultures, the oldest true living 
cultures and race that sets Australia apart from any other country which is the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people … I think that is a debate in itself and it 
needs to happen (Gela qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23).  
 
Gela’s claim that discussion about the flag is important in its own right is noteworthy. 
Postponing the debate to ‘when Australia becomes a republic’ for example, or employing 
excuses such as ‘when the Queen dies’ are strategies designed to obstruct such calls. Dissenting 
voices are subsumed into bureaucratic discourse and power: the ‘special’ status of nation-as-
white-possession is reinforced. According to Graeme Gardner, 
[I]t is a new era now. There is a need to represent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people and that must be first and foremost, and whether anything else is put on there is 
a matter for the people. But I think the flag needs to be based on the original people of 
this land (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23). 
 
Graeme Mundine notes the importance of an on-going new flag discussion,  
… because we need to develop what it is to be Australian, and it’s obvious … a lot of 
people, not just Aboriginal people, don’t see it representing who we are as a nation” 
(qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 23). 
 
Jason King claims, “[W]e need a new symbol for Australia. Even if it is in the colours used it 
needs to represent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people” (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 24). 
Lisa Jackson-Pulver argues for a flag, whose redesign is premised on inclusion, 
it’s time we had a serious discussion about a new national flag ... it’s not inclusive 
because it is not including us. It is only acknowledging one small slice of history, a tiny 
little slice of history … I think we need to design a flag as a country that belongs to us 
all, and we can all stand there hand on chest and say, I believe (qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 
25). 
 
Consultation and collaboration with Indigenous people are central tenets for both Marianne 
Mackay and Richard Downs, 
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what needs to be done is that it’s a consultative process where everyone around 
Australia is involved and we come together as a nation to create a whole new flag that 
truly does represent the nation, not one that represents the history of the oppression of 
the Indigenous people (Mackay qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 25). 
 
I think changing the flag is going to happen. We have to go down that pathway. All 
Indigenous leaders and people throughout this country here will have to come up with 
a design or proposal. We will need to play a major part of the whole design and how 
the flag will look (Downs qtd. in Bagnall 2012: 27). 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided evidence regarding the associated meanings of the Australian 
national flag for some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. A broad-spectrum of 
responses indicate that for many Indigenous people the Australian flag in its current formation 
is both a source of anxiety and sadness and, it can be argued, a direct contributor to on-going 
health issues. Some twenty years ago, on the other side of the world, Aboriginal artists voiced 
their disdain for the national flag. While in Australia, at around the same time, despite 
overwhelming evidence calling for the removal of the Union Jack, Foley notes that the findings 
of her survey while useful could not be considered as indicative of the wider Aboriginal 
community. As stated, the breadth of reaction to the flag by Indigenous people has been 
overwhelming and it leads me to consider the wider sociological implications associated with 
the nation’s flag being understood by so many as a “nightmare”. According to the responses in 
this chapter, the emotions transmitted through the presence of the Australian flag are profound; 
they include rage, outrage, depression, grief and sorrow. The evidence presented in this chapter 
demonstrates that the flag, as an ever present effigy of genocide for many that manifests in all 
spheres of social and cultural activity constitutes a site of perpetual distress for many 





CONCLUSIONS: The Australian National Flag: A Re-View 
…take some time to think about the Aboriginal people who have had these jewels of life taken 
from them in the short history of our nation. I say this not to condemn your forebears, or 
yourselves, but to merely to state the truth. Even today the truth is hard to bear, such is the loss 
suffered by so many Aboriginal people, continuing to this day. The truth may help you 
understand your own life better and allow you to be a contributor to the challenges that lie 
ahead in making a settlement between our people within the nation. 
                                                   (Galarrwuy Yunupingu qtd. in Koori Mail 10 August 2016: 4).  
 
Nations are not static and this is a time of national and global tension where borders are 
anxiously maintained by fleets and forces bearing national flags. The instability of nation states 
continues to be countered by emerging new forms of nationalism that decree who and what 
‘we’ are and in turn, what constitutes ‘Australian-ness’. The flag plays a pivotal role in this 
discourse. For many non-Indigenous Australians, the banality of the flag with its colonial 
imprimatur will serve well these new nationalistic forces. For many Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people however, the flag will continue to serve as a reminder of the loss of 
sovereignty and the violence that continues to accompany colonial rule. As the nation’s most 
powerful symbol, the Australian national flag,  
symbolises a narrow slice of our history including a significant period when the rights 
of Australia’s indigenous peoples were overlooked. For this reason, most of Australia’s 
indigenous people cannot relate to the existing flag. For us, it symbolises dispossession 
and oppression (Lowitja O’Donoghue qtd. in Ausflag 2013).  
 
This thesis has demonstrated both the force and the fragility of the national flag, and by 
extension, the nation itself. From the outset of my inquiry, it became increasingly evident that 
a rigorous exploration of the flag’s dominant significations would provide the space required 
to identify other contexts and narratives. The thesis has considered the multitudinous ways in 
which the national flag signifies as a colonial emblem, and also, how this signification has 
256 
 
become “banal”, unremarkable, and naturalised to the extent that by and large the flag remains 
an unquestioned symbol, seamlessly embedded into the national landscape.  
This work began as an enquiry relating to the national flag’s representational force and 
its influence in the reproduction of national identity. My primary questions were how the flag 
makes meaning – or makes meaningful – the articulations of nation through its symbolism and, 
in particular, I was interested in how the flag is received and understood by Indigenous people. 
My research has been shaped by my migrant and life experience, and in particular was 
influenced by my return to education. As an adult female scholar I learnt how to critically 
reflect on the process of my migrant experience and was able to focus my attention on various 
questions, such as: “what is the flag of my birthplace doing here?” “How can this still be in the 
twenty first century?” 
Prior to commencing this work I had experienced increasing unease at every encounter 
with the national flag, a disquiet I was often at odds with as I noticed the flag flying almost 
everywhere in the public domain, in workplaces, and institutions. For me, the very presence of 
the flag became noticeable, remarkable, and worthy of exploration, a source of keen interest 
and indeed, concern, as my questions kept recurring. As I learned more about Australia’s 
colonial history, I wondered what the Union Jack might represent to Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. How did the Union Jack signify? Could the flag have a negative impact 
on health and wellbeing? Is the flag yet another reminder of the on-going consequences of 
colonisation? Or can such questions be construed as assumption based on how I imagine the 
significatory potential of the flag? This investigation was generated by these queries which 
refused to abate: they demanded answers. Over time, the simplicity of my questions revealed 
a complexity of discursive forces. It seemed to me that the omnipresence and omnipotence of 
the flag worked to construct national allegiance because of its “banal” acceptance. If, as my 
research demonstrated, the construction of Australian national identity is forged through such 
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powerful symbolism as a flag with the Union Jack in its canton, how then does this function 
for Indigenous people? Reflecting on my desire for answers, I have learned that my analysis of 
the Australian flag and its attendant and powerful symbolism for Australia as a nation state 
tends to provoke more questions than answers. However, what is disclosed in this work is the 
complex web of discourses that continues to produce and reproduce nation through the flag’s 
ubiquity and the sacrosanct status afforded to white history, white traditions and white 
sentiment.   
In order to provide a comprehensive review of the flag’s potential as a signifier, it was 
necessary to commence this investigation by tracing the construction of the modern nation and 
then progress to its maintenance. Chapter Three grounds the thesis in theories of nation creation 
and from this it emerges that the nation is both a discursive formation and an ideological 
construct which resides in the minds of its people as a “banal” materiality that is routinely 
accepted as natural. The true power of the nation, however, lies with its maintenance– without 
nationalism’s repetitive rites and rituals, the fragile concept of nation is compromised. In view 
of this, Chapter Four discusses the various ways in which the Australian nation is maintained. 
Australian nationalism is constructed and endorsed through various discourses and symbols 
which collaborate to mark and re-imagine the landscape as a white possession. 
Chapter Five investigates flags as material objects that signify in multitudinous ways. 
To facilitate my interrogation of the Australian national flag I have drawn from work in 
Australian Indigenous Studies, Critical Whiteness Studies, Vexillology and History. This 
multidisciplinary approach has allowed me to consider more broadly the implications of the 
national flag’s history and symbolism. As the Australian nation was constructed, so too was its 
flag and this thesis has highlighted how the racialised symbolic properties of the national 
symbol work to sustain a hegemonic, white-Australian national identity. Accordingly, the 
discursive framings of both flag and nation continue to perpetuate Anglo-centric perspectives. 
258 
 
The flag as the primary symbol of the Australian nation continues to dominate the imagi-nation 
and to promote the benefits of colonial traditions that sanction the perceived superiority of ‘our’ 
way of life, ‘our’ laws, and ‘our’ values.  
Throughout the thesis I have presented accounts of Indigenous resistance to the colonial 
project. These counter-narratives challenge dominant discourses of nation by exposing their 
fragility and their need for continual reinforcement; thus they make available spaces for 
intervention. In addition, the counter-narratives presented in this work demonstrate that despite 
insurmountable odds, the world’s oldest living culture has survived. Chapter Six presents 
research that examines resistance, and as such, underpins the final chapter. The responses and 
reactions to the national flag by Indigenous people comprises research that must be 
contextualised not as isolated incidents, but as expressions which are firmly grounded in nearly 
two hundred and fifty years of oppression.  
In exploring the discursive conditions that construct nation through the Australian 
national flag, my study has both responded to some of my initial questions while generating 
the potential for further inquiry. Early in this work I noted that there appeared to be a paucity 
of Indigenous perspectives to be found about the Australian flag in the literature. This gap 
however, was unexpectedly supplemented and enriched through the work of Indigenous artists 
whose perspectives have made a valuable contribution. To this end, the thesis has re-viewed 
the flag, and in so doing has made a small contribution to the extant scholarly knowledge that 
serves as critique. The consequences of flying an identity-exclusive national flag are yet to be 
fully realised as are the opportunities for further research which present in light of this work. I 
see many possibilities that will extend the capabilities of this literature based study including 
field-work and interviews.   
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This work provides a solid foundation from which to undertake post-doctoral work, 
further research will continue to reveal the pedagogical influence that the flag has on social 
cohesion and most importantly on the health and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people. In the discussion stages of my PhD it was suggested that I investigate what the 
Aboriginal flag represents to white Australians. This was, and is indeed an important proposal 
which warrants further investigation. To determine how informed white Australia is about the 
significations of the Aboriginal flag and what they ‘feel’ when they see it flying, or on clothing 
has a significant role to play in further understanding the socio-political force of Australian 
nationalism. Out of these conversations different understandings and ways of ‘knowing’ the 
flag may be generated. This in turn, will contribute to a shift in the discursive terrain which 
surrounds the Australian flag and its affiliated nation.  
As this research suggests, national flags are inextricably bound to the rise of the nation 
state and these emblems ‘wave’ to their citizens in ways that are not always apparent. For white 
Australia, flags serve a very particular purpose whereby the violence of colonial imposition 
can be overlaid and ‘forgotten’ by the fabric of a ‘new nation’ whose flags fly in their thousands 
to augment the necessary amnesia of nation building. This study also finds that there is a 
disconcerting duality wrapped up in the threads of nation which permits the Union Jack 
residency as point of honour. There is meaning attached to the Australian flag which goes 
beyond symbolism and the seemingly ‘straightforward’ understandings of what the national 
flag signifies in relation to history, sentiment and tradition. In light of this, I contend that a 
more inclusive and robust Australian national identity lies somewhere between the flags and 
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ULURU STATEMENT FROM THE HEART 
We, gathered at the 2017 National Constitutional Convention, coming from all points of the 
southern sky, make this statement from the heart:  
Our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tribes were the first sovereign Nations of the 
Australian continent and its adjacent islands, and possessed it under our own laws and 
customs. This our ancestors did, according to the reckoning of our culture, from the Creation, 
according to the common law from ‘time immemorial’, and according to science more than 
60,000 years ago.  
This sovereignty is a spiritual notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother nature’, 
and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who were born therefrom, remain 
attached thereto, and must one day return thither to be united with our ancestors. This link is 
the basis of the ownership of the soil, or better, of sovereignty. It has never been ceded or 
extinguished, and co-exists with the sovereignty of the Crown.  
How could it be otherwise? That peoples possessed a land for sixty millennia and this sacred 
link disappears from world history in merely the last two hundred years?  
With substantive constitutional change and structural reform, we believe this ancient 
sovereignty can shine through as a fuller expression of Australia’s nationhood.  
Proportionally, we are the most incarcerated people on the planet. We are not an innately 
criminal people. Our children are aliened from their families at unprecedented rates. This 
cannot be because we have no love for them. And our youth languish in detention in obscene 
numbers. They should be our hope for the future.  
These dimensions of our crisis tell plainly the structural nature of our problem. This is the 
torment of our powerlessness.  
We seek constitutional reforms to empower our people and take a rightful place in our own 
country. When we have power over our destiny our children will flourish. They will walk in 
two worlds and their culture will be a gift to their country.  
We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution.  
Makarrata is the culmination of our agenda: the coming together after a struggle. It captures 
our aspirations for a fair and truthful relationship with the people of Australia and a better 
future for our children based on justice and self-determination.  
We seek a Makarrata Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making between 
governments and First Nations and truth-telling about our history.  
In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard. We leave base camp and start our trek 
across this vast country. We invite you to walk with us in a movement of the Australian 





Why should I acknowledge the Union Jack? (Minungka McInerney qtd. in Koori Mail 23 





































‘Up the Country’ was published 9 July 1892 and Lawson’s understandings of the bush 
are explicit: 
Land where gaunt and haggard women live alone and work like men,  
Till their husbands, gone a-droving, will return to them again:  
Homes of men! if home had ever such a God-forgotten place,  
Where the wild selector’s children fly before a stranger’s face.  
Home of tragedy applauded by the dingoes’ dismal yell,  
Heaven of the shanty-keeper – fitting fiend for such a hell –   
And the wallaroos and wombats, and, of course, the curlew’s call –  
And the lone sundowner tramping ever onward through it all! 
                                                                                          (Lawson & Baglin 1988: 202). 
 
Paterson’s response, ‘In Defence of the Bush’ was published 23 July 1892: 
… you found the bush was dismal and a land of no delight, 
Did you chance to hear a chorus in the shearers’ huts at night? 
Did they ‘rise up, William Riley’ by the camp-fire’s cheery blaze? 
Did they rise him as we rose him in the good old droving days? 
And the women of the homesteads and the men you chanced to meet – 
Were their faces sour and saddened like the ‘faces in the street’, 
And the ‘shy selector children’ – were they better now or worse 
Than the little city urchins who would greet you with a curse? 
Is not such a life much better than the squalid street and square 
Where the fallen women flaunt it in the fierce electric glare, 
Where the sempstress plies her sewing till her eyes are sore and red 
In a filthy, dirty attic toiling on for daily bread? 
 
Did you hear no sweeter voices in the music of the bush 
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Than the roar of trams and buses, and the war-whoop of ‘the push’? 
Did the magpies rouse your slumbers with their carol sweet and strange? 
Did you hear the silver chiming of the bell-birds on the range? 
But, perchance, the wild birds’ music by your senses was despised, 
For you say you'll stay in townships till the bush is civilised. 
Would you make it a tea-garden and on Sundays have a band 
Where the ‘blokes’ might take their ‘donahs’, with a ‘public’ close at hand? 
You had better stick to Sydney and make merry with the ‘push’, 
For the bush will never suit you, and you’ll never suit the bush  






On National Flag Day 2000, former Governor General of Australia, Archbishop Peter 
Hollingworth delivered a eulogy to the Australian national flag.  
The Australian National Flag Prayer 
Almighty and most merciful God,  
the sovereign lord of all nations; 
we give you thanks for this our flag, 
the symbol of our nationhood, 
which we raise this day. 
We thank you for the abundant blessings 
you have bestowed upon us, 
for our heritage expressed in three crosses 
of St George, St Andrew and St Patrick, 
for the Southern Cross set in azure skies, 
the symbol of the land where we live today, 
and for the Federal star, 
the symbol of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
Finally we give thanks for the blessings of cultural diversity, 
For though we are many people, yet we are one nation, 
With one destiny under your good providence, 






The Burnum Burnum Declaration: England, 26th January 1988   
I Burnum Burnum, being a nobleman of ancient Australia do hereby take possession of 
England on behalf of the Aboriginal People. 
In claiming this colonial outpost, we wish no harm to you natives, but assure you that we are 
here to bring you good manners, refinement and an opportunity to make a Koopartoo – ‘a 
fresh start’. 
Henceforth, an Aboriginal face shall appear on your coins and stamps to signify our 
sovereignty over this domain. 
For the more advanced, we bring the complex language of the Pitjantjajara; we will teach you 
how to have a spiritual relationship with the Earth and show you how to get bush tucker. 
We do not intend to souvenir, pickle and preserve the heads of 2000 of your people, nor to 
publicly display the skeletal remains of your Royal Highness, as was done to our Queen 
Truganinni for 80 years. Neither do we intend to poison your waterholes, lace your flour with 
strychnine or introduce you to highly toxic drugs. 
Based on our 50,000 year heritage, we acknowledge the need to preserve the Caucasian race 
as of interest to antiquity, although we may be inclined to conduct experiments by measuring 
the size of your skulls for levels of intelligence. We pledge not to sterilize your women, not 
to separate your children from their families. 
We give an absolute undertaking that you shall not be placed into the mentality of 
government handouts for the next five generations but you will enjoy the full benefits of 
Aboriginal equality. 
At the end of two hundred years, we will make a Treaty to validate occupation by peaceful 
means and not by conquest. 
Finally, we solemnly promise not to make a quarry of England and export your valuable 
minerals back to the old country Australia, and we vow never to destroy three-quarters of 
your trees, but to encourage Earth Repair Action to unite people, communities, religions and 
nations in a common, productive, peaceful purpose. 
Burnum Burnum (qtd. in Norst 1999: 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
